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iii Abstract 
     The focus and reliance on a concept can often blind us from the real things that 
exist that cause a concept to come into being. Futility as a concept has been 
painstakingly debated in the literature. This study takes a different approach and seeks 
to discover complexity and dynamics of what happens during the course of the care of 
a child that leads to intractable conflicts. A single case study method is used. 
Participant interviews, chart review, and policy review were the sources of data 
explored. Transcriptions of interviews were inductively and deductively analyzed 
using Walker’s expressive-collaborative model of morality. The roles, relations, 
objects, and concepts were critically analyzed through systems theory and critical 
realism. The results of this study suggest reframing discussions away from definitions 
of futility and movement towards conceptualizations and dialogues that include the 
moral community, and relationships between and among clinical and organizational 
ethics. The study advocates a moral and ethical need for early identification of futility 
dynamics, continuity in communication, and a perspective about managing polarities 
and problems versus solving them.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
 
     The purpose of this study is to investigate and critically analyze the social structure 
around a case that evolves into an intractable conflict and evokes the concept of 
futility. This will help to construct the pieces of the system that make it possible for 
futility, or perceptions of futility to exist. The results from this study will help shape 
future methods of ethical inquiry around patient, provider, and hospital interactions as 
well as a method to investigate ethical issues that result from structural flaws in other 
areas of healthcare such as disparities and deficiencies.  
     The concept of futility has been the subject of much debate since the advancement 
of several life-sustaining technologies (LST). There have been many attempts to 
define futility and there is still no consensus as will be described below. This has 
resulted in decades of discussion, policies, statements, and articles. The recent 
“consensus” around this term is that we should abandon its use in non-literal 
applications (Bosslet et al., 2015). In this reorientation, futility is anchored back 
towards definitional clarity: futility as having no use in the current context such as 
CPR on a body in rigor mortis. However, clarifying futility and shifting the 
conversation towards using terms such as “potentially inappropriate” and “non-
beneficial” simply replaces the value-laden and subjective connotation of futility with 
another. There has been no attempt to analyze futility as an unintended consequence 
of a system or to examine what it is about the structures of healthcare where futility 
conflicts can exist? Healthcare providers operate within a social structure as a part of 
a system. Futility, or intractable conflict, provides a unique vantage point with which 
to investigate social structural causation that supports futility dynamics within 
healthcare. 
 
  
2 Background to the Study 
     The concept of futility seems specific to many clinicians but applying it 
objectively can be difficult and is the impetus for many conflicts (Bosslet et al., 2015; 
Brody & Halevy, 1995). Intractable conflict related to disputes over the conception of 
futility in pediatric critical care are normally considered individual dilemmas in 
decision-making between parent and provider. The focus is aimed at mitigating the 
conflict and coming to an amenable decision. Futility, however, is a social 
phenomenon and concept that is dependent upon a particular context. Futility is 
necessarily dependent upon a particular viewpoint within a particular context of 
society’s ability to provide the care deemed futile as well as competing viewpoints, 
yet the bulk of the futility literature in the past few decades has focused on defining it 
as an objective measure. For example, if we didn’t have a sophisticated electrical-
power grid, many of the treatments referenced in futility debates would not be 
practically feasible. 
     The concept of futility has become viewed as imprecise, ambiguous, and even 
subjective (Bonanno, 1995). Additionally, the goals of a treatment can be ambiguous 
enough to make it difficult to apply true futility. Nevertheless, it has been the focus of 
much discussion and has led to the initiation of “futility” policies in health care 
institutions (Frankel, Goldworth, Rorty, & Silverman, 2005). 
     Academic discourse on futility coincides with the implementation and innovation 
of the mechanical ventilator, as well as the dialysis machine (Kaufman, 2015). The 
earliest published literature on futility appear as early as 1988, which seems to be 
when an initiative to define futility began (Carnevale, 1998). The concept of futility, 
however, is much older. Hippocrates discussed it saying that to “…attempt futile 
treatment is to display an ignorance that is allied to madness (Schneiderman, 2011, 
p.124).” Using this history as a starting point, Schneiderman argues that futility has 
  
3 both a quantitative and qualitative component (Schneiderman, 2011; Schneiderman, 
Jecker, & Jonsen, 1990). Schneiderman, Jecker, & Jonsen argue in 1990 that there is a 
common sense, though not objective and value free, definition of quantitative futility 
where if the treatment has not worked in 100 cases it will not work again (1990). 
Schneiderman (2011) sought a “reasonable consensus” approach as opposed to an 
absolute knowledge. In contrast, qualitative futility is defined as a situation where the 
effect of a treatment cannot be appreciated as a benefit to the patient (Schneiderman, 
2011). The definitions of medical futility have also included concepts such as 
patient’s goals, prolonging life, and physiologic effect on the body (Schneiderman, 
2011).  
     Truog, Brett, & Frader (1992) discuss the addition of “futility” to the bioethical 
lexicon in a New England Journal of Medicine editorial titled “The Problem with 
Futility.” The authors discuss several limitations in how the concept of futility is 
being utilized. They find three paradigms of futility: cases involving persistent 
vegetative states, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and organ-replacement 
technology (R D Truog, Brett, & Frader, 1992). They find that the use of futility in 
these paradigms seems to be an obscuring concept and that the ambiguities and 
assumptions that are obscured can be grouped into problems of subjective values and 
probability of treatment success (R D Truog et al., 1992, pp. 1560–1561). Problems 
with value are the most apparent test to physiologic futility as it requires some set 
goal that seems to shift depending on how or what a person values quality of life. 
    Probability, as explained by Schneiderman (2011), is problematic too because it 
doesn’t seem to articulate issues of variance in patient factors such as comorbidities, 
ability to sustain treatment, etc. Resource allocation is also mentioned here by the 
authors as problematic because futility arguments conceal “…many statistical and 
value-laden assumptions, whereas strategies based on resource allocation force these 
  
4 assumptions to be stated explicitly (R D Truog et al., 1992, p. 1562).” They also 
contend that futility will simply have no impact on making resource allocation 
arguments because they will have little impact as these cases are relatively sparse.  
     Truog, Brett, & Frader conclude with a discussion of social consensus and report 
the professional societies the Hastings Center, the Society of Critical Care Medicine 
(SCCM), and the President’s Commission positions (at the time) on keeping patients 
who are in a persistent vegetative state alive as being a misuse of resources and 
should be removed from life support (R D Truog et al., 1992). Their analysis leads 
them to conclude that the concept of futility “…generally fails to provide an ethically 
coherent ground for limiting life-sustaining treatment…” except for very narrow cases 
of physiologic futility (R D Truog et al., 1992, p. 1563). Finally, they argue for a 
removal of futility from the professional language of bioethics because it is 
undermined by clinical variability and differing values (ibid, 1992). In addition, the 
focus or response around futility in resource allocation arguments conceal real issues 
and arguments that may have a more important place in the debate over proper use of 
resources.  
     Brody & Halevy (1995) are the first to question the validity of the concept of 
futility itself. The authors develop a framework of eight types of futility definitions 
and then analyze these definitions. The also analyze statements from three 
professional medical organizations, The American Medical Association (AMA), The 
American College of Physicians (ACP), and the American Heart Association 
(AHA)(Brody & Halevy, 1995). Essentially, the definitions of futility they find are 
physiologic-not physiologically feasible, imminent demise-person will die, lethal 
condition-condition will not change with treatment requested, and qualitative-
subjective quality of life (Brody & Halevy, 1995, p. 128). They conclude their 
thorough analysis by arguing that while there may certainly be “…patients whose 
  
5 condition is so poor that life prolonging interventions are qualitatively futile…” but 
that: 
…Advocates of the various conceptions of futility have 
not given enough thought to the conditions that must be 
satisfied by any adequate conception of futility that 
could be used as the basis for a unilateral limiting of life 
prolonging interventions (Brody & Halevy, 1995, p. 
142). 
 
In addition to this problem, Brody & Halevy also put forth that much of the 
discussion around futility appears to be motivated by concerns of resource allocation 
and that these discussions would be better focused on the resource itself rather than 
futility (1995, p. 142). 
     More recently the debate around futility has taken a new course in a multi-societal 
policy statement from the American Thoracis Society (ATS), American Association 
of Critical-care Nurses (AACN), American College of Chest Physicians (ACCP), 
European Society of Intensive Care Medicine (ESICM), and SCCM (colloquially 
known as the “ATS” statement) (Bosslet et al., 2015). This was followed up with a 
society specific statement from SCCM (Kon et al., 2016). The multi-society statement 
listed four recommendations with two of those dealing with the concept of futility. 
The authors of the statement argue for the use of the term “potentially inappropriate” 
rather than “futile” when there is at least some chance of an effect being 
accomplished (Bosslet et al., 2015, p. 1319). In another recommendation, they list 
what they call “less-common situations” such as strict futility and legally proscribed 
and/or discretionary treatments (Bosslet et al., 2015, p. 1319). The ATS and SCCM 
statements highlight a shift in thought on futility and a change in what we consider 
“futile” versus “inappropriate.” Kon et al. (2016) further adapt this to the ICU setting 
and determine that interventions are inappropriate when there is: 
 …No reasonable expectation that the patient will 
improve sufficiently to survive outside the acute care 
setting, or when there is no reasonable expectation that 
  
6 the patient’s neurologic function will improve 
sufficiently to allow the patient to perceive the benefits 
of treatment. (2016, p. 1772) 
 
    This shift, from futility to inappropriate interventions, shows a temporal discussion 
from the 1980’s to the present. This evolution has two relevant processes, one is the 
changing of our thought on futility and the other is the changing nature of technology 
and abilities that influenced what we consider futile. The difficulty in determining 
futility is not surprising given the relational complexity that occurs around these 
cases. There is not only patient or surrogates and providers but “…hospitals, public 
and private insurers, ethics committees…(Bonanno, 1995, p. 155).” Patient autonomy 
is a principle that overrides many others and has been further complicated by right-to-
die principles in addition to “…technological innovation that sustains body functions 
for longer periods…(Bonanno, 1995, p. 156).” The concept of futility has been 
shaped by these issues which are also intricately tied to other problems facing our 
healthcare. In fact, I believe, and will hope to show, that issues such as futility are 
unintended consequences of specific mechanisms in our healthcare structure. 
     Analyses and reports of futility in the literature focus on the instance that futility is 
invoked, which is always by clinicians. The common point of analysis is focused on 
the decision-making around the care that is deemed futile rather than the preceding 
interactions, roles, and responsibilities. Ethical issues that nurses, and other 
caregivers, are faced with often have systemic or structural causes due to unintended 
consequences of those systems or flaws in the structures within healthcare. Futility is 
no different, regardless of the dispute over the concept itself, the feeling exists, and 
the causes of this feeling are often the powerlessness of persons on either side given 
the insurmountable causality of the system. In the case of futility, the system operates 
in such a way where futility exists; so why is this? 
  
7      An example is the case of Baby K, a child with anencephaly and dependent upon 
LST. Baby K’s mother disagreed with the care team, who recommended withdrawal 
and do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders. Baby K’s mother believed further rescue care 
and mechanical ventilation was not futile and had benefits for the child. In this case 
there is a disagreement over whether further care was futile, which became a 
judgment of value. However, there is a practical issue of what can be maintained 
reasonably in society. Someday anencephalic children may be kept alive without great 
burdens. However, today there are large disparities where the cost of a child breathing 
brings forward several moral and practical questions such as the dichotomy between 
ventilating an anencephalic child and enough resources and care for a child with 
asthma.  
     In pediatrics, the issues around futility are especially complex due to the status of 
children in our society- the concept of an open future (Feinberg, 1980), best interests 
and harms (Bester, 2018; Diekema, 2004), and decision-making (Brunnquell & 
Michaelson, 2016). Though there have been many attempts to define, identify, and 
respond to futility, it remains present and problematic with no formal resolution 
(Helft, Siegler, & Lantos, 2000). Even attempts to move beyond the concept have not 
removed it from the health care lexicon (Bosslet et al., 2015; Brody & Halevy, 1995; 
R D Truog et al., 1992). It seems clear that intractable conflict must or typically exists 
prior to futility disputes or publication around futility discourse. 
     I believe that cases of intractable conflict around conceptions of futility are not 
unique and individual dilemmas, and are instead symptoms of structural flaws in the 
American healthcare system (Chambliss, 1996). My larger hypothesis is that futility is 
a result of a system where value and obligation are poorly distributed and leads to 
problems of futility and disparity. The way the social structures and systems around 
healthcare work generates this dichotomy. An instance of a futility dispute is a 
  
8 breakdown of the system, a critical or pathological situation that provides an 
opportunity to study the structures and mechanisms around it (Danermark, Ekstrom, 
Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002, p. 104).  
      
Research Question and Specific Aims 
     The immediate aims of this research are to investigate the social phenomenon of 
intractable conflict invoking futility in pediatric critical care with the question “what 
is happening within the social structure around a case as it progresses to intractable 
conflict?” Focusing on attempts to mitigate conflict after it has happened excludes the 
voices of those existing around the case before, during, and after. The roles, relations, 
responsibilities, concepts, policies, and artifacts are important to understanding how a 
case of intractable conflict develops and happens. This research will expand 
knowledge by how it analyzes these types of problems and in particular; through an 
examination into what is happening prior to, during, and after conflict begins around 
conceptions of futility.       
     The question that drives this research project is: “what must exist for this to 
happen?” Specifically, what is happening within, among, and around the social 
structure of a case that progresses to intractable conflict? The second question asks 
what is happening within and among members of the social structure involved which 
must be present for this to happen, and what concepts, policies, roles, obligations, and 
artifacts work to contribute to an intractable conflict? 
Specific Aim 1: perform a critical retrospective longitudinal case study on a single 
case of intractable conflict that elicits the concept of futility. 
Specific Aim 2: provide critical analysis of chart review, interviews, and policy data 
relevant to the specific case. 
  
9 Specific Aim 3: perform ethical analysis using Margaret Urban Walker’s expressive-
collaborative model of morality. 
Specific Aim 4: extrapolate principles from this case to aid in evaluating other cases. 
 
Theoretical Foundation 
 
     “What must exist for this to happen?” This question is inspired by systems theory 
and critical realism whose founding tenet is the question: “What must the world be 
like for this to occur or to be intelligible (Mingers, 2014, p. 17)?” This question, 
which is integral to critical realism, the philosophy of Roy Bhaskar, is also a 
fundamental idea for systems thinking and complex adaptive systems theory related to 
the notion of initial conditions (Bhaskar, 2000; Schneider & Somers, 2006). Rather 
than looking at outcomes as direct effects of some variable, critical realism insists that 
there are mechanisms at work that are often unseen or go unnoticed that influence a 
larger set of structures to produce outcomes. Systems thinking also has a basis in an 
anti-reductive theme which believes:  
…We cannot explain the behavior of objects and 
entities purely in terms of the nature and constitution of 
their parts or components. Rather, the parts are related 
together in such a way that the whole has behaviors 
or…properties that are distinct from and irreducible to, 
the properties of the parts.  -Mingers, 2015, p. 29  
 
     An expansion of the first research question is “what must exist for a case of 
medical futility or dispute over futility to happen?” There is a need to identify the 
structures around cases of futility and the distinctions, systems, relationships, and 
perspectives to understand why they happen (Cabrera & Colosi, 2008). In this case, 
structure means the systems, components, relationships, and processes that surround 
and affect a phenomenon. Andrew Sayer, a social scientist working in realist 
philosophy, also conceptualizes structure as “…a set of internally related objects or 
practices…(Sayer, 1992, p. 92).” Related objects or practices can include 
  
10 departments, people, processes, and/or resources (Easton, 2010). Within the context 
of a pediatric case there is nurses, aides, physicians, ventilators, parents, concepts, 
policies, and practices that are all connected and related that make up a system. This 
messy intertwining that makes up healthcare fits well within the definition and 
elements of a complex adaptive system (Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001; Schneider & 
Somers, 2006).  
A complex adaptive system is a collection of individual 
agents with freedom to act in ways that are not always 
totally predictable, and whose actions are 
interconnected so that one agent’s actions changes the 
context for other agents. (Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001, p. 
625) 
Therefore, there is a need to not only conduct an ethical examination around 
intractable conflict invoking futility, but a critical systems analysis as well. 
     There are these structures that exist, such as in a hospital, where roles exist 
independent of the person in the role. That person is transformed by and, in turn, 
transforms that role, so there are both inherent and particular qualities. This is 
similarly conceived by systems theorists who view a system as “…a perceived whole 
whose elements “hang together” because they continually affect each other over 
time…(Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, & Smith, 1994, p. 90).” Systemic structure for 
systems thinkers is defined as “…the pattern of interrelationships among key 
components of the system…” to be distinguished from an organizational chart or 
work flow diagram (Senge et al., 1994, p. 90). This is better described as a complex 
adaptive system through complexity theory, a type of systems theory (Mingers, 2014; 
Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001). The relationships between the actors and objects make up 
a structure. The internal relations, roles, and objects are of great importance when 
investigating futility in the pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) because how, when, 
and why these situations happen are determined by the structures in place that make it 
possible for them to exist. 
  
11      The relationship of nurse-patient-doctor-administrator-parent-etc. exists prior to 
the individual entering that role. These roles, through their relations, create a 
structure, which has causal powers that may determine what happens independent of 
an individual action or decision. The context of this structure, as well as its historical 
and pertinent context, needs to be identified and analyzed.  
     I am guided by feminist ethical naturalism and Margaret Urban Walker’s view of 
moral theory as situated discourse, “…a culturally specific set of texts and practices 
produced by individuals and communities in particular places at particular times 
(Walker, 2007, p. 4).” It is not enough to look at only nurses, or only physicians, 
rather we must analyze and understand the entire structure of the hospital system and 
the relations that make up this structure related to the phenomena in question. 
Knowing this structure is important to finding out how or why it is contributing to the 
phenomena in question (Mingers, 2014, p. 186). This approach is used by systems 
analysis and based in systems theory and critical realism (Mingers, 2014).  
     Examining a case from within the hospital is one step toward a larger goal of 
putting together the pieces that make up the whole of this issue, which would also 
require assessment of legal, political, and cultural institutions. I believe pediatric 
critical care adds an additional layer of complexity as opposed to adult critical care 
due to the age of the patient and the issues of best interests versus patient wishes. It 
seems odd to me that we live in a world that produces futility debates while at the 
same time showing evident disparities in health outcome and access. I believe 
questions around how futility can exist along with disparity must be answered to 
inform appropriate and reasonable policy interventions. 
 
 
Significance of the Study 
  
12 Moral and ethical challenges in nursing…are systemic 
features of the contemporary hospital; they are a normal 
part of its operations rather than external or accidental.  
(Chambliss 1996, 180) 
 
     Daniel Chambliss, a professor of sociology, noted the above insights in his book, 
Beyond Caring: Hospitals, Nurses, and the Social Organization of Ethics, in which he 
reported his extensive field research inside hospitals (1996). Although this was 
published in 1996, there has been little discourse since then around ethical issues as 
structurally related. In addition, discussion of moral and ethical challenges in nursing 
is relegated to intra-professional discussions, and mostly only in education. 
Chambliss’s insights deserve attention, particularly when we are faced with growing 
issues around futility and disparity. It is worth investigating these instances as 
resultant from complex structures.  
     I take Chambliss’s statement about these challenges as part of the “contemporary 
hospital” farther upstream and argue that these challenges are systemic features of the 
contemporary American healthcare “system,” of which the hospital is a major part 
(Chambliss, 1996, p. 180). Viewing, and subsequently intervening, on ethical issues 
through the frame of “difficult dilemmas” ignores the existence of the structural flaws 
that contribute to their existence. Nurses, as caregivers and advocates, are constantly 
running into these types of structural flaws that create moral and ethical challenges to 
their work. Nurses are often repeatedly confronted with systemic failures that 
contribute to moral distress. Viewing these failures as individual dilemmas only 
allows them to continue and cause more distress. In this conceptualization, the 
distress a public health nurse feels from powerlessness over health disparities in their 
patients is like the distress felt by ICU nurses faced with care that is felt to be futile. 
We have reached a point in our society and our profession in which we are obligated 
to confront systemic causes and structural flaws of the institution of healthcare and 
  
13 how it not only affects patients but also affects nurses and other agents operating with 
that institution, even if inadvertently.  
     I hope to show and understand how many problems in healthcare, such as futility, 
are socially and structurally created and abetted by how value and obligation are 
perceived and distributed. Just as “…an inequitable distribution system [has] the power 
to cause poverty…” (Mingers 2014, 19) so too does a poor distribution system in 
healthcare have the power to cause futility and disparity; something already evident in 
the US healthcare system (Cutler, 2018). Investigating the social structures and systems 
around an outcome will aid in emergence of the causal powers and liabilities that lead 
to certain types of events or outcomes (Easton, 2010).      
       
Barriers to progress 
The ethical problems of nursing…are neither random 
occurrences nor are they individual dilemmas of 
particular nurses. They are, rather, structurally created 
and occur in bulk. (Chambliss 1996, 117) 
 
…Ethical problems in health care are inseparable from 
the organizational and social settings in which they 
arise.  
(Chambliss 1996, 182) 
 
     Historically, futility has been discussed as a singular phenomenon that occurs at 
some specific timepoint, just as disparity and equity issues are often relegated to 
patient irresponsibility, or “non-compliance.” In this way we look at futility, or non-
compliance as unique and individual cases rather than complicated social 
phenomenon. Daniel Chambliss saw this in 1996 during his investigation into the 
social organization of ethics in hospitals. Chambliss disagrees with this view of 
ethical problems in isolation, showing how ethical problems such as futility are 
structurally created and inseparable from the social world in which they are found 
  
14 (Chambliss, 1996). In futility discourse, the focus has been on the disagreement, 
interventions, and policies aimed at futility going forward rather than focusing on the 
structures, objects, and relations that are necessary for the phenomenon to exist.  
     A critical barrier towards progress in resolving issues of futility and improving our 
health systems is the normative view of health outcomes as unconnected cases in need 
of intervention rather than symptoms of poorly functioning systems in need of 
analysis and change. Margaret Urban Walker shares a similar view to Chambliss and 
believes that morality is social and contextual (Walker, 2003). Normative ethical 
principles continue in the tradition of, what Walker terms, the theoretical-juridical 
model that examines outcomes as unconnected, isolated, and non-relational, able to be 
subsumed under specific principles (Walker, 2007). There is a need to look beyond 
normative bioethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, and maleficence and 
towards how caregivers and providers view their moral spaces within their roles and 
identities and how they accept, deflect, and assign responsibility (Walker, 2007). 
     While interventions aimed at resolving futility disputes are good and necessary, we 
must at the same time be looking at the upstream root causes in the systems and 
structures that are causing them to come into being. There is a need to look at what is 
going on for a conflict like this to happen, how individuals involved navigate the 
moral space and context they find themselves in. The normative viewpoint that is 
used to analyze ethical problems only works towards mitigation of the further 
sequalae and not towards the spaces within which the ethical issue arises. We must 
remove the barrier that normative ethical analysis leads us to and begin to look at 
ethical issues as resultant from structural flaws.  
     This critical barrier to analyzing ethical issues as structural flaws has implications 
towards the progress in American health care. This research will have significance not 
only in how we examine and respond to intractable conflicts around futility but how 
  
15 nurses can analyze and respond to ethical problems that are systemic and create 
barriers towards progress in care.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The current discourse on futility in pediatric critical care1 
Literature Search Strategy 
     The literature review used OVIDMedline, CINAHL, EthicsShare, and Google 
Scholar. The strategy was to look for the keyword futility with pediatric intensive 
care. The review specifically aimed to assess futility in critical or intensive care areas 
of pediatrics in the United States, inclusion criteria were formulated accordingly. All 
articles not written by an American scholar or researcher were excluded. When 
articles were found where there were sectioned commentaries from different scholars, 
the commentaries from American institution-affiliated scholars were used. To assess 
futility in a structural way it must be analyzed within its setting. American healthcare 
is arguably like no other, and social and cultural differences are important.  
     All articles not involving pediatric critical or intensive care were excluded. In 
addition to this, articles about neonatal futility were also excluded because of the 
differing nature of a newborn neonate and a pediatric patient. Several articles 
discussed “infants” and in-depth reading was done to ensure the setting was a PICU 
versus a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). Issues of viability are vastly different 
than survivability and futility in the pediatric patient. A neonate in the NICU has, 
typically, never left the hospital where a pediatric patient admitted to a PICU has or 
has progressed to issues beyond neonatal viability. This small distinction has larger 
implications around futility discussions and how staff and parents conceive them. No 
year limits were set since the intention is to assess the literature over time.  
                                               
1 A version of this literature review which was the preliminary written exam to this 
dissertation was published under Wolfe, Ian. (2019) A Critical Analysis of Futility 
Discourse in Pediatric Critical Care. Journal of Pediatric Ethics. 1(2) 82-90. 
 
  
17      The search strategy utilized for this review was eclectic due to the specific nature 
of the subject. There is a paucity of literature on futility in pediatric critical care 
compared with neonatal care where there is abundance. Futility in general has been 
discussed more so in the past few years culminating in the “American Thoracic 
Society multi-society policy statement” (Bosslet et al., 2015). Overall, futility 
literature is far more abundant in adult literature. This is an interesting finding that 
would lead one to conclude either that there is less of a discussion in pediatrics or that 
there is a hesitation to use a concept like futility.  
     The initial search performed with a librarian yielded many results in Ovid 
Medline, CINAHL, and Ethicshare, but few that met inclusion criteria. A more 
exhaustive search was done once results were assessed for inclusion from title and 
abstract. Google Scholar was searched to exhaustion using several combinations of 
the terms “pediatric,” “futility,” “medical futility,” “intensive care,” “critical care,” 
and “PICU” and results were searched and collected until a page of results no longer 
contained relevant results. Articles were read to assess the inclusion criteria was met 
in the text. Some articles were found to mention futility in the title but not discuss it at 
all in the text, these were excluded. In addition to this, articles were found to discuss 
futility and meet inclusion by text but not by title and abstract. Figure 1 displays the 
PRISMA2 flowchart describing the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2 Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA).  Moher, D., 
Liberati, A., Tetzlaff, J., Altman, D. G., & PRISMA Group. (2009). Reprint--preferred reporting items 
for systematic reviews and meta-analyses: the PRISMA statement. Physical therapy, 89(9), 873. 
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        Figure 1. PRISMA Flowchart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Analysis and Synthesis 
     Seventeen articles met inclusion for critical review and were kept for synthesis 
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19 inclusion and then read again for summative content analysis prior to synthesis.3 This 
type of content analysis is described by Hsieh, H.F. & Shannon (2005). Summative 
content analysis was used to assess content related to three contexts: how futility was 
conceptualized, the tensions that existed, and the variables present around the issue of 
futility being discussed. After review of included results, articles that were excluded 
were reviewed again to ensure they did not meet the inclusion criteria. Summative 
content analysis was performed on included material. Initial analysis was performed 
for the purposes of assessing the entirety of the results. This was followed by second 
analysis to identify codes and themes. Several articles were of the “round-table” or 
“discussion” format where there were different view-points or commentaries by 
different scholars. The content was coded to each author when delineated in the text 
as distinct. Three articles did not discuss the concept of futility and in Wightman, 
Largent, Del Beccaro, & Lantos (2014), only two of the authors discussed it. In Gunn 
et al. (2004) only the American authors were analyzed. Overall, four codes were 
developed in relation to the conception of futility; futility as an unclear concept, 
futility as against medical standards, futility as value judgments, and futility decisions 
as not unilateral. There was a total of seventeen authors with these codes. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 This type of content analysis is described by (Hsieh, H.F., & Shannon, 2005). 
Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. Qualitative Health Research, 15, 
1277-1288 
 
  
20         Table 1. Summative Content Analysis Description 
Futility Codes Number of Authors* Years Published Profession(s)** 
Unclear 4 1993, 1995, 1995, 1995 
MD,  
JD 
JD 
PhD  
Against medical 
standards 4 
1994, 1992, 
1990, 2014 
JD 
PhD JD, MD 
SJ PhD, MD, JD 
RN, JD, PhD 
Subjective/Value 
judgments 5 
2006, 2001, 
2002, 2015, 
2004 
PhD 
SJ PhD 
SJ PhD 
MD, PhD 
MD 
Not unilateral 4 2014, 2004, 1993, 2014 
MD, MD 
MD 
MD JD 
MD 
        *Authors counted either individually or as a group based on presentation of article.  
         **Commas separate authors coded as a collective, speaking as one.  
      
Futility as an unclear concept 
     Futility as an unclear concept was described by four authors all in the 1990’s. 
Ackerman (1993) is a Medical Doctor (MD) writing a commentary in Critical Care 
Medicine, the journal of SCCM. In reviewing some studies about limitation of care 
and resuscitation in the PICU, Ackerman (1993) found that it was unclear how 
determinations to limit care were met. In addition, Ackerman comments that the 
decision-making process in these studies, or how these decisions and/or 
determinations were made, were not detailed though there is a presumption that some 
type of severity of illness determination was used (Ackerman, 1993). However, the 
use of futility as a concept in the studies Ackerman is discussing is unclear and seems 
to embrace a combination of subjective and objective data combined.  
     Bonanno (1995) is a Doctor of Jurisprudence (JD) writing in the Annals of Health 
Law using the case of Baby K to explore the concept of medical futility. He also gives 
an analysis of medial futility in pediatrics as an “imprecise” term (Bonanno, 1995, p. 
154). Bonanno writes that medical futility as a concept emerged from the struggle for 
comprehensive health care combined with the technological imperative, reduction in 
  
21 physician authority in decisions, and cost-containment pressures (1995, p. 154). 
Origins of the debate around futility and construction of the concept, he goes on to 
say, has “…roots in right-to-die principles, [and] technological innovation that 
sustains body functions for longer periods of time… (ibid., p.156).”  
     Bonanno details some factors that are present around futility such as the notion of 
“…an emerging distrust of doctors making medical decisions…” because of 
modernization in medicine away from the private house calls to the production line 
model, which erodes the doctor-patient relationship (Bonanno, 1995, p. 156-157). He 
believes that with the empowerment of patients who have more decision-making 
authority, doctors are turning to other strategies to regain power and control, and this 
leads some to hang “…treatment decisions on the concept of medical futility 
(Bonanno, 1995, p. 157).” Bonanno (1995) also admits there may be an implicit or 
explicit links to futility debates from financial concerns (p. 157). However, Bonanno 
(1995) reports that medical futility as a concept is poorly defined, misused, and very 
subjective (p. 157). Bonanno (1995) suggests that some uses of futility are value-
laden, whether rightly or wrongly. He concludes that there is no definitional 
consensus or objectivity in futility and that disagreements will occur leading this issue 
to be deliberated in the courts (1995, p. 160).  
     Flannery (1995) is a JD writing an analysis of the Baby K case in the Journal of 
Law, Medicine & Ethics. Flannery, it is noted at the end of the article, was a partner 
in the law firm that represented the mother of Baby K. Flannery starts out her 
reflection by discussing “futility” and “medically inappropriate care” as vague 
concepts (Flannery, 1995, p. 11). Mechanical ventilation being the main issue in care 
for Baby K, Flanner goes on to state that it is “…neither futile nor medically 
inappropriate…” because it treated the respiratory distress of the child and thus 
preserved the child’s life (Flannery, 1995, p. 11). Flannery discusses that the 
  
22 judgment of futility in this case was viewed, by the court, as a subjective judgment 
based in values and thus not within the expertise of physicians (1995, p. 11). The 
concept of ethics is not given an explicit definition by Flannery, instead she discusses 
the absence of clarity on futility in addition to confusion over who gets to determine 
it. 
     Post (1995) is another JD writing on the case of Baby K in the Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics. He is also a PhD researcher and ethicist who argues for the free 
exercise of religion. In this article he argues four claims, two of which are concerned 
with futility. In one, Post argues that the free exercise clause of the U.S. constitution 
should not be overridden “…in the name of a concept so vague as futility... (Post, 
1995, p. 20).” The other claim is that the free exercise of religion should be a 
component of any futility debates and religious accommodation ought to be included 
in any futility policies, whether societal or institutional (Post, 1995). Post is not 
disagreeing that futility is concept that exists, nor is he stating there should not be 
futility policies, instead he is arguing for religious accommodation using his argument 
that the concept itself is too unclear (Post, 1995). 
 
Futility as against medical standards 
     Futility as a concept describing treatment against medical standards was described 
by four authors ranging from 1990 to 2014). Annas (1994) is a JD holding a master’s 
in public health (MPH). This article discusses the case of Baby K and examines the 
case through the courts. This case challenged the idea of futile care as held by 
physicians and hospitals largely due to a vague application of the emergency 
treatment and active labor act (EMTALA). The issue brought forth was how 
EMTALA applied to the hospital’s obligation to resuscitate Baby K as she presented 
in an emergency. There was also a question around discriminatory application of 
  
23 EMTALA regarding Baby K’s disability. The hospital deemed further care for Baby 
K’s episodes of respiratory distress futile because her main issue was anencephaly 
and instituting mechanical ventilation would not improve this condition. Annas 
(1994) uses this case to examine many issues and highlights key points regarding how 
we conceive futility and what we do with parental request. He argues that a parent’s 
request “…for treatment does not alter the physician’s obligation to exercise 
reasonable medical judgment (Annas, 1994, p. 1544).” Instead medical standards 
must be followed by the physician, not whatever the parents request. Treatments can 
have a physiologic effect while still not being in the best interests for that patient 
“…as a person, not on the patient as reduced to a group of separate organ systems 
(Annas, 1994, p. 1544).” Annas makes the distinction between a treatment that may 
have some effect versus one that falls within standards of medical practice; if it can’t 
meet the latter then it may be futile. 
     Lawrence Nelson, a JD as well as a PhD, and Robert Nelson an MD, also adopt 
futility as a concept meaning against medical standards (1992). These authors appear 
to be the first, noted by this review, to separate this concept into two different terms, 
that of “strict futility” and “disproportionate burden” (Nelson & Nelsom, 1992). Strict 
futility, they argue, should be used when “…treatment will fail to reverse a 
physiologic disturbance that will lead to the child’s proximate death…” such as CPR 
in a decapitated person (Nelson & Nelson, 1992, p. 428). They admit that any other 
use of futility is a value judgment.  
     Disproportionate burden is used by these authors as another form of futility that 
has two parts. First, they argue that a treatment is futile if it “…will not, with 
reasonable medical certainty, preserve a physiologic function necessary to maintain 
life…” again with the child’s death being proximate (Nelson & Nelson, 1992, p. 428). 
As in strict futility, the authors say that the physician is under “…no ethical or legal 
  
24 obligation to provide or even offer…” care that falls into these categories, regardless 
of demands by parents (Nelson & Nelson, 1992, p. 429). The second part of 
disproportionate burden is that treatment can be deemed futile if it “…will not serve 
any useful purpose for the patient, may cause the patient needless pain and suffering, 
and does not achieve the goals of curing and restoring the patient to an acceptable 
quality of life (Nelson & Nelson, 1992, p. 429).  
     Paris, Crone, & Reardon (1990) write a discussion of a case of physician refusal to 
treat a child called Baby L. Paris is a Jesuit priest-Society of Jesus (SJ)-and PhD, 
Crone is an MD, and Reardon is a JD. In this article, using the case of Baby L, they 
dispute a claim by John Lantos and his colleagues that reportedly regarded futility 
judgments as those belonging to the goals of the patient and family, not the physician 
(J. J. Paris, Crone, & Reardon, 1990, p. 1013). The authors dispute this concept of 
futility and instead argue that despite pleas from a patient of family the physician 
must only submit to demands if the treatment has a realistic expectation of prolonged 
benefit. These authors embrace a concept of futility that closely aligns with medical 
standards as judged by the medical team. 
     Emily Largent Registered Nurse (RN), JD, PhD responds in an ethics roundtable 
article as one expert in Wightman, Largent, Del Beccaro, & Lantos (2014).  In this 
discussion over allocation of ICU beds with a patient occupying one in whose care is 
considered “futile” Dr. Largent reports that the concept of futile is “…generally taken 
to mean that additional care is not in a patient’s best interest (Wightman, Largent, Del 
Beccaro, & Lantos, 2014, p. 911).” This can be interpreted as meaning it is against 
medical standards as “not in a patient’s best interest” would seemingly mean that it is 
not within medical standards. Though the overall discussion is about who should be 
able to utilize the “last PICU bed” it is wholly about futility. If there were no scarcity 
to PICU beds the issue may still be important in this concept of futility as it would 
  
25 still be against medical standards. The amount of scarcity makes a difference as far as 
the amplitude of the distress caused by futility as against medical standards. 
 
Futility as a subjective or value judgment 
      Futility was described as either a subjective or value judgment by five authors all 
writing after the year 2000. Baergen (2006) is a PhD professor of medical ethics 
writing in Pediatric Nursing about responding to “unreasonably” optimistic parents. 
Baergen brings forth several insightful issues around how parents’ decisions are 
shaped in end-of-life situations (2006). He argues for a thoughtful approach through 
many encounters and rapport building in addition to managing uncertainty (Baergen, 
2006). Though he admits that when those processes break down, the use of limitation 
contracts and futility determinations can be helpful in limiting harm, but that they 
should be used with “…good judgment… (Baergen, 2006, p. 486).” Baergen argues 
that all futility judgments are value judgments (2006, p. 486). He also argues that 
these judgments are “…employed as a means of overriding parents’ decisions…” 
when the success of the treatment is low and the suffering of the child is high (2006, 
p. 486). The difficulty with these judgments, Baergen admits, that trying a treatment 
is often the only way to determine if it will be effective (2006). This provides a 
problematic layer for the treating team. 
     Clark is a PhD, bioethicist, and Jesuit Priest (SJ) writing two articles on futility 
policy for pediatrics in 2001 and 2002. Clark seems to suggest that there is some 
consensus around futility in medicine but that it is “…a subjective judgment, but one 
that is realistically indispensable (P. A. Clark, 2001, p. 181).” This first article was 
published in Pediatric Nursing. He goes on to detail some other definitions and 
determinations other ethicists have formulated. Clark believes in futility policies as a 
step towards improving end-of-life care for children and aiding parents and physicians 
  
26 in decision-making (Clark, 2001). In his 2002 article published in the Journal of 
Public Health Policy, Clark is proposing policies for medical futility in pediatrics and 
neonatology. He repeats his definition of futility has a subjective judgment (Clark, 
2002). Interestingly, he argues also that this debate around medical futility “…comes 
down to a conflict between patient autonomy versus physician beneficence and 
distributive justice (Clark, 2002, p. 77).” This notion of distributive justice in medical 
futility is an interesting idea. 
     Jonna Clark, an MD, and Dudzinski, a PhD, writing in Pediatrics in 2013, discuss 
the performing of CPR in terminally ill children. Through their analysis of case 
discussions involving CPR attempts they discuss the issue of withholding in certain 
cases and whether clinicians should perform CPR even when if it is wholly symbolic. 
They also discuss issues of benefit towards the child or parents. The concept of 
futility as based on value is agreed upon by these two authors but with the caveat that 
“…it remains a recognizable phenomenon in clinical medicine (J. D. Clark & 
Dudzinski, 2013, p. 574).” They also argue that determination of futility should be 
intervention specific and goal relative (Clark & Dudzinski, 2013, p. 574).  
     Dan Thompson is an MD and ethicist who wrote the discussion section of an 
article reporting opinions from international scholars about a pediatric critical care 
ethics case in Critical Care (Gunn et al., 2004). Thompson, an American and thus 
fitting inclusion into this review, states that futility “…is a difficult and value laden 
concept… (Gunn et al., 2004, p. 217).” Interestingly he goes on to argue that, in the 
case presented in the article, he does not believe that futility has a role to play. 
Whether this is because he believes it to be a value laden concept and therefore not 
relevant to any case is unclear. He does discuss a more compassionate approach that 
assumes parental agreement.  
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     The final theme was futility as being unable to be conceptualized unilaterally. This 
was found in four articles/authors and seemed to argue against the concept’s use as 
one-sided. The first article to show this conceptualization was Ganeson & Hoehn 
(2014), both MD’s, in Pediatric Critical Care Medicine. Within the article, there is a 
section dedicated to “unilateral decision making and futility” (Ganesan & Hoehn, 
2014). The authors use data from surveys to support their interpretation that most 
physicians do not support unilateral decisions on futility or withholding treatment 
(Ganeson & Hoehn, 2014). Based on this, the authors make their recommendation 
towards support of families and providers when there are disagreements. Next the 
article moves on to conflict resolution and improving communication around best 
interests. The authors conclude that medical decisions will be made by a child’s legal 
guardians, with advice from clinicians (Ganeson & Hoehn, 2014). 
     Scott Gunn, an MD writing the American opinion in Gunn et al. (2004) in Critical 
Care, argues that the “…wishes of the patient should prevail (Gunn et al., 2004, p. 
215).” Gunn discusses the many factors that are affected by disagreements and 
attempts to a process for mediating conflict. In this, he defers to the family to define 
what they consider to be futile. He then goes through the process of deliberation that 
is like many futility policies where deliberation is sought to allow and assist the 
family to make decisions. If the family does not choose withdrawal then Gunn takes 
the standard path towards facility transfer since cases which appeal to a court will 
almost always end in continued care (Gunn et al., 2004).  
     Landwirth is an MD and JD writing about issues in resuscitation in the Annals of 
Emergency Medicine (1993). For Landwirth, futility is a judgment that is made 
relevant to a particular goal obtained through medical decision making, which 
“…implies participation of patients and families (Landwirth, 1993, p. 503).” In this 
  
28 commentary section he echoes this sentiment in the context of CPR that might be 
futile saying that withholding CPR “…without prior discussion with parents is 
virtually never appropriate (Landwirth, 1993, p. 506).”  
     Del Beccaro, an MD writing an opinion in a case about futility and resource 
allocation in Pediatrics, discusses a decision matrix around futility of care (Wightman, 
Largent, Del Beccaro, & Lantos, 2014).  This article has a different context because it 
looks at a scarce resource situation involving limited PICU beds and futile cases. Del 
Beccaro, in this context, believes that there should be discussions with family around 
the futility that is present in their child’s case (Wightman, Largent, Del Beccaro, & 
Lantos, 2014). However, he argues that if this does not work towards the conclusion 
sought after then the ethics committee should be involved (Wightman, Largent, Del 
Beccaro, & Lantos, 2014).  While this is not quite the same as the previous article’s 
concept of futility as not unilateral it is similar in that Del Beccaro is arguing for 
discussions with family that seem to aim towards convincing them followed by the 
ethics committee involvement if that should fail. 
 
Futility: tensions, dynamic structures, and polarities to manage 
     Relational tensions emerged through this summative content analysis of the 
content of this critical review. The concept of a tension being referred to is the 
meeting of two parties with competing interests in disagreement; “…internal parts and 
relations that are in tension with each other (Elder-Vass, 2011, p. 37).” These tensions 
seem to assist in maintaining what Dave Elder-Vass would call a “dynamic structure” 
by “…constantly striking a balance between internal parts and relations that are in 
tension with each other (2011, p. 37).” These structures will either lead to a 
constrained pattern of convergence on a variable, adaptive steps over time, or collapse 
of the structure itself (Elder-Vass, 2011). In analyzing the literature obtained in this 
  
29 review, tensions were discovered that seem to make up the structure necessary around 
cases and/or discussion of futility. Most articles discussed the tension between family 
and physicians (hospitals, staff, etc.).  
     The main tension mentioned in nearly every reviewed article was the demands of 
the parents/guardian against the obligations of the physician, a relational tension. This 
was described in different ways but provided the same theme of a conflict between 
what parents demand and what the physician is obligated to provide, or refuse. A 
second tension appeared as a goal-oriented tension, that is, a tension between what the 
goals of care are or should be. This tension emerged as differences in goals between 
parents and providers as well as internal tensions of the provider. Third, there was a 
tension between beliefs and values present within and between parties involved. 
Finally, tensions of responsibilities were present, though like relational tensions but 
different as they seemed to indicate less of a tension between relations and more of a 
tension in who or whom is responsible for what. Table 2 shows the tension codes that 
make up the themes 
 
Table 2. Tensions existing within futility discourse. 
Relational Tension Goal Oriented Tension Belief/View Tension Responsibility Tension 
1. Medical team versus 
Patient/Family 
1. Treatment 
versus caring 
1. Value versus 
chance of 
survival 
1. Medical indication 
versus consumer 
desire 
2. Demands of the 
family versus 
physician obligations 
2. Use of 
technology 
/severity of 
illness 
2. View of life 2. Conception of 
futility 
3. Medical standard 
versus parent 
demands 
3. Sustaining life 
versus Relief of 
suffering 
3. Physiologic 
versus Religious 
3. Causation versus 
responsibility 
4. Paternalism versus 
rights 
4. Goals of care 4. Hope versus 
acceptance 
4. Impact of decisions 
by parents 
5. Autonomy of patient 
versus MD practice 
 5. Value versus 
reality 
 
6. Moral demands of 
MD to child versus 
wishes of parents 
 6. Free exercise of 
religion 
 
7. Role as parent    
8. View of parental 
decisions by staff or 
other parents 
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     Relational tensions were found in thirteen of the seventeen results. Ackerman, 
1993; Annas, 1994; Baergen, 2006; Bonanno, 1995; Clark, 2001; Clark, 2002; Clark 
& Dudzinski, 2013; Flannery, 1995; Ganesan & Hoehn, 2014; Gunn et al., 2014; 
Landwirth, 1993; Nelson & Nelson, 1992; Paris, Crone, & Reardon, 1990; Truog, 
2007 all describe a tension between the patient’s family and the physician or provider. 
This was described either in terms of patient and family wishes or demands, patient 
autonomy against physician obligations to the patient, medical standards, and 
physician practice. These are not always simply disagreements between what the right 
course of treatment is but often a tension or conflict between the moral demands and 
obligations that exist. Baergen (2006) describes the tension of how parents feel their 
decisions will be viewed by medical staff and other families, even themselves as they 
continue to live; whether their decisions will be viewed as giving up, putting their 
child through too much, etc. This tension seems to be present within the parents 
themselves and between other people involved. The role of the parent is a powerful 
tension within the parent that has some impact on how they interaction relationally 
with medical staff. Clark & Dudzinski (2013) also discuss the decisions that parents 
must make and how critical illness can threaten their role as a parent as well as the 
identity of being a parent if the child were to die (p. 577). The necessary relation of 
the parent to the child seems to conflict with the decisions about limiting treatments 
or resuscitation interventions that need to be made or are viewed as expected to be 
made.  
     The medical staff tensions in the literature results discuss a tension with physicians 
or other providers with parents but also in what or how they are treating the patient. 
Gunn et al. (2014) reported the two authors observations on whether physicians feel 
that they are sustaining life as opposed to relieving suffering or sustaining life and 
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between what the physician is obligated to provide against the demands of the 
parent(s) (Bonanno, 1995; Clark, 2001; Landwirth, 1993). Nelson & Nelson (1992) 
argue that parents should not dictate the “…moral values of pediatric practice (p. 
427),” and that refusal of treatment is acceptable if such treatment is inconsistent with 
their professional obligations, suggesting a tension around what treatment must be 
provided when demanded.  
 
Goal-oriented tension 
     There was a theme of tensions existing around what the goals of care in the 
treatment of children are, both within and between parents and providers. Ackerman, 
1993; Annas, 1994; Baergen, 2006; Flannery, 1995; Gunn et al., 2014, described 
some aspect of tensions in goals of care. Ackerman (1993) described this tension as 
the use of technology and severity of illness. Ackerman describes this in the context 
of using our technology simply because it exists despite a severity of illness that 
indicates imminent death (1993). Annas describes the case of Baby K who was born 
with anencephaly which prompted a disagreement between the mother and hospital 
and physicians over what the goals of treatment should be and whether further 
resuscitation attempts were appropriate (1994). This case has many tensions but this 
one about goals of care existed due to the mother’s goals (and argued by her attorney) 
of treating the respiratory distress versus the hospital’s opinion that the anencephaly 
was the underlying condition causing the need for resuscitation; anencephaly is 
untreatable (Annas, 1994).  
     Baergen (2006) brings forward the tension of treating versus caring to describe the 
phenomenon where we call medical treatment medical care, thus confusingly linking 
treatment to care. Baergen puts forward a discourse discussing the confusion that 
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not giving care (2006). This tension has serious implications in how patients and 
families view goals of “care” or “treatment.” Flannery (1995) presents an interesting 
perspective as one of the attorneys representing the mother of Baby K. In this case, 
Flannery describes the tension between the goals of care around further mechanical 
ventilation of Baby K where the hospital felt it was not a goal that provided any 
benefit and was futile and the mother believed the goal to be towards life-saving 
(1995). Finally, Gunn et al. (2014) describes the physician’s goals as being “…to 
sustain life and relieve suffering (p. 215).” Gunn, in his opinion, describes the effects 
of disagreements regarding goals of therapy as affecting patient care and family 
satisfaction with “…the health care team’s ability to function (Gunn et al., 2014, p. 
215).” Thompson, in Gunn et al. (2014) the difficulty in unrealistic goals of parents 
that may lead to conflict with staff who may be asked to perform treatments they do 
not view as necessary and possibly harmful. Goals of care are seen here as a major 
tension not only within the physician, as sustainment of life and relief of suffering, 
but between the family and care team.  
 
Belief and value tensions 
     Tensions between beliefs and values was seen in the data in views of what life is, 
physiologic values versus religious values, value of life or continued treatment versus 
chance of survival, belief values versus objective reality, hope versus acceptance, 
tension between the value of autonomy and belief in the right to demand, free exercise 
of religion, and hope versus acceptance. Annas, 1994; Bonanno, 1995; Clark & 
Dudzinski, 2013; Gunn et al., 2014; and Post, 1995 all contained discourse of tensions 
between beliefs and values between the medical team and parents, between hospital 
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medical team. 
     Annas (1994) describes the case of Baby K and the tension between the mother of 
the child, the hospital, the guardian ad litem, and the father. The mother is reported to 
view all human life as having value based in Christianity and a belief in miracles 
while the latter involved believed that further assistance with mechanical ventilation, 
and thus continued life, was “…medically and ethically inappropriate (Annas, 1994, 
p. 1542).” Bonanno (1995) discussed the tension between a family’s value in each 
additional moment of life and the chance of survival. Bonanno also discusses this as 
the physician wanting to end treatment due to these having no benefit which often 
conflicts with the family’s belief or value in seeking any additional time (1995). 
These disagreements, when brought to court, almost always end with the court 
deciding in favor of the family as the patient surrogate (Bonanno, 1995, p. 152).  
     Clark & Dudzinski (2013) discusses the tension of value versus reality in 
performing what might be viewed as futile CPR. These authors maintain a conception 
of futility that is value based and not helpful, and instead focus on discussing the role 
of the parent in making decisions as well as the nuance between value and the reality 
that cannot be controlled (Clark & Dudzinski, 2013). In Gunn et al. (2014) the author 
Dan Thompson discusses the tension between hope of the parents and reality of the 
prognosis and argues for consensus building to mediate this tension (p. 217). Post 
(1995) discusses the Baby K case in terms of the free exercise of religion and 
describes how this value can create tension between family and providers. Post 
ultimately argues that while there may disagreement in the amount of treatment, or 
overtreatment, in futile pediatric cases such as Baby K many of the effects of this 
overtreatment do not warrant restriction unless the burdens of the treatment are 
inhumane (Post, 1995, p. 22).  
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     Tensions around responsibility were seen in the literature results in the form of 
whether a physician is responsible to medical indication and standards for treatment 
or the patient as a consumer’s demands, who is responsible for the conception of 
futility, causation and responsibility, and the impact of parental decisions. Ackerman, 
1993; Baergen, 2006; Clark & Dudzinski, 2013 reported these tensions. Ackerman 
(1993) argues that responsibility for determining a “diagnosis” of futility and when to 
limit and/or withdraw care is wholly that of physicians. Baergen (2006) and Clark & 
Dudzinksi (2013) both discuss the difficulty for parents being responsible for making 
decisions around life and death for their children. In connection to the belief and value 
tensions, the role responsibility around limiting care and thus either eliciting tension 
within the parent over their responsibility to their child or the tension with others over 
making certain decisions. This is described in two ways, one where there is belief that 
we should help families accept this role and decision and that we should remove the 
decision and responsibility all together.   
 
       Table 3. Variables present in literature 
Variable % Articles Correlated Futility Conceptions  
Life-Sustaining Therapy 
• Mechanical 
Ventilation 
61% • Against Medical 
Standard 
• Value/Subjective 
• Unclear 
Neurologic Devastation 44% All 
Terminal Illness 11% • Value/Subjective 
• Not Unilateral 
Parent/Provider 
Disagreement 
100% All  
CPR/DNR 28% • Unclear 
• Not Unilateral 
  
35 Aggressive Treatment 28% • Value/Subjective 
• Unclear 
• Against Medical 
Standard 
Uncertainty 17% • Value/Subjective 
 
Variables: 
Life-Sustaining Therapy (LST), Mechanical ventilation 
     The tensions that were found within the literature have implications towards 
constructing the social structure around cases of pediatric futility. There are several 
variables that seem to be necessary or contingent to these tensions. One finding in 
eleven of the eighteen results was the presence of the need for mechanical ventilation 
or LST, which is the presence of at least mechanical ventilation. This may be simply a 
variable present in the condition of being critically ill but also seems to indicate a 
level of devastation that also correlates with conceptions of futility. None of the 
results, after all, discussed futility about a child who is cognitively intact and reliant 
on mechanical ventilation. The case of Baby K discussed a reliance on intermittent 
mechanical ventilation (Annas, 1994). This review of the literature suggests that there 
is something about the presence of mechanical ventilation that correlates with 
discussions of pediatric futility. 
 
Neurologic devastation and terminal illness 
     Differences in patient status between terminally ill and neurologically devastated 
were seen in the literature search results. The cases of Baby K and Baby L both 
described neurologic devastation, the former was the subject of four articles found in 
this search and referenced by others (Annas, 1994; Bonanno, 1995; Flannery, 1995; 
Ganesan & Hoehn, 2014; Paris, Crone, & Reardon, 1990; Post, 1995; Truog, 2007; 
Wightman, Largent, Del Beccaro, & Lantos, 2014). There was also a group of 
literature results that discussed children who became terminally ill from some disease 
  
36 process such as cancer (Clark & Dudzinski, 2013; Gunn et al., 2004). Forty-four 
percent of the results discussed neurologic devastation compared with 11% of results 
that discussed terminal illness in futility discourse, which may suggest that there is 
something about neurologic devastation (or severe neurologic injury) that invokes 
futility disagreements more than imminent death or children who are terminally ill. 
One reason for this may be the fact that a child with neurologic devastation can 
reasonably survive for quite some time dependent on technology where a terminally 
ill child has a much shorter survival and the disagreement is less around the question 
of “what is life and death” and more on when to stop and how aggressive to be.  
 
Parent and provider disagreement 
     A disagreement must be present for the presence of pediatric futility in the 
literature. All the results of this literature search had the presence of a conflict or 
disagreement between the family and some or all members of the medical team.4 Four 
of the articles reported that futility judgments or determinations should not be a 
unilateral process (Ganesan & Hoehn, 2014; Gunn et al., 2004; Landwirth, 1993; 
Wightman, Largent, Del Beccaro, & Lantos, 2014). This suggests that futility is either 
not present when there is agreement or that since both parties agree, either that there 
is futility or agree to not continue care, it does not lead to disputes and subsequently 
does not have academic literature written about it. There is a theme that indicates 
there is a conflict between what parents request and what is viewed as against medical 
standards, such as aggressive treatment with little chance of benefit, CPR in terminal 
illness for example (Annas, 1994; Nelson & Nelson, 1992; Paris, Crone, & Reardon, 
1990; Wightman, Largent, Del Beccaro, Lantos, 2014). Clark & Dudzinski (2013) 
                                               
4 The two outlier articles were not analyzed for variables. However, they did present a disagreement 
between practitioners and parents.  
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CPR will not be performed rather than asking for consent.  It is interesting that these 
authors seem to be arguing for more decisional control around treatments that have 
little benefit even though they believe futility to be a value-laden concept (Clark & 
Dudzinski, 2013). Though not all the authors were arguing from one side of the 
debate, such as Flannery (1995) who was one of the attorneys for the mother of Baby 
K, the fact remains that the parental and family side of these disagreements is wholly 
absent.  
 
CPR/DNR 
     CPR and Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) variables are present in 28% of the discourse 
found in this review. There was also one article that mentioned CPR, DNR, and 
extracorporeal life support (ECLS) (Clark & Dudzinski, 2013). CPR was mostly 
discussed in the literature when there was an issue of terminal illness such as a 
hematological or ontological condition. In Baby K the issue was not whether to 
perform CPR but rather whether to reinstate mechanical ventilation, though CPR in 
that case may have also been an issue, it was not discussed. 
 
Aggressive treatment 
     Five articles mentioned the concept of “aggressive treatment” (Baergen, 2006; 
Bonanno, 1995; Clark, 2001; Clark, 2002; Paris, Crone, & Reardon, 1990). These 
authors are by nature of this critical review publishing in academic literature and are 
arguably representing one vantage point of the structure and relations around futility. 
This limited vantage point may affect how “aggressive” is perceived. Where 
clinicians may consider something aggressive more so than a parent or non-clinician. 
There may be as much clarity around what is “aggressive” as there appears to be 
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authors view certain treatments as either not standard or not recommended. 
 
Uncertainty 
     Uncertainty was mentioned in three articles when discussing issues of 
prognostication, diagnosis, and morbidity and mortality (Baergen, 2006; Clark, 2001; 
Clark, 2002). Two of these articles were written by the same author. Clark (2001) also 
discusses the confusion within stopping, withholding, and withdrawing treatment, in 
the context of uncertainty around who is the agent or what is the cause of the death. 
Parents making a choice to stop, withhold, or withdraw, may feel that they are the 
agent of their child’s death and this is an important complexity to consider. 
 
Futility results: outliers 
     There were two articles that were outliers because they met initial inclusion criteria 
but did not fit the definition of discourse, both were empirical studies and were 
therefore not a discourse and were excluded. Sachdeva, Jeffereson, Coss-Bu, & Brody 
(1996) is a prospective cohort study to determine the resource consumption and extent 
of futile care in a pediatric intensive care setting. The authors developed three 
definitions of futility that were used to measure and group patients into imminent 
demise futility, lethal condition futility, and qualitative futility. This article did not fit 
into the current review because it was not a method of discourse about futility but 
rather a quantitative attempt to measure resource consumption. The authors found that 
very few patient-days were associated with futile care across the definitions used 
(Sachdeva, Jeffereson, Coss-Bu, & Brody,1996). They also concluded that according 
to their data, a focus on care that is deemed futile to control or reduce resource 
consumption may be unsuccessful due to very few patients in their study meeting 
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(Sachdeva, Jefferson, Coss-Bu, & Brody, 1996). 
     Morparia, Dickerman, & Hoehn (2012) is another outlier that was a survey sent to 
members of the Critical Care section of the American Academy of Pediatrics. The 
survey contained four clinical vignettes where families were requesting care that may 
be perceived as futile and were asked if they would go against the parent’s wishes and 
how they would work towards resolution if there was a conflict. This article is an 
outlier because it is not taking a position such as the other results around futility 
discourse in pediatric critical care. It does add some interesting insights into this topic, 
however, and is therefore being discussed here as an outlier. The authors do not 
discuss a specific concept of futility but in their clinical vignettes with two of them 
being about terminal illness related to an oncologic condition, with one progressing to 
a brain death consistent state, the other two are neurologic conditions (Morparia, 
Dickerman, & Hoehn, 2012, p. e312). The survey received a 43% response rate which 
is fairly poor, and they found no consensus for unilateral decision making (Morparia, 
Dickerman, & Hoehn, 2012). While their conclusions lack statistical support for 
unilateral decision making due to their response rate the lack of consensus is 
consistent with the findings in this literature review that suggests there is not one 
conception or approach that is more popular.  
 
Synthesis: limitations 
     The limitations to this critical review involve the eclectic nature of literature 
around the discourse of futility and pediatric critical care. Attempting to capture 
results around this topic presented significant challenges. There has been much more 
literature written about futility in adult intensive care. There is also a fair amount 
more literature around futility in pediatrics in journals from outside the United States, 
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social context. Despite these limitations the nature of the debate was arguably well 
captured by the results in this review as most authors are either responding to other 
authors or exploring the debate itself. Authors taking a position tend to reference 
other articles in their discourse. There were also articles that had many authors as part 
of a discussion. This was difficult to quantify for the purposes of a review looking at 
discourse. 
 
Conclusion and implications 
     As indicated by other authors (Brody & Halevy, 1995), conceptualizing futility 
continues to cause problems and appears to hinder the process towards resolution of 
these tough cases. The results of this review seem to confirm this as no one concept 
emerges more than others. Futility as a subjective value judgment was found to be the 
majority but only by one, followed by being discussed as unclear and against medical 
standards (Table 1). The same number of authors discussed futility not in conceptual 
forms but as something that should not be decided unilaterally (Table 1).  
     Conflict between family/parents and providers emerged as a main variable in all 
articles, even the two outliers which were not counted in totals (Table 3). This 
suggests that this may be the variable that is the impetus for publication of discourse 
on futility because it seems to be the main subject of the articles. In fact, the nature of 
the discourse around pediatric intensive care and futility seems to be sparked by a 
conflict; agreement, after all, eliminates the need for discussions about futility. The 
differing conceptions of futility (shown in Table 1) suggest that there are differing 
opinions between authors in the literature results. The concept of futility itself seems 
to be a point of conflict, therefore it is no surprise that conflict is a major variable 
present in discussions around futility.  
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surprising since “critical care” was a term of focus. The use of technology is a tenet of 
critical care, and the cause of much debate. Typically, a child who progresses in their 
illness to the need for mechanical ventilation is very ill. More research on mechanical 
ventilation is warranted here. My hypothesis would be that it’s not so much the 
mechanical ventilation as it is the pseudo-stability that the ventilator can provide and 
the issues around withdrawing the ventilator. What I mean is, that after the chaos of 
critical care resuscitation, the quiet peacefulness of a child who is neurologically 
devastated but breathing on a ventilator may hide the reality of this devastation; it 
hides the illness by displaying a quiet and calm presence. It is perfectly acceptable to 
withdraw a ventilator but once a child with neurologic devastation is on the ventilator 
they can reasonably “live” for quite some time.  
     There are children who live while dependent upon mechanical ventilation without 
neurologic devastation. This is where the third most common variable associated with 
futility, neurologic devastation, becomes relevant (Table 3). A child who is sick and 
progresses to mechanical ventilation and continues to progress towards terminal 
illness (the fourth variable, Table 2), as described in Clark & Dudzinski (2013), 
would have more issues around aggressive treatment, such as CPR, in the presence of 
terminal illness where death is likely and not amenable to rescue therapies. This may 
be why neurologic devastation is present in the results more often, because it is not 
often self-resolving. In the case of Baby K (Annas, 1994; Bonanno, 1995; Flannery, 
1995; Post, 1995) the child’s neurologic status is a central point. In Baby K, CPR was 
not the issue presented, rather it was whether to institute mechanical ventilation or 
not.  
     The pattern that emerges around pediatric futility in critical care seems to suggest 
that when there are disputes involving a child with terminal illness the discussions of 
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most articles discussed neurologic devastation with the presence of mechanical 
ventilation and disputes between family and providers that brings these discussions to 
publication contain variables of uncertainty and treatment decisions (Appendix B). 
The tensions that were found in these articles were mostly relational in nature, 
followed by belief and value tensions (Table 2). Goal-oriented tensions and 
responsibility tensions were both mentioned equally (Table 2). Beliefs, values, and 
goals are all tensions that would arise secondary to relational and responsibility 
tensions as the former require the latter to exist. Tensions in our relations with the 
roles involved in cases around pediatric futility are due partly to how we view our 
responsibility to the various parties involved. These are influenced by our beliefs and 
values and affect how we formulate goals. 
     …there is little appreciation that the structure of 
social relations, together with their associated resources, 
constraints or rules, may determine what happens, even 
though these structures only exist where people 
reproduce them. In such circumstances it is futile to 
expect problems to be resolved by the discovery of a 
guilty persons and their replacement by a different 
individual. –Sayer, 1992, p. 93 
 
     Andrew Sayer discusses the idea of how necessary and contingent relations work 
within a social structure. In examining the tensions found in the results we can see 
that there are necessary-relational and responsibility, and contingent- belief/value and 
goal-oriented sets of relations. Necessary relations, doctor to patient, parent to child, 
are necessary but when the contingent relations create tensions there is dispute which 
is seen in all cases where futility is discussed. Walker (2007) provides an insight into 
how to begin using the findings in this review through her expressive-collaborative 
model. In Walker’s model, morality is viewed as a “…socially embodied medium of 
understanding and adjustment in which people account to each other for the identities, 
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account to each other and how we accept, deflect, and assign responsibilities is a way 
forward in investigating the social structures around conflicts of futility (Walker, 
2007).  
     This seems to answer the question that Sayer (1992) suggests that social scientists 
should be asking: “What is it about the structures which might produce the effects at 
issue? (p. 95).” In this case, futility in pediatric critical care, the findings of this 
critical review suggest focusing on tensions around responsibility and relations for 
identifying strategies to mitigate conflict around cases of futility. Combining Sayer’s 
conception of social structures and Walker’s philosophy of the expressive-
collaborative model of morality which includes responsibilities, relationships, 
identities, and values, has potential for a unique and effective methodology to address 
not only conflicts around futility but how health care is practiced, received, accessed 
and who is responsible to whom for providing and receiving care. Viewing social 
structures as having causal power can aid in addressing many other structural and 
embedded problems. 
 
Gaps, potential areas of future research, and significance 
     There are clear gaps in the state of the science around futility in pediatric critical 
care. I have identified three critical gaps from this review: 1) the viewpoint 
represented, 2) the temporality of the discourse, and 3) the reductive view towards 
this phenomenon as singular problems rather than as inherent results of a system 
where these problems are an undesirable but inevitable result. These gaps speak to the 
traditional way that ethical cases are viewed and analyzed. This traditional method 
has been that of viewing them through a legal lens compared to previous cases, legal 
accountability, and risk. This view, as pointed out in this review, is likely due to the 
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usefulness or impact of an ethics service or committee and ensuring the continuance 
of these disputes and their trajectory towards the courtroom.  
       Addressing the first critical gap I have documented the discipline of the authors. 
Authors from results of the review were mostly physicians (MDs) and lawyers (JDs) 
(see Appendix A, and Table 1). The remaining were PhDs with one RN who was also 
a JD. This is a major gap because the view at which these are discussed is severely 
limited to clinicians and legal and ethical clinical experts. Although one author 
(Flannery, 1995) was writing as a patient and family advocate as the mother’s 
attorney, there were not parental viewpoints. At the very best there was some 
representation of the parents in their decisions that was written by the author 
anecdotally. There was also an absence of other voices who would have been 
intimately involved in the care around these children. These voices that are absent 
include parents, nurses, caregivers, social workers, etc. This leads the literature into a 
sort of echo chamber of which all are arguing one vantage point. 
     The second critical gap that came through was around the temporality seen in the 
discourse around futility in pediatric critical care. The bulk of the literature analyzed 
this phenomenon as it happened, or at the point of disagreement where one side, 
usually the clinical side, identified that there was futility against another side who 
disagreed, typically the parent or parents. This may be due to the influence of 
casuistry involved in many of these cases because of the legal issues around them as 
well as risk aversion and publicity within the institution. It also may be influenced by 
how we view and when we view outcomes as being undesirable. Rather than looking 
at complex structures that produce an incidence of a futility debate, the focus is on the 
current state of the situation. I believe that conditions are set up far earlier in the chain 
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to have these situations. 
      A final critical gap identified through the course of this critical review is the way 
in which the literature focused on this phenomenon in a singular view or not as a 
phenomenon rather as a singular and unique event. There was discussion of similar 
cases or landmark cases, but these were in the manner of casuistry to show 
precedence. All the authors attempted to discuss the cases towards resolution. Other 
authors presented ways to protocolize a response. Instead, or in addition, this 
phenomenon should be examined or analyzed towards identifying the system and 
structure that works together and has generative mechanisms that lead to these 
outcomes. These cases are the result of a structure. These cases may be the negative 
outcome of a system that is designed for a positive reason. The only way to reduce 
incidences of this phenomenon is to examine how they come into being in the first 
place. I will next discuss how to do this.  
 
Significance and next steps 
     The first step towards better understanding how these phenomena come into being 
is to recognize how these systems, such as hospitals, units, clinics, and families work 
together. This can be best studied through non-linear dynamical systems theory,  
complexity theory, or complex adaptive systems (Mingers, 2014; Plsek & 
Greenhalgh, 2001). Complexity theory, through its modeling and investigation of 
complex adaptive systems, recognizes the interrelatedness of individual agents with 
the freedom of acting unpredictably and changing the context for other agents (Plsek 
& Greenhalgh, 2001). This embracing of complexity and chaos is necessary to 
investigate social structures where interactions happen outside of rigid boundaries, in 
an open rather than a closed system. This is how a case of intractable conflict in 
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agents and structures working within a socially constructed moral space.  
     Within complex adaptive systems, there exists structures and mechanisms that 
hold certain powers and liabilities that generate events (Mingers, 2014, p. 36). These 
structures and mechanisms are not always physical “things” but can be concepts, 
actions, behaviors, feelings, relations, etc. The causal structures must be brought to 
light in order to show the mechanisms that generate the continuance of a problem. 
Looking only at interventions towards an outcome caused by a system will only 
mitigate the effects, but the system will remain and continue to produce the problem. 
The system and structures must be identified in order to understand how they cause a 
problem to come into being. Dave Elder-Vass proposes five questions for a 
methodological framework towards identifying causal powers in social structures: 
1. What are its parts 
2. What are the relations between those parts that are 
characteristic of this particular type of entity 
3. What set of morphogenetic causes has produced the 
entity in its current form 
4. What set of morphostatic causes stablises [sic] the 
entity and ensures is continued survival 
5. Through what mechanisms do its parts and relations 
produce the specific properties of the entity 
(Elder-Vass, 2011, p. 39) 
     The parts must be identified as well as the relations involved among and between 
them. Morphogenetic causes are those “…processes which tend to elaborate or 
change a system’s given form, structure, or state (Elder-Vass, 2011, p. 34). 
Morphostatic causes are those “…processes in complex system-environment 
exchanges that tend to preserve or maintain a system’s given form, organization, or 
state (Elder-Vass, 2011, p. 34). Identification and understanding of the interactions 
between the parts, relations, mechanisms, and structures will help bring emergence of 
the complex system’s behavior and causal power and how the system continues to 
exist.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Approach and Theory 
     Drawing from the philosophical principles of critical realism and complex adaptive 
systems theory, this research will focus on a single case of intractable conflict where 
conceptions of futility were present. Initial conditions, social structure, relations, and 
parts existing around a specific outcome drive the framework that must be examined 
in order to understand how something like intractable conflict can exist. The method 
used for this study will be that of qualitative case study constructed through critical 
realism and complex systems theory regarding the larger structures and Walker’s 
expressive-collaborative model of morality to examine how persons within the social 
structure navigated within the moral space. Case study method has been discussed as 
an appropriate method for examining complex adaptive systems (Schneider & 
Somers, 2006) and Walker’s expressive-collaborative model of morality has been 
used to examine moral spaces in ethical and practice situations (Mohammed & Peter, 
2009; Peter & Liaschenko, 2013).  
     In looking towards an approach for future research around this issue, the DSRP 
model designed by Derek Cabrera will aid in analyzing the systems structures and 
extrapolate principles for future research (Cabrera & Colosi, 2008). This model 
examines distinction (D), system (S), relationships (R), and perspective (P). This 
model is a useful tool to examine complex systems and relations.  
     Intractable conflict in critical care cannot be separated from the contextual and 
social conditions in which it exists. An investigation into real life events of a complex 
phenomenon and its contextual conditions is well-served by the qualitative case study 
method (Munhall, 2012, p. 359). For the study of a complex phenomenon and its 
contextual conditions many different actors, agents, objects, and experiences must be 
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unusual, common, revelatory, or longitudinal (Yin, 2018, p. 49). In addition, Yin also 
discusses a replication strategy that requires an initial single case study to develop 
patterns that can be used to examine successive similar cases (2018). Intractable 
conflict and futility have not previously been studied in this way and this will 
therefore provide initial patterns for further investigation. 
      The case that will be used for this analysis is that of a child who spent many years 
in a pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) who transitioned through many physiologic 
changes and conflicts which ultimately led to an intractable conflict when caregivers 
felt further treatment was futile and parents disagreed. This case is an exemplar case 
because it touched many different disciplines and roles within the unit and hospital. 
The case shows how complex these situations can become. In addition, this case is 
important because it shows what caring for a child throughout this process is like for 
bedside caregivers, consultants, and administrative agents.      
     This case meets the rationale for a single-case method because it will aid in 
analysis of a situation that deviates from common occurrences, it can help capture 
circumstances and conditions, the descriptive information alone will be revelatory, 
and the longitudinal study of the case can aid in studying how the conditions and 
underlying processes changed over time (Munhall, 2012, p. 363; Yin, 2018, pp. 49–
51). Performing a qualitative case study for the goals of this research fit within the 
aims of comprehensive understandings of a phenomenon with rich contextual detail, 
understanding the social context will require firsthand view, subject interaction and 
personal meaning is important, and actual experiences are required to meet with the 
goals of the project (Munhall, 2012, pp. 361–362). 
     The research questions aim at identifying a complex social situation and its context 
and therefore the explanatory case study and elements of descriptive case study have 
  
49 been chosen (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The descriptive and explanatory case study 
method as described by Yin (2018) and Munhall (2012) is well suited to attempt to 
answer the research questions. Data collection methods will be primarily through 
recorded semi-structured interviews and secondarily through chart and policy review. 
This case study is retrospective and longitudinal in that it will explore the case 
through a temporal context from admission to final discharge.  
    Interview, policy, concept, and artifact review will be used for this case study. The 
child had several different points throughout his inpatient stay: critically ill, recovery, 
stability, decompensation, and finally intractable conflict. This case provides a unique 
opportunity to explore different views from various roles involved in the care of this 
child throughout the transitions in care towards conflict.  
 
Specific Aim 1: perform a critical retrospective longitudinal case study on a single 
case of intractable conflict that elicits the concept of futility. 
 
     A case study of an instance of intractable conflict will be performed. This will take 
place through interviews and relevant hospital policies. Chart review will provide 
objective data such as procedures, physiologic data, dates and events, as well as 
clinician notes. Key documents such as history and physical, notes, etc. will be 
identified through investigator review. A document that is considered a key and 
integral part of the case will be collected. This will be an iterative process as 
interviews may reveal other key documents important to the aims of the research. 
Interviews of the parents, primary nurses, physicians, surgeons, social workers, case 
managers, ethicist, risk managers, and administrators will provide rich descriptive 
data to augment the chart review. Policy review will also add to the case by reporting 
the institutional policy standards. Concepts such as futility, best interests, etc. that are 
brought forward during interviews will be explored within the context of the case. 
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case. 
     The case will be studied around four timepoints: first, the initial admission and 
period of critical illness, second the period of recovery and stability will be studied, 
followed by the initial critical event that led to neurologic devastation, and will then 
be followed by the final readmission following another critical event.  
 
Specific Aim 2: provide critical analysis of interviews and policy data relevant to the 
specific case. 
 
     Interviews will be recorded and transcribed. These sources of data will be open 
coded and analyzed critically as a structure. They will be open coded separately then, 
along with policies collected, compared and analyzed.  
 
Specific Aim 3: perform ethical analysis using Margaret Urban Walker’s expressive-
collaborative model of morality. 
 
     Interview transcripts will be coded a second time specifically looking at themes 
around practices of responsibility from Walker’s expressive-collaborative model of 
morality. Analysis of how each participant viewed these will be analyzed then as a 
whole or social structure existing around this child.  
 
Specific Aim 4: extrapolate principles from this case to aid in evaluating other cases. 
 
     Finally, the ethical analysis will provide principles to aid in an approach towards 
practical application in evaluating other cases or other outcomes of structural flaws. 
This approach and the principles found will provide a path towards analyzing and 
hopefully emancipation from social processes that continue these ethical problems. 
  
51            
Data collection 
     Data collection will be performed through semi-structured interviews, chart 
review, and policy review. Consent will be obtained from each participant agreeing to 
an interview. Interviews will be conducted with key agents involved in the case. 
Interviews will be semi-structured around the key points of interest as well as 
experiences with caring for the child and interacting with other members of the care 
team. Interviews will be recorded and transcribed for analysis. Interviews will be 
anonymized to code for each person, such as RN1, RN2, MD1, surgeon1, etc. Data 
sources obtained for purposes of analysis and participants who consented to 
participate are reported below (Figure 2.) 
     Key documents from the chart will be sought out such as history and physical, 
notes around key timepoints, ethics notes, and any other relevant documents found 
through the chart review process. Documents will be printed with identifying 
information redacted, and then scanned to aid in analysis of themes and codes. These 
documents will be analyzed separately from the interviews. Policy review will be 
performed during and after data collection through interviews and chart review.  
            Figure 2. Data Sources 
 
              Created with © 2018 Plectica 
  
52 Data analysis 
     Consistent with qualitative case study method, data analysis will occur 
concurrently with data collection (Munhall, 2012; Yin, 2018). Interview recordings 
will be sent for transcription to a professionally trained, HIPPA compliant 
transcription company. Once returned, open coding for codes and themes will be an 
ongoing process. Memos and research journal entries will be utilized during this 
process. An eclectic process of analysis will be used that is consistent with case study 
method (Munhall, 2012; Yin, 2018). Both deductive and inductive analysis will be 
used. Critical realism describes a process called “abduction” or “retroduction” in 
which facts are studied and then an explanatory hypothesis is formed (Mingers, 2014, 
p. 53). This has also been called “generative causality” and is a mode of reasoning at 
the heart of critical realism which seeks to understand things that exist unknown to us 
that work to cause events known to us (Mingers, 2014).  
     The interviews will be semi-structured around specific themes of interest and so 
there is a deductive element. A deductive analytic process will be used to examine 
how participants viewed their role, obligation, interactions, and conceptions about 
futile care in general and in the case. Analysis will also be performed in an inductive 
process to discover themes and concepts happening that are unknown prior to the 
study. Overall, abduction or retroduction is the process that the entirety of the study is 
based upon and is informed by the main question around what is going on within and 
around a case that leads to intractable conflict? What are the causal factors? 
     Through the philosophy of Margaret Urban Walker and her expressive 
collaborative model of morality, data will be analyzed through how participants view: 
1. Identity-relationship: how understanding occurs 
through responsibilities that are assigned, accepted, and 
deflected. 
2. Moral accounting-authoritative and shared in social 
setting through: evaluative language, exemplary 
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responsibility. 
3. Constructive and transformative as tasks of human 
life: self-direction, responsiveness to others, and mutual 
accountability. 
4. Structure of responsibility: contact/relationship 
initiation of moral claims, interests that are vulnerable 
to actions/choices, and obligations to respond to others 
when dependent on us. 
 
     Identity-relationship (1) seeks to discover how participants “…understand 
themselves as bearers of particular identities and actors in various relationships that 
are defined by certain values (Walker, 2007, p. 10).  Moral accounting (2) examines 
the way in which the participants viewed the way the moral space is constructed 
regarding responsibilities. Morality is constructed and transformed (3) in and among 
people and data will be analyzed for how participants viewed how they directed 
themselves, responsiveness to others, and how they were accountable and to whom 
(Walker, 2007, p. 10). Finally, the structure of responsibility will be analyzed (4) in 
the data on how participants initiated moral claims, vulnerabilities, and obligations.  
     Walker believed in ethical ‘naturalism,’ that morality is a structure within all 
human social groups and can be seen from observing shared understandings (Walker, 
2003).  Through this lens, transcripts will be analyzed towards how participants 
viewed their role and responsibility and how they viewed others’ roles and 
responsibilities within this moral space. Examining this moral space will aid in some 
understanding of the morality that is present in this community and between these 
different persons. The process of analysis will begin with interview transcripts as they 
are obtained. Results from the deductive analytic process will be reported in the 
results chapter categorized through the theme of the structured questions. Contextual 
information, policies, concepts, and pertinent artifacts such as technology will also be 
identified.  
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in an inductive analytic process to discover the moral and ethical content found in the 
data, particularly that of how participants viewed acceptance, deflection, and 
assignment of responsibility (Walker, 2007). Identification of practices of 
responsibility will be actively sought out with Walker’s expressive-collaborative 
model of morality in mind. Moral and ethical phenomena exist in relational contexts 
and how we perceive our role or identity, relationships and responsibilities are 
integral to how morality is experienced and shaped (Peter & Liaschenko, 2013). How 
a person views their role and responsibility is important to how they view moral 
claims and obligations that they have towards others. The moral claims, obligations, 
and ultimately responsibilities are essential to understanding and reconstructing the 
morality within a social structure. Themes that emerge inductively through this 
process will be reported in the data analysis chapter.  
      Chart review documents such as clinician notes will be analyzed using open 
coding as well. Objective physical data will later be used for comparison with 
interview and chart note data. The purpose here is to have three streams of data, agent 
experience and interpretation, official clinical note documentation, and objective 
physiological and temporal data. Policies collected will also provide a background for 
analysis for theory development as well as for specific aim four. 
Trustworthiness 
     In keeping with principles of qualitative research, validity and credibility will be 
provided through several deliberate strategies. The study question will be clearly 
stated, design appropriately constructed, data collected and managed systematically, 
and data analyzed correctly (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Data triangulation will occur with 
collection of narrative interviews and chart data. Rapport with participants and this 
researcher is already established and issues or questions that come up from interview 
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of the aims of this research and will be purposeful. It may be the case that some 
sought after participants decline to be interviewed, in this case these perspectives will 
be dealt with by examining them openly, generally, and with respect. Dependability 
will be addressed by consensus of data analysis with other researchers trained in 
qualitative methods. This will be done through independent coding and analysis then 
through group consensus. Credibility will also be pursued through critical 
philosophical discussion and data will be presented in detail to ensure validity and 
credibility of the analysis (Baxter & Jack, 2008) 
 
Ethics, privacy, and data security 
     The purpose and protocol of this research project was submitted to the IRB at 
Children’s Minnesota and the University of Minnesota and was deemed not to be 
human subject research and was therefore exempt from review. There are no 
interventions in this study. Participants will be consented by their participation. 
Names will be anonymized into codes. The child in the case will be given a 
pseudonym. The institution will not be named. Consent to examine this child’s case as 
a study for educational purposes has already been obtained by the child’s parents, and 
has already been published in a brief report (Wolfe, 2016). 
     Consent was obtained through agreement to participate. Interviews will be 
recorded using recording device owned by the investigator. Interviews will be 
transcribed. Interview recordings will be stored on the investigators personal external 
hard drive locked in a personal safe. Transcripts will be kept on a personal password 
protected computer during analysis. 
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Chapter 4: The Story 
 
     Chase5 was born in the hospital at 38 weeks gestational age via caesarean section 
and was transferred to the neonatal ICU with respiratory distress with concerns for 
meconium aspiration and the possibility of a heart defect with phenotypical 
appearance for Trisomy 21; he was the third child for this family. Chase was only in 
the NICU for a day and was then transferred to the special care nursery. He had an 
uneventful course after that first day and was ready for discharge at nine days old with 
follow-up routine newborn screenings as well as a testing for Trisomy 21. (Link to 
timeline here) 
     Roughly eight weeks later he presented to the emergency room (ER) with a two-
week history of on-and-off breathing difficulties. In the ER he was found to be in 
respiratory distress with increased secretions, inspiratory and expiratory stridor. He 
was given nebulized racemic epinephrine and Heliox- a mixture of helium and 
oxygen that can be easier to breathe- with little effect.  
     Upon transfer into the PICU he decompensated and required endotracheal 
intubation. Due to large amounts of secretions this was rather difficult and attempts 
by the intensivist to place a breathing tube were not successful. Bag-mask ventilation 
resumed but he continued towards respiratory failure. Anesthesia was called to the 
bedside as well an ear, nose, and throat (ENT) surgeon. A laryngeal-mask airway was 
placed but was unsuccessful in improving ventilation. A certified registered nurse 
anesthetist (CRNA) was able to place a very small breathing tube past the vocal cords 
but had difficulty placing it deeper within the trachea. Chase was then taken to the 
operating room (OR) with anesthesia and ENT for direct laryngoscopy and 
bronchoscopy as well as the potential for tracheotomy. 
                                               
5 Name changed for privacy and respect to family 
  
57      Securement of a breathing tube was achieved in the OR by ENT, however, over 
the next few days he continued to have issues with ventilation and oxygenation and 
on day five the decision was made by the intensive care team in consultation with 
ENT to initiate extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO). Chase’s parents were 
not initially able to be reached via telephone prior to him going to the OR but 
presented in person to the PICU and consented, though it was emergent and necessary 
and would have been done without consent. The ENT surgeon’s note the following 
day relates a phone conversation with Chase’s father concerning cannulation for 
ECMO; Chase was two-months old.  
     It was determined that Chase’s trachea appeared tortuous and with severe malacia- 
a softening of the cartilage- which explained the difficulty in endotracheal tube 
placement as well as difficulty ventilating his lungs once a breathing tube was in 
place. This was later termed “long segment tracheal stenosis.” Due to the severe 
nature of Chase’s structural defect the ENT surgeon recommended transfer to a 
national institution better equipped to handle this type of repair. According to persons 
present in his care at this time the ENT surgeon discussed long-term planning and 
offered three options: transfer to a more specialized institution out of state, attempt to 
reconstruct the trachea at the present institution, or withdrawal and comfort care; 
Chase’s father chose reconstruction at the current institution.  
     Tracheal reconstruction was attempted on hospitalization day thirteen. After this 
initial reconstruction the ENT surgeon was called to the bedside as the child was 
again having respiratory issues. On airway exam in the OR it was found that he had 
developed crusting and obstruction on the distal aspect of the grafting in his trachea, 
the reconstruction had failed. This crusting required removal and the ENT progress 
note reports: 
I discussed the findings over the phone with the father 
for an emergency airway exam under anesthesia for 
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described the procedure to father. The risks, benefits, 
and alternatives were discussed. I again impressed on 
him that the child is in critical and serious condition and 
the procedure has a very high risk of morbidity and 
mortality. (ENT progress note) 
 
     On day fifty-one, at around four months of age, Chase received an aortic 
homograft and tracheoplasty with ENT working alongside a cardiothoracic surgeon. 
He was able to come off of ECMO after eight days. Sometime after this there was an 
attempt at reconstructing his trachea. This latest attempt ultimately failed, and it was 
determined the tracheotomy tube would be needed for the time being. After a long 
recovery from this surgery, he was eventually weaned off of sedation, weaned off the 
ventilator and began to have more stability.  
After the surgery, we had a trach placed, and we sat and 
we watched. We were looking to see if it would be an 
effective airway, and a lot involved the position of the 
trach, the length of the trach, and where it was in the 
airway due to the new reconstruction that had just 
occurred. Then it just became more of a let’s keep 
fixing the repair, fixing the repair, and moving the 
trach, manipulating the trach, to promote life. (RN1) 
 
     Chase was almost one year of age and developing normally except for his airway. 
His tracheostomy was very tenuous and the tube difficult to replace when it came out 
due partly to the structural issues with his trachea and the stoma site itself. He was 
completely dependent on the tracheotomy tube and could not tolerate it being out for 
any length of time. “Some days were nice, quiet, and boring; others, it was frequent 
near-death experiences (RN1).” Chase continued to require many bronchoscopies and 
dilations in the OR and at the bedside requiring intermittent periods of anesthesia and 
sedation. Despite this, and in between events, he was able to be off the ventilator and 
supplemental oxygen. He began a phase of rehabilitation and outside of the 
dependence on his tracheostomy tube he was quite stable and active as any child his 
age with Down’s Syndrome.  
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and with that we were dealing with a little boy who was 
starting to grow and develop, and I felt it very important 
to nurture that part of it, to let him experience a little bit 
of the world going on around him, because he was 
starting to interact and behave just like a regular kid his 
age, and I wanted to show him off. (RN1) 
 
     Children who are active and dependent upon medical devices often need very close 
attention because of their limited understanding between their curiosity and 
spontaneity and the consequences of removal of those devices. Normally, a child 
healthy enough to pull at their tubes and lines is no longer in the PICU.  
Usually, when they get to that point, they go upstairs, so 
we don’t get to interact too much with them. With 
[Chase], it was interesting, because we all got very 
close to him because his family wasn’t there that often, 
so we became daycare, kind of, for him, and just his 
entertainment…He would sit on our laps and type on 
the computers, and he wound never really be in his 
room. He was always being passed around or strolled 
around. He became like a little unit mascot. He would 
just be there all the time…It was more like a parenting 
role… (RN3) 
 
     Due to the seriousness of decompensation that Chase experienced when his trach 
came out, he was kept in the PICU. “There was something [procedures] happening 
every week (RN1).” In between these procedures he would be up in his crib watching 
a movie, held by staff and walked around the unit, and sometimes even in an “exer-
saucer” in the hallway so his nurses could balance the needs of their other work, such 
as their other patient, and Chase’s need to be active. This also allowed others to keep 
an eye on him. Often times, the nursing assistant would be tasked with carrying him 
around the unit, hooked up to a portable pulse oximeter, to have some time out of his 
room socializing. 
And as a team of nurses we would all pull together. 
Whoever was in the neighborhood had your back. Half 
of the time you never even had to say anything, because 
everybody was always keeping track of him. (RN2) 
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was really difficult, because, like I said, he could just 
lose his airway at any minute and then you would have 
to be in there. I do feel like the unit as a whole kept an 
extra eye on him, but that was difficult, to get a new 
admit with him. You always felt like you had to have 
somebody watching him. You had to pass that off 
constantly, all the time. You couldn’t just go in your 
other room and know that he’d be fine. (RN3) 
 
     If there was no availability of support staff, and if the unit was busy, Chase often 
stayed in his crib unless he was playing with physical and occupational therapy. He 
could be alone in his room for quite some time depending on the needs of his nurse’s 
other patient. It was known on the unit that this was an issue, and it was almost 
unspoken knowledge that everyone had an ear out for the alarms on Chase’s monitor. 
If his alarms went off, someone responded. “It was extremely stressful to take on that 
assignment knowing that his life depended solely upon that trach, and knowing that if 
it fell out, he could easily die (RN1).”  
     Most of the time it was his game of pulling off his EKG leads or pulse oximeter 
cord as he had learned that this would get him some attention. “He got to a point 
where he would just get attention by pulling it out…That’s how he we would get 
somebody in there to play with him (RN3).” Other times he had moved too much or 
in the wrong way to where his tracheostomy tube dislodged and was out. One of his 
nurses described how he would pull out his trach for attention and once it was 
reinserted and he had come to, he would often assist in squeezing the anesthesia bag 
that the nurse was using to give him ventilation and oxygen, something he learned 
from requiring it so many times.  
In fact, he would bag himself sometimes. It was so cute. 
You’d put the anesthesia bag on, and sometimes that 
was enough just to open him up, but he would 
sometimes just need a few breaths, and he got used to 
doing that, too (RN3).”  
These removals led to instant decompensation and an urgency to reinsert the tube, 
which could be difficult to those not used to inserting it due to the appearance of his 
  
61 stoma. This made taking care of him scary to many staff members who did not know 
him as well. 
I remember a lot of us talking, like, ‘I don’t want to be 
that one. I don’t want to be that nurse that he 
decannulates on,’ because [ENT] was very clear about it 
being a very big possibility that if we couldn’t get the 
trach back in, it would be devastating to him. (RN3) 
 
     During these first two years in the PICU where he was unable to leave due to the 
tenuous nature of his airway, many staff members noted that parents would come in 
only on Sundays after church, or to consent prior to another procedure. There was 
concern about this because typically in this stage of care where the child was awake 
and active, parents were at the bedside. However, most children in the PICU who are 
this awake and active do not stay that long. This presented an interesting challenge 
because outside of his airway he was developing as usual. There were attempts to try 
to find supports for family so they could be present more. However, given the length 
of time Chase was in the PICU, life goes on, people need to get back to work, other 
kids require care, etc. Also, for some time he was unable to be touched and held due 
to his critical status and once he was less critical his airway was still quite terrifying, 
and he would often have events after a dislodgement.  
We see a huge gap when the kids transition from ICU 
side to IMC side…when you have a child that’s acutely 
ill and we’re telling you, ‘Stay away from him. Don’t 
touch him, that’s disturbing him. That’s making him 
sicker,’ then, like any parent, if your child is taken away 
from you, in a sense, for several months, you start, I 
think, detaching as self-preservation, and maybe not 
knowing exactly how you fit into helping him or her get 
better… (CM) 
 
     Caring for Chase, as the unit mascot, was almost a rite of passage to begin working 
in the unit. He was a very happy and engaging child and during a little over a year of 
interaction only within the PICU, he became close to many of the staff. Some 
animosity began to grow towards the parents from the weight of the responsibility 
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on a care role expanded to everyday growth and development, and risk around his 
airway, led to disappointment in the situation that seems to have been directed at 
parents. After all, it was the nurses who were there during his good days, bad days, 
critical events, and so on. This requires a lot of practical and moral work. 
I think there was a global perspective that he would at 
some point succumb to his multiple medical 
complexities…I think it was challenging to get a handle 
on him  and feel confident that he was going to sustain 
on your shift, and maintain stability…also knowing that 
he had this potential to go sideways pretty quickly…the 
nursing staff bore a lot of the care and process…but I 
think everyone’s goals were a little bit different in their 
investment. (SW) 
 
     Unfortunately, at two years and one month of age, one of his many decannulation 
events led to a hypoxic ischemic brain injury. One evening, at two years his alarm 
went off while his nurse was in their other patient’s room. Those outside noted the 
alarm and responded and his nurse returned to the room as well. His trach had come 
out and others were summoned, including the intensivist. As attempts were made to 
reinsert the tube, he became pulseless and CPR was initiated. During this episode his 
implanted central line broke as a medication was administered and a peripheral IV 
had to be inserted. Parents were called to come in. Although he had always recovered 
quickly from these events, he was slow to respond this time. Resuscitation protocols 
were followed. He was put on the ventilator and radiographic scans were obtained. 
I was sad. I immediately thought which nurse did it 
happen to and how are they dealing with it, knowing 
that his airway was so fragile. I experienced that many 
times, where he’d pull his trach out and literally within 
10 seconds he’d pass out. I’d put the trach back in and 
he was right back up playing again. And I knew it 
would only take mere seconds before something 
catastrophic could happen, and hearing that it did 
happen, it was like…Shocking, but definitely not 
surprising. (RN1) 
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that day. That was terrible. That was a hard day. We all 
got close to him, I think, so it was more like I was his 
auntie. That’s how it felt to me. It was heartbreaking. 
But we all knew it was possible. (RN3) 
     Normal post-arrest protocols were followed, and care was directed towards 
preserving as much function as possible. He was kept sedated and was requiring extra 
doses to keep him comfortable due to severe muscle contractions and autonomic 
storming. Pain and Palliative care were consulted to help manage his now complex 
medication regiment required to maintain safety and comfort. Staff on the unit were 
saddened at the tragic event, though not surprised. There was empathy for the nurses 
that had been there when it happened, and some relief to those who hadn’t had him in 
their care when it happened. As time passed it became clear that Chase would not 
recover to the happy and interactive child he was previously. The thought was that 
maybe he would be able to smile, cry, feel pain, etc. but not return to his previous 
status.  
     It was difficult to get his discomfort under control and he continued to receive 
doses of powerful sedatives intermittently. For a time after his event, he required 
sedative boluses throughout the day for agitation until Pain and Palliative care were 
able to get his comfort under control. For staff this was hard to watch and hard to 
convey to a family who saw a calm and quiet sedated child when they arrived. It was 
difficult to convey what was required to maintain his calm state and what he looked 
like prior to it. 
     The divisions between staff and family, already present, were starting to widen. 
There was a meeting held to review the event. There was some concern that Chase did 
not have an ECG monitor on at the time, (which was not verified) or it had come off, 
and that this was a reason that lead to the injury. However, nursing staff, and some 
physician staff members disagreed. This conclusion seemed to disregard the 
complexities around an active child in a rehab plan of care whose nurses were 
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continuously.  
     There was also suspicion of an additional episode of hypoxic injury during a 
bronchoscopy after this incident. There were feelings that Chase’s injury, though 
tragic, were a very probable outcome that was bound to happen despite all precautions 
in place in the PICU. However it was viewed by different staff members, the care 
team came to the conclusion that it was no longer in Chase’s best interests to maintain 
on life-sustaining therapies, withdrawal of these technologies was recommended.  
     The medical team felt that due to his new static encephalopathy, which reduced the 
desire to continue to perform surgeries on his airway, that Chase could now safely go 
home, preferably on hospice with a DNR in place. Parents, per notes, continued to 
feel that they do not wish to care for him in their home even with home care nursing. 
We turned to discussion of hospital discharge for 
[Chase], and the fact that the parents continue to feel 
that they do not wish to and cannot care for him in their 
home even with extensive home care nursing. 
(Ethics note from care conference) 
 
I think he was too complex, in their [parents] point of 
view, to be managed at home. Some of that was our 
own messaging of  saying, ‘He’s too complex, he’s too 
complex, you can’t take him home,’ and then all of a 
sudden we went through a dramatic shift from, ‘There’s 
no way, if we’re on this course of him being here until I 
don’t know what happens,’ to, ‘He had this incident, he 
can go home.’ (CM) 
 
 Parents also rejected the recommendation to withdraw the ventilator and allow 
natural death. The next option presented was that of group home placement. As time 
passed, with Chase still in the hospital, parents were intent on resolving all of Chase’s 
medical issues of which the particulars were unclear. The team contended that dealing 
with current and ongoing medical issues and preparing for discharge was not only a 
parallel process, but that Chase had been ready for discharge for some time.  
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and that [Chase] would remain in the hospital if his 
medical condition warranted, but has been ready for 
discharge for many months.  [CM] noted that she had 
been in touch with the group home and that they are 
open to a visit by the parents any day of the week.  For 
that reason SW on behalf of the team said that the 
family should make a visit by…and let us know if they 
had questions and would accept moving forward with 
the group home placement in [local area] or if they had 
decided to take [Chase] to their home, and if not we 
would move forward with a referral to Child Protective 
Services regarding the fact that [Chase] is medically 
ready for discharge but the parents are not actively 
working towards plan for discharge.              
 (Ethics note, care conference) 
 
     During this process there continued to be a disconnect around the responsibility of 
the parents for touring and choosing a group home and what the team felt as their 
responsibility over Chase’s disposition as not needing to be in the hospital. 
Eventually, the team felt that parents were not meeting their responsibility, and it was 
decided to set a deadline for parents to decide. If this deadline was not met, then child 
protective services (CPS) would be contacted, and medical foster care would be 
sought. The options on the table for Chase were either to go home with parents with 
home care nursing, to a group home, or to medical foster care. Through this, the team 
continued to recommend comfort care and hospice while parents continued to desire 
aggressive life-sustaining treatment.  
     Chase eventually was accepted into a group home. Group home nurses came to the 
hospital to learn Chase’s cares from the PICU nurses. Care management worked with 
the outside companies to line up all the medical and equipment needs. One of Chase’s 
primary nurses put together a book about him, his history, surgeries, life, care, etc. 
The day came, an ambulance transport team arrived in the morning. Chase was loaded 
up onto the stretcher and was rolled down the hall back through the main area of the 
PICU to the transport elevators; and he was gone. 
  
66      Twenty-four days later, the intensivist on service received a call that there was a 
three-year-old child coming in after a respiratory/cardiac arrest. The history was 
relayed to the intensivist and it became quite clear who the child was. The details of 
what happened are unclear, but his tracheostomy tube had somehow become 
decannulated and he was found unresponsive. The trach was reinserted, and CPR had 
been administered, his circulation returned, and he was brought back to the PICU. 
Standard post-resuscitation measures were implemented and the PICU nurses who 
had cared for him for so long were now caring for him once again. 
     Once post-resuscitation measures had been done, it had become clear that Chase 
had suffered some further brain injury due to anoxia. Once sedation was weaned off 
his neurological assessment proved poor and plans for brain death testing were made. 
The first brain death testing proved to be consistent for death by neurological criteria 
according to the hospital policy informed by state law and professional society 
recommendations. Consistent with the clinical standards and state statutes, a second 
brain death exam was performed 24 hours later by a pediatric neurologist. This 
second exam was also consistent with death by neurological criteria with no 
respiratory effort after his carbon dioxide levels reached 108 (normal is 35-55) during 
the apnea test.  
     The attending intensive care physician wrote a discharge note in Chase’s chart 
declaring him dead. Consistent with hospital policy, as well as national practice 
standards, if the child is not a candidate for organ donation, or if family refuses, the 
family has some time to gather prior to removal of the ventilator. In this case, family 
declined both organ donation and postmortem examination. His family requested time 
to investigate how they may transport him home to let him pass there instead of in the 
hospital. While this isn’t common it has been done by some families at their own 
expense. Somewhere in this time, Chase had an agonal breath that continued to 
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invalidate the diagnosis of death by neurological criteria. 
     Chase continued to have a flat line on his EEG monitor as well as show clear signs 
of having sustained a massive hypoxic-ischemic injury. Chase’s parents were 
informed that he no longer satisfied the criteria for brain death. Parent’s had been told 
of Chase’s potential demise many times before and he had always come back, 
including a time where they were told an innominate artery in his trachea would 
imminently burst and he would bleed out, yet he survived. Now here they were, once 
again, seeing their child alive after being told their child had died.  
     The medical team continued to maintain that while he was legally alive, they still 
recommended compassionate removal of the ventilator and to allow natural death 
and/or switch to a comfort care/hospice approach. The team voiced to parents, per 
ethics notes, that the treatments being asked to be performed were being done to him 
and not for and that further interventions would not be beneficial. Parents continued 
to look towards recovery and despite the team’s recommendation parents also did not 
consent to withholding any resuscitation measures if Chase’s heart stopped. 
     Chase was three and a half years of age, and there continued to be ongoing 
discussions with the family in the hopes of coming to some agreement towards the 
medical team’s recommendations. Despite this, family continued to state their goals 
being that of recovery with less medical equipment and the removal of his 
tracheotomy tube and reconnection of his airway, which had been, at this point, 
anatomically separated. The team continued to try to clarify the situation as much as 
possible for the parents in hopes of coming to a reasonable end. There continued to be 
intractable discussions around taking the child home and allowing the child to pass. 
Parents rejected this and requested time to think about and make these choices. The 
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for him. The bedside caregivers’ distress was mounting. 
After he had his first hit, there were things that brought 
him comfort. You could see that they were comforting 
to him. He loved to have his legs massaged, and who 
knows if he was smiling or not…We would play The 
Little Mermaid, and he would smile and his heart rate 
would go down. So there were things that we were able 
to do to give him comfort and give him some quality of 
life, and I felt like, okay, this is the quality of life that 
he has now. At least it's something. After his second hit, 
there was nothing. He would just have this twitching, 
and sometimes nothing at all. I just didn't feel like there 
was anything in there, and if there was something in 
there, it was painful to him, or like futility: no matter 
what we did, we would never get him to have any 
quality of life. No matter what. (RN3) 
 
The other piece of that was that the dad was insisting 
that his airway keep getting dilated. I think my stance 
was, okay, fine, if you don't have to do anything to him 
medically ever again and you can just leave him here in 
this body, you can maybe find some way to give him 
comfort. But the fact that we had to keep dilating his 
airway and keep doing things to him to keep his body 
here, for me that was too hard…(RN3) 
The family and team came to some initial decisions around working towards training 
parents and getting Chase home and if he stopped having agonal breaths then they 
would let him go. Chase continued to demonstrate no brain activity on the EEG 
monitor. 
     At this point, the home care agency reached out to the medical team and reported 
that they would not re-accept care for Chase without a DNR order in place. This came 
about after some home care nurses came to Chase’s bedside in the PICU to view some 
of his care where they witnessed his atypically low heart rate in the thirties, and his 
temperatures that were typically around 35 degrees Celsius.  
Given his overall condition and the high likelihood of 
further deterioration and the recent events in which 
changes in his cardiac status required fluids and his low 
heart rate, they realistically anticipated that a cardiac 
deterioration is likely at home, and in view of his 
overall status the nurses felt it was not appropriate to 
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provide care for him at home without a DNR in place.  
    (Ethics note) 
 
The medical team continued to reiterate their recommendation of compassionate 
extubation of his trachea. The note from a care conference around this discussion also 
notes an extensive description of the concern from caregivers that they were doing 
potentially harmful things to Chase. At this point, a dispute resolution process put 
together by the hospital and physician group was proposed to the family with the goal 
being to identify a mutually agreeable plan of care. 
     This process outlined the limits of current care for Chase in the hospital and that 
there will be no escalation of major treatments such as dialysis, ECMO, and cardiac 
device or structural interventions. There would be continued effort to contact home 
care agencies and Chase would be transferred when medically stable enough. 
Discharging to the family home was now officially abandoned as a goal. The medical 
team stated their pursuance of second opinions from various relevant specialties. 
Transfer to another acute care institution would be attempted through hospital to 
hospital contact.  
     National institutions in different states were contacted, all refused. Some of these 
institutions seemed interested in the airway problem itself but due to Chase’s overall 
condition they were not willing to accept him in transfer. These refusals of transfer 
were discussed with the child’s father who seemed to disagree with how clinicians 
were connecting the airway and neurologic problems. This was explained that to 
attempt to fix the airway became for many clinicians and experiment with no benefit 
to Chase. The final piece of the resolution process stated that if it does not end in 
some mutually agreed upon plan, that court intervention would be pursued. 
     Second opinions were obtained from specialists in intensive care, neurology, and 
ethics. The reports from these were shared with the parents. Of note is a section of the 
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conference: 
The likelihood of meaningful recovery is nil and that his 
tracheal stenosis is not capable of being repaired due to 
his development of scar tissue and stenosis.  His airway 
is critical and not able to be repaired in a more 
meaningful way, and thus, he would never be able to 
leave the hospital.  Due to his unfixable compromised 
airway, it is unlikely that a group facility would accept 
him unless his parents agreed to DNR status. Per the 
chart, his parents are not accepting of this option and 
thus discharge from the hospital is not a 
possibility.  Based on my careful review of [Child]’s 
medical records, imaging, and physical exam and 
discussions with his medical team and [father], the 
combination of severe hypoxic ischemic injury and lack 
of cortical functioning with an unstable airway lead me 
to conclude that continued provision of life-sustaining 
treatment is non-beneficial and potentially 
inappropriate.   (Outside Ethics Consult note) 
 
This outside ethics consultant had met with Chase’s father. This didn’t seem to move 
the needle any further. The longer discussions went on the more intractable they 
seemed to become. Parents continued to look towards a goal of treating Chase’s 
airway along with hoping for recovery from his brain damage. There was some 
discussion from parents around construction of a 3-D trachea, hyperbaric oxygen 
therapy, and other experimental treatments. At this point the two options going 
forward presented to parents were mediation and continued attempts by parents to 
find another institution willing to treat Chase in accordance with the parents’ wishes. 
     Disagreement around further treatment and benefits to Chase was ongoing. Parents 
continued to ask for him to stay in the hospital until he is well, while the hospital team 
believed that he could not get any better. 
[Father] asked why [Chase] just can’t stay in the 
hospital until he can get well.  I noted that there is a 
basic disagreement of understanding between them as 
parents and the hospital team, with the health care team 
believing that [Chase] can not [sic] get better, and the 
parents believing that he can. [Father] asked what the 
law says about situations in which there is not 
  
71 possibility of getting better.  He then added that the 
problem is people feel that they do not want to treat 
[Chase] anymore, and I acknowledged that this is true 
for many because they feel they are not helping 
[Chase].  (Ethics note) 
 
At this point, the ethicist recommended an outside mediator to become involved given 
that there is disagreement around the central concept of Chase’s ability to improve. 
Parents stated concerns that the mediator was a way for the hospital to pressure them 
into removing life support from Chase. The parents also discussed concern that 
mediation was a way to build a case for CPS. 
     Continued intermittent testing of Chase by EEG continued to show no brain activity, 
a flat line. The intensivist explained his finding that there is limited cranial nerve 
function and upper brain cortical function did not return on exam or EEG. The team 
continued their recommendation to shift towards comfort care/hospice plan. The 
parents at this time stated their desire to have Chase out of the hospital with a stable 
airway. During this conversation the intensivist stated that it is unlikely that Chase’s 
airway will ever be stable enough to be cared for outside of the hospital and did not 
believe that Chase could get home safely. The intensivist stated the probability that 
Chase will arrest either in the hospital or home and no home nursing will take Chase 
on without a DNR order.  
     The mediation went forward with questionable success. Chase did finally discharge 
to a different group home a year after his final admission. He was four years and four 
months of age. His final narrative summary lists twelve active problems:  
severe static encephalopathy with profound neurologic 
dysfunction, tracheal stenosis with aorto-homograph 
with limited granulation tissue but patent airway, 
complete laryngeal occlusion, tracheostomy and 
ventilator dependence with pseudomonas and candida 
colonization, intercurrent urinary tract infection, 
Trisomy 21, hypertension, ischemic bowel injury-
feeding intolerance, past TPN support; enteral feeding 
dependent, iliofemoral thrombus on Lovenox, adrenal 
insufficiency with baseline and stress steroid deficiency, 
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central origin. (Narrative summary from chart) 
     Chase had multiple bronchoscopies and dilatations throughout his hospitalizations, 
multiple procedures, and over ten surgeries including ECMO cannulation. He 
discharged on twenty-two medications. It was decided by parents but encouraged by 
the hospital that they would transfer Chase’s future care and/or stabilization to another 
institution. At the time of writing, in 2019, he is still alive and would be almost seven 
years-old. Before his final discharge, one of his primary nurses had the following 
discussion with Chase’s father: 
It's interesting, because I did get into a conversation 
with Dad shortly before the final discharge. He had 
asked me something like, 'Do you think my son will 
ever be who I remember?' Then he showed me a video 
at 3 months of age where he's sitting in a high chair 
laughing -- or maybe it was in infancy, because at 3 
months he probably wouldn't be in a high chair -- just 
laughing and attentive, playing with toys, and he said, 
'Do you think I will ever see this again, [RN2]?' and I 
said, 'It is a beautiful memory. I have never seen that. 
It's refreshing to see. But that is a memory from the 
past. It's not current. And I think you need to see your 
son as who he is right now. And if you enjoy that, and 
you value that, and you find that worthwhile, and you 
love him, what more do you need?' But I said, 'If you're 
using that as your goal, I don't think that will be in the 
future.' So he was crying, and I felt awful. But I couldn't 
not answer. I'd never not answered him. And I 
apologized for the tears, and then he discharged. 
Probably in the best situation -- of what we can do here, 
on earth. (RN2) 
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Chapter 5: Results 
 
     This chapter will report the results of this investigation and analysis into the main 
research questions that undergirded the study: (1) what must exist for this [intractable 
conflict] to happen? and (2) what is the social structure around this case and how is it 
operating? This can be more clearly stated as discovering how participants viewed 
their role in relation to the roles of others to include organizational and institutional 
components. The social structure is in a sense, everyone and everything involved or 
intertwined with the point of reference, the case or child. The data collected and 
reported here will be analyzed critically and ethically using Margaret Urban Walker’s 
expressive-collaborative model of morality as stated in the third specific aim of this 
study. Walker’s expressive-collaborative model of morality provides a useful tool for 
analysis of this data because of its ability to examine moral practices critically within 
the complexity of a social structure. Walker’s model can aid in analysis of this data as 
it locates moral practice through the complexity of identities, relationships, and 
practices (Mohammed & Peter, 2009, p. 296).  
     To answer the research questions and the study aims, a single case study design 
was developed drawing from systems theory and critical realism to explore the social 
structure through semi-structured interviews and chart review, analysis of policies, 
concepts, and artifacts referenced in the data. Of particular interest was how 
participants involved in the case viewed their roles, responsibilities, and obligations 
around a very complex case. Participants were specifically asked how they viewed 
their role and responsibility, obligation, and their conception of futility. Findings from 
this study can help us examine how these cases happen and provide a lens into the 
institution of healthcare to examine causality, social structure, and the moral spaces 
that exist. 
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     Interviews were conducted by the researcher with persons who were primary 
providers and caregivers in this case. Subjects were identified by previous knowledge 
of this case, chart review, as well as report from other study participants. Consent was 
obtained through agreement to be interviewed and recorded. Three nurses were 
identified as primary nurses to the child and agreed to participate (RN1, RN2, RN3). 
One social worker (SW) and one case manager (CM) who is also a nurse by 
profession, agreed to participate. Three physicians agreed to participate, one 
intermediate medical care physician who was the child’s physician the longest 
(IMCMD), one intensive care physician and pulmonologist (ICUPULM), as well as 
the child’s pain and palliative care physician (PPMD). The hospital ethicist at the time 
also agreed to participate (Ethicist). Requests to participate were also sent to the 
primary ENT surgeon and the hospital risk manager, however these requests went 
unanswered. Risk management did answer one request, but this researcher was unable 
to meet within the offered timeframe, further requests to reschedule went unanswered. 
     Much consideration went into the question of an interview request to the parents of 
this child. Ultimately the answers to the research questions would be strengthened by 
the inclusion of the parental view. However, inclusion of parents was weighed against 
any burdens that participation would put on them. An email request was sent to the 
email contact provided to this researcher by one of the parents during a discussion 
around using their child’s case for research and education. The request was for either 
email questions, phone, or in-person interview. A reply to this request was never 
returned. 
Data Analysis 
     Interviews averaged forty-five to ninety minutes, recordings were sent for 
transcription. All names of persons and places were removed for privacy, as well as 
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from chart review. During analysis of this data names of persons and places were 
removed, as well as any information about the family. Structured questions were 
asked about the participants role, responsibilities, obligations, and feelings and 
thoughts around futility throughout the timepoints in the case.  
     Once interviews were transcribed, analysis began in an ongoing process. Any 
errors in transcription were verified with the audio and/or clarification with 
participant. Initial open coding was performed with another researcher experienced in 
qualitative analysis until consensus in analysis was reached. Predetermined themes 
were identified in a directed coding process towards how the person perceived their 
role and what concepts, policies, and objects were discussed, and how they viewed 
the idea of futility. Other themes were identified in an open coding process. After 
preliminary data analysis, consensus with two researchers trained in qualitative 
methods was reached. 
     Chart review data was collected in an ongoing process as relevant information was 
referenced in the interviews. Initially, history and physicals and narrative summaries 
were collected as these are generally known to be the primary summary of admissions 
and discharges. These documents, along with care conference and ethics notes were 
utilized for constructing the story.  
Findings: 
     The following were findings from data analysis of participant narratives. 
Following pre-conceived outline adapted from Walker’s expressive-collaborative 
model of morality, narratives were analyzed for themes. Results are grouped into 
nurses, allied staff, and physicians, or individually identified. Of note, the care 
manger (CM) is a nurse but for ease of data analysis and presentation the current role 
that participant is in fits well with allied health. Tables 4 through 6 below will report 
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how responsibility was accepted, assigned, and deflected which emerged from the 
data throughout the different timepoints. While accepting, assigning, and deflecting 
are used to group the data, a more nuanced analysis will be presented in the 
interpretation section with reference to the outline adapted from Walker in chapter 
three.6 
Nursing Role  
     While nursing participants reported many roles, their primary obligation was 
reported to be to the patient through caregiving, advocacy, and educating and 
coordinating with family and other staff (Table 4). Each of these nurse participants 
had taken on the role of primary nurse for this child. The primary nurse role, in the 
institution where this case took place, means that any time one of these nurses is 
scheduled they will be taking care of this child. This means that they will be experts 
in the care of this child, familiar to the child and his parents, and provide seamless 
and consistent care from the time of signing on as primary to when the child leaves 
the PICU; often when a child is readmitted as well. It is discouraged to remove 
yourself as a primary without valid reasons. This commitment is a major one given 
that signing up as a primary can mean being with the patient through the critical phase 
and possibly a lengthy rehab phase in the intermediate care side of the unit, which is 
often less exciting than the ICU side.  
     These nurse participants report an obligation and role towards rescue or care in 
responding to the child’s many events due to his treacherous airway in the initial 
                                               
6 While this first section will refer to role and responsibility, the following section will deal more specifically with “practices of 
responsibility.” It is impossible to remove responsibility completely from how participants view their particular role but I 
separate them due to the differing analytic process of deductive versus inductive. Meaning, I asked participants specifically about 
how they view their role, but how they assign, accept, or deflect responsibility, structure it, and morally account for practice is 
analyzed inductively. 
  
77 timepoint in his hospitalization (Table 4). Their role also included monitoring and 
translating information to parents and between staff members. 
 
Table 4. Nursing Role and Responsibilities 
Nursing Role and Responsibilities 
Roles Narrative 
RN1 Primary 
caregiver, 
advocate, 
teacher, 
translator, 
protector 
“First and foremost it’s the patient. I’m going for the patient. That’s my assignment, and 
that’s what I’m going to do: promote and advocate for the patient…I get advice from the 
team on how to care for the patient, and from there I go to the parents and say ‘this is 
what’s going on.’” 
“…doing primary care of the child: monitoring vital signs; keeping him safe; keeping the 
parents informed of what’s going on; keeping the docs informed of what progress he’s 
making, where he stands; and also interpreting what the docs are saying to the parents 
and how the parents are interpreting that.” 
“…I explain the details of past histories of patients I’ve dealt with and reference those, 
and I explain the life-altering and life-changing processes that will and can occur if 
certain medical interventions occur…” 
“..I felt it very important to nurture [growth and development], to let him experience a 
little bit of the world going on around him…” 
“…still advocating for him, making sure that he was cared for, and then trying to figure 
out where we were going to go from there.” 
“Teaching the home care nurses how to take care of him.” 
“I couldn’t leave him. I signed on as the primary, and for me a primary continues until 
that discharge—my obligation.” 
 
RN2 Cheerleader, 
primary 
caregiver, 
primary 
teacher, 
advocate, 
protector 
 
“Just to cheerlead, to praise them [parents], to encourage them, to support them, to lift 
them up that what they're doing is just what they would do for their other kids…It's a lot 
more medical than what they would do for their other children, but it just takes love and 
common sense and watchful eyes, and parents can do it, and they need to be praised and 
encouraged when they do a good job. Did I ever believe that this child would ever go 
home? No. But do you know what? The child and the family deserved the best chance. I 
knew he would have nursing in the home, so the education and the training would 
continue on at home, and he would be safe.” 
“…First to the patient…even if I have a different viewpoint or see something 
different…Second, to family, to help them understand an honest and truthful picture of 
their child, and always tackling those difficult, awkward, uncomfortable topics…quality 
of life, how to interpret changes of condition…” 
“…A lot of listening and understanding parents’ perspective…the listening there then 
helps me formulate ideas and suggestions to the team of how we might be able to better 
approach [the goal].” 
“Because ultimately parents are the back-up, so they have to believe that they can do it. 
And trying to teach them little idiosyncrasies of their son, like how to read the nonverbal 
communication that maybe a diaper needs to be changed, and catching it early on so that 
he isn't into a full-blown agitation episode, things like that.” 
“Having to advocate for active treatment for a chronically ill child is like pulling teeth 
sometimes.” 
“I don’t know that I would evaluate my cares for this child as valuable, but what I did 
have going on in my mind was that I knew this child as a person, he knew me, so he was 
deserving of my time and energy. Just as I do for every child, I want to make things 
better, not worse, and if I can do that, I’ll figure out how to do that.” 
 
RN3 Coordinator, 
advocate, 
responder, 
protector, 
primary 
caregiver, 
caretaker 
 
“…Try to coordinate with the family well and…be very thorough. I see that as a primary 
responsibility, to advocate for him and just give some consistency to get good care.” 
“He had a really, really treacherous airway, so just to be ready for any intervention that 
he could possibly need.” 
“…I felt like giving him the most we could give him in that situation, giving him the 
consistency and giving him….compassion…” 
“…[Responsibilities] became more restorative: more rehab, more looking at him and 
seeing how much more we could back neurologically…” 
“I felt like I was caring for a body, at that point. After his second neuro hit, there wasn’t 
anything that resembled him left…” 
 
Allied Staff Role 
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worker (SW), and clinical ethicist (Ethicist). The roles of the participants in this group 
are quite varied and it was not expected that similarities would necessarily be seen. 
However, in their own way, via their professional lens, they were the most consistent 
clinicians who took on the responsibility of maintaining the communication and 
narrative of the case. CM reported planning, coordinating, and forecasting in relation 
to discharge disposition. CM reports a primary responsibility to the child and their 
needs which includes working with the parents to achieve that. SW reports a role 
supporting parents and helping them navigate the hospital system, bridging 
communication between hospital care team and family, as well as connecting family 
with any outside resources. SW does also report supporting the patient, which in this 
case involves supporting the family primarily as the child is critically ill and young.  
      These participants do have a duty to the patient in the same way the hospital or 
other staff would through a more broad interest in a child’s welfare. In this particular 
case SW reports taking on the role of managing and maintaining what amounted to a 
complex communication web. Ethicist reports an obligation to understand the 
different viewpoints and perspectives around the case. Ethicist takes a management 
role of the situation by looking at the case from many different aspects and 
investigating strategies for mediation. It is interesting to note that these allied staff 
members are both a part of the healthcare team structure and also separate from the 
main clinical staff. The allied staff seem to sort of exist within and just outside the 
main relational node that connects the nursing and physician staff to the child. The 
allied staff have a more broad relational position that is connected through 
relationships to the whole of the structure- child, nurse, physician, parent- contrasted 
to that of nurse and physician who see primary relation to the patient and then family. 
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after the first neurologic injury. Once the case became more complicated SW reports 
supporting staff as well as managing expectations and perspectives of staff coming 
into this situation which seems to have sparked distress or confusion. SW reports 
helping staff maintain perspective, understand the global picture, and keeping the 
narrative straight amongst constantly changing nursing staff and physicians who 
rotated every seven days. Ethicist, once consulted on the case, joined SW in managing 
the complexity of the situation and the constantly changing clinicians. 
 
Table 5. Allied Staff Role and Responsibilities 
Allied Staff Role and Responsibilities 
Roles Narrative 
CM Coordinator, 
planner, 
forecaster 
“…We now follow every child in the hospital…with their insurance reviews to their 
discharge planning, so we review every case…” 
“I meet with providers to identify a discharge timeline and identify their discharge 
needs; I talk to families to help coordinate those services at home, explaining what 
going home entails, what equipment is needed, what training is needed…We also plan 
care conferences...coordinate with the outside services, the family, and the providers to 
get everything they need in place…” 
“I like to view myself as here for the kids. A lot of the discharge planning requires 
parent involvement, so I like to try to put the child’s priorities first and then work with 
the family to make those needs happen.” 
 
SW Supporter, 
navigator, 
communicator, 
narrative 
keeper,   
“Support the family; support for the patient; helping them navigate the hospital system; 
navigating community resources, if needed, or community-based resources; and aiding 
in communication between team and family.” 
“…My role shifted to help navigate what the team's new goals or expectations and 
recommendations were…” 
“A lot of my work was supporting the staff and helping them maintain some 
perspective. A lot of people were dropping into this situation.” 
- “… Helping them understand that the family had had this course to this point, that it 
would be hard for any family to appreciate a recommendation knowing that he survived 
some of those… understanding that there are realities that we all have to face, and we 
have to support that.” 
- “…Supporting the primaries that were in there routinely, knowing that they had a point 
of reference for who he was, and then helping the people that were new to his situation 
understand the global picture.” 
- “…We started to, at times, villainize the parents, when we were just as culpable in what 
his course was and what our role was in communication and expectation. 
“I was eyes and ears, I guess, on the unit,” 
“It was Ethics and I trying to help maintain that common thread across the whole team, 
knowing that every seven days you had potentially a new provider, a new nursing group, 
a new whatever…my primary interaction was with catching people up to speed, or one 
more of a social dynamic of what was going on and where we were in that, trying to 
move things forward, and engaging with Ethics and what were other options to see some 
kind of resolution to the now-developing solid conflict that we were in.” 
 
Ethicist Mediator, 
analyzer, 
complexity 
manager 
“The first role is to try to understand the different points of view about what has 
happened and then to come up with some formulation of what actions might be 
helpful…” 
“The first responsibility is always to the patient, to the child. The second circle of 
responsibility is the family. The third…is direct caregivers. The next…would be the 
people who support the direct caregivers…The next circle…is the institution…” 
 
Physician 
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viewpoints. That being said, IMCMD and ICUPULM are both intensive care 
physicians. While IMCMD primarily cared for the child during his lengthy rehab and 
recovery phase, timepoint two, ICUPULM cared for the child during all timepoints 
both as a primary intensivist and consulting pulmonologist and took on a primary role 
in the end timepoints. PPMD reports a much different role that seems to be more 
complex or broad. It is interesting to contrast PPMD and the RN’s multitude of roles 
described, to the two other physicians. One way of looking at this may be to consider 
whether a broader or less concrete the responsibilities are the more role codes are 
found. A striking difference between other participants and the physician participants 
is the way in which they related their narrative, in a much more objective and less 
personal way. One could interpret from this that the more personal the role the more 
role codes there are or at least are more complex and nuanced.  
      
Table 6. Physician Role and Responsibilities 
Physician Role and Responsibilities 
Roles Narrative 
IMCMD Physician, 
Partner 
“We didn’t have as much help as we do now, so I did a lot of the helping things.” 
“You’re obligated [to provide care] until there is a futility policy…that legally is seen 
throughout this country.” 
“As a group, we had a couple of other cases…where we discussed this, whether we 
wanted to do this [override parents] and be the first to do it.” 
 
PPMD Pain and 
Palliative care 
physician, 
Symptom 
management, 
Decisions and 
goals coach, 
consultant,  
“…Medication management of some symptom versus a medical decision-making and 
goals-of-care conversation…” 
“…My role is to try to explain in great detail what these options really are and clarify 
each option they’re presented with; help families weigh the benefits and burdens of 
each of these options, even to the granular level of what day-to-day life is like; and 
help them as they try to weigh what that means for their child.” 
“…The biggest thing we do is to try to outline their goals of care and how they see the 
situation.” 
“I think a lot of people have expectations of us, but my primary responsibility is to the 
child.” 
“Eventually I signed off. I gave my best recommendation: that this was an ethical 
issue… and needed to go through formal mediation…That was not accepted by the 
team, so, given that the child was comfortable, I didn’t see another role for myself…” 
“…I don’t think I was actually serving him so much as coming to provide an outlet 
for the nurses with the moral distress that they were feeling, and trying to show up for 
the medical team to help shoulder the burden…” 
“…I’m a consultant…” 
“Really, our primary palliative care role was to identify the goals and help family 
make sure they understood the risks and benefits of all things being offered.” 
 
ICUPULM Intensivist, 
pulmonologist 
“I was either playing intensivist or pulmonologist…” 
“As an intensivist one is more proactive with decision making. As a pulmonologist in 
the ICU you’re a consultant and the role is reduced to consulting, not necessarily 
making the decision to move forward in one direction or the other.” 
“We treated him like really any airway surgery patient, which involves nutrition, 
analgesia, airway support.” 
  
81 [As a pulmonologist] “Once this got into the land of tracheostomy, there’s education, 
interventions, technical skills that have to be mastered by the family, home care 
arrangements have to be made, and there has to be a collective decision that the 
patient is safe enough to go home…from a physiologic point of view.” 
“I think the dilemma we have as providers is that we often fall prey to the notion that 
if we just do this, the child might survive.” 
[After 2nd event] “All I can say is consciousness was not available to this child to 
experience pain. For me, the person in the bed meant much, much less than the people 
caring for that person in the bed. 
 
Process of Responsibility: 
     The process of responsibility refers to the way in which the particular identity-
relationship influences the way responsibilities are assigned, accepted, and deflected. 
These themes identify how participants viewed the structure of responsibility, 
construction and transformation of the moral space, and moral accounting within and 
throughout the case. The results will be interpreted through the different time points. 
While accepting, assigning, and deflecting are used to organize the data, these do not 
necessarily represent strict lines of delineation, rather it is more complicated. 
Timepoint 1 
     On admission, as with any critically ill child, the focus was on stabilization and 
determination of the situation. There was fewer narrative data about this time then 
there was about the later times, particularly as the case progressed towards conflict. 
This is interesting as it could signify the ‘routineness’ of the initial timepoint being 
that the child was critically ill and following the normal order of the PICU. Later 
timepoints deviated from this norm and thus, arguably, stands out more for the 
participants.  
     The main themes that resonate from the data with regard to this timepoint is how 
the responsibility over the decisions were structured. It was described by RN1, as well 
as ICUPULM, that three options were presented to the family: pull the breathing tube 
and allow the child to pass, transfer to a center for transplant or one that specializes in 
this issue or attempt reconstruction in the current facility (Table 7). This assigning of 
responsibility for these choices to parents is interesting, and one could argue that it is 
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great job of explaining choices such as this, and that maybe we should have insisted 
on the specialty center (Table 7). This could be seen as the providers assigning the 
responsibility to the parents to make a decision that they may not necessarily be 
equipped to make, which is in line with normal practice.  
     The gravity of the responsibility in taking care of this child is reported by SW 
(Table 7). Assigning, or being assigned to his care (or accepting his care) was 
challenging due to his propensity to spontaneously decompensate. Nursing 
assignments are made by the charge nurse and therefore this duty is both assigned and 
accepted, as a nurse technically can refuse an assignment. Accepted to a lesser degree 
for most nurses and to a higher degree for the nurses in this study who took on care as 
a primary nurse. This commitment, given the responsibility of assuming his fragile 
care, seems quite monumental. Assignment and acceptance are less clear with allied 
and physician participants because if they are on service then the child is under their 
responsibility with less of an ability to refuse it or deflect it. 
     This first timepoint is where we start to see how moral accounting and structures 
of responsibility emerge. As a child is acutely ill there is an increase in responsibility 
of the nurse and other medical staff. As reported by CM, parents often cannot even 
touch their critically ill child due to its fragility (Table 7). This seems to represent 
more of a removal or a loss of responsibility, albeit necessary. And as CM, further 
reports, it seems natural that a parent may detach, particularly if it becomes a 
prolonged time. The admission by ICUPULM around well we explain difficult 
procedures to parents, such as the one the child in this case required, speaks to a sort 
of deflection of responsibility by assigning decisions to parents (Table 7). What 
ICUPULM is questioning is whether we should have offered the choice. This suggests 
that while we seem to feel required to offer choices, there is concern that there are 
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interesting here is that while choice is seen to empower parents over a paternalistic 
healthcare provider the actual offering of more choice may be just as depowering, 
particularly if the gravity of the choices is not fully understood, and/or the choices 
elicit competing interests for parents and child. 
Timepoint 2 
     As the child aged and improved in his condition he became more interactive. The 
second timepoint finds the responsibilities shifting away from continuous critical 
intervention towards intermittent and potential problems. With the child’s increased 
awareness of the world around him, RN1 reports a responsibility to nurture the child’s 
growth and development (Table 7). Again, the commitment of the role of primary 
nurse sees the acceptance of responsibility for the child-as-child, rather than simply 
child-as-patient. This distinction of the child-patient and child-child is an interesting 
finding. This speaks to a deeper commitment than an assumption of a patient 
assignment but a responsibility towards the child’s course, care, and needs. At the 
same time the data that suggests that there was an expectation from staff that parents 
should be more present at the bedside.  
     There was also a great fear that was present around the stability of the child as 
reported by RN3 (Table 7). This was also reported CM, where the data suggests that 
due to the tenuous nature the staff accepted responsibility around keeping the child in 
the PICU while at the same time expecting (assigning) responsibility towards the 
parents where earlier this responsibility of parents was removed or unassigned by 
staff due to the child’s status. The notion of staff accepting responsibility to keep the 
child in the PICU seems a more global theme though. The decision-makers, the agents 
who endeavored down the path that led to the child’s fragility, weren’t really 
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by necessity, whether intentional or not.  
     There is no data that suggests the outcome of having to stay in the PICU was 
known, however, as a consequence of the decision to reconstruct the airway, this was 
the consequence and through continued interventions and care there is an implicit 
acceptance of responsibility. The participants who are not the main decision-makers 
seem to accept this responsibility differently. One could say they are assigned this 
responsibility, though if this is considered a possibility within the realm of pediatric 
critical care acceptance could be viewed by continued involvement in the domain, 
though this would be a derivative view that could be argued as problematic.  
     Deflection of responsibility in timepoint two became complicated. As SW reports, 
there is a reasonable assumption that given the longevity of this child remaining in the 
PICU, that life goes on, and the parents have other responsibilities that are also 
important (Table 7). As CM reports, the child’s airway was not stable enough to go 
home and have parents assume the responsibilities for their child’s care (Table 7). 
However, during this time there was an assigning of responsibility from CM to nurses 
to begin educating them on their child’s cares (Table 7).  
     Given that the child had an unknown length of time until discharge and an 
unknown trajectory towards his cares at discharge, while CM’s role is to begin 
discharge planning early (Table 5), the question becomes whether parents accepted, or 
should accept, responsibility at this stage. What the unintended consequence of this 
problem may have been, as evidenced in the data by SW, is that parents did not see 
the day-to-day care and crises that staff bore. Here, the findings suggest a 
responsibility for seeing or bearing witness to the child’s struggles and successes. 
Within this data there is some moral accounting and structuring of responsibility that 
appears important to the moral space and community around this child (Table 7). 
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is important to the participants in this case where those, the parents, who are 
perceived to not being witness to it are not within the moral community, and are thus 
deflecting some responsibility (or having responsibility deflected), according to the 
participant data.  
Timepoint 3 
     This time period begins after the child’s first neurological injury following one of 
his many events where his trach came out and he decompensated, which is to say, he 
almost died, and his brain was starved of oxygen. Nurses continued similar roles and 
responsibilities which was to care and advocate for him (Table 7). The nurses 
continued their commitment as primary nurses and the roles and responsibilities that 
came with that, the goals, or how those are carried out may have changed. RN1 
reports continued responsibilities to the child related to the new potential path forward 
(Table 7). This suggests that the acceptance of primary nursing is still present but that 
instead of advocating towards ensuring growth and development it may change 
towards comfort. RN3 echoes this in the data as reported by showing a commitment 
to providing the child with best possible care, and at the very least, compassion (Table 
7).  
     Data from this timepoint show the emergence of moral distress and the beginnings 
of a moral community. PPMD discusses taking on the responsibility to help the nurses 
and alleviating some of the burden of the medical team (Table 7). This timepoint 
shows SW and PPMD as purposefully attempting to support staff members and 
helping cope through maintaining a continuity and perspective of the situation (Table 
7). This suggests that significant distress and possibly confusion around the situation 
was emerging and these two participants felt a moral claim to aid the other caregivers 
in this. There seems to be a certain vulnerability to the situation of the nurses and 
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responding to this and attempting to mitigate some distress or help clarify the 
situation, or at least help shoulder the burden.  
     The data also shows how responsibility for the child’s safety had to be balanced 
with parental requests and needs. At this point the child still had a tenuous airway and 
was difficult to move due to the ventilator tubing and his muscle contractions. While 
this may have been seen, as is suggested by RN2, as inconsistencies to parents, there 
is a reality of ownership of any further injury towards the child on the nursing staff. 
There is a sense that there was a conflict between attempting to aid parents in having 
physical time with their child and balancing the vulnerability of the child to 
movements along with responsibility the nurses had to the child’s safety. Nurses seem 
to have had conflicting responsibilities with no clear way to balance them among the 
many demands put upon them.  
     This timepoint brought out data that suggests there was significant confusion 
around how responsibility was assigned. SW points out the multitude of attempts to 
convey the fragility of the child on parents in what seems like an attempt to bring 
them in to the moral community, to bear some witness to the work required to keep 
this child alive (Table 7). This confusion of control is also evident from RN2, who 
articulates how this lack of control puts the nurse in a vulnerable spot with 
responsibility being assigned through the perceived lack of any agent accepting or 
being assigned overall responsibility. At this point there were ongoing discussions 
between parents and physicians on what to do, with significant disagreements. As SW 
indicates, the parents had been told several times that the child was likely going to 
die, and he didn’t, and so why should they understand the fragility (Table 7). Given 
the data around the fear nurses felt, and the responsibility for the child’s possible 
decline, and the parents perceived viewpoint of how durable the child seemed to be, 
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responsibility, or hazard, then other actors within and around the child’s case. The 
resentment inevitable from this fractured moral space is found in the data from SW, in 
the description about villainizing the parents (Table 7). There is fear and thus an anger 
among nurses around the situation they are being put in, and it seems to be felt despite 
SW’s attempts to provide perspective. The moral sentiment around the child’s care, 
and the moral weight of it on the nursing staff at the bedside was too great.  
     Deflection of responsibility is seen in the data during this timepoint in several 
different ways. PPMD reports signing off the case because attempts to assist the 
situation and take on some of the responsibility was rejected by the main team, as 
well as that PPMD’s responsibilities for this participant, comfort of the child, were 
satisfied (Table 7). Deflection out of fear was also found due to risk of litigation. In 
addition to this, as CM’s narrative shows, the medical team had been telling the 
family how complex the child was and that he had to stay in PICU, and then there was 
a change and suddenly he could go home (Table 7). There is evidence in the data at 
this point where there was an attempt to reassign responsibility to parents, who had 
previously seen their responsibility unassigned. Provider responsibility to make the 
decision they felt was best was deflected due to fear of litigation or bad press for the 
hospital. There seems to be multiple views of differing responsibilities, all of which 
either were confusing, conflicting, unrealized, unassigned, or expected but not 
explicit. 
Timepoint 4 
     The data from this timepoint shows a detaching from the case by nurses and 
physicians who were not primary caregivers. There was an acceptance of 
responsibility only when there was a crisis that had to be dealt with. Evidence of 
ongoing distress particularly around the change in personhood the child underwent is 
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7). At this point, data from RN2, finds that the child’s father affirms responsibility, 
whether accepted or taken back, is seen and this is an interesting point as previous 
data suggests that the team had been attempting to reassign responsibility to the 
parents through discharging him home. Here, the father, is giving a time and goal of 
his responsibility.  
     At this timepoint there is an attempt to assign responsibility or to bring parents into 
the moral space that the caregivers are existing in by getting them to witness the 
moral work of continuing to rescue this child. This attempt was aimed at getting the 
parents to understand the gravity of the responsibility that the nurses bore. Yet, it 
seems to have only assured parents that they could not take responsibility for the 
child’s care in their home. The attempts to assign the responsibility to the parents may 
not be ideal, as PPMD indicates, but at the same time the norm seems to be that it is 
the parents who ultimately have to make the decisions around life-sustaining 
therapies. The data suggests that while this is the accepted norm, it is problematic. 
The decisions are burdensome to parents and ultimately, as evidence here, nurses 
seem to bear the brunt of the hazard of this process while some participants could 
easily deflect and distance themselves, nurses were inherently bound to the bedside. 
     The data discusses blunting responsibilities that parents have in making decisions 
they don’t seem equipped to make (Table 7). ICUPULM discusses this reality within 
decision-making that indicates the complexity of how responsibilities are accepted, 
assigned, and deflected within this space. The data shows this fracturing and 
complexity, and how it influences the space that this child exists in. In deflection of 
responsibility in this timepoint (Table 7). There are expectations of parents assuming 
care and responsibility with the acknowledgement that the care is very complex that 
had required trained nurses for years, with a sudden shift of responsibility. Also 
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make a particular decision which is deflected on the parents or assigned to parents 
depending on whether you think parents should be making these decisions or not.  
     Also evident in the data in this timepoint is the structure of responsibility and the 
ability to disengage or deflect. There is data that speaks to an isolation of bedside staff 
who are ultimately responsible for the child’s status and must work hard to get other 
staff members to accept responsibility for the needs of the child. There is also some 
deflection around advocating for the child as person and responsibility to the parents 
as decision-makers. At this point, deflection of responsibility it seen through 
disengagement and reluctance to make decisions that are seen as best for the child. 
Much of this deflection is understood and fitting within the norms of the space but are 
also seen as problematic in the data. Participant data suggests that there was 
consensus on what was best for the child, and that parents shouldn’t be solely 
responsible for that choice, yet due to fears around bad press and litigation there is a 
shared responsibility towards parents, hospital, and legal to all weigh in on the choice.  
 
Table 7. Process of Responsibility 
Process of Responsibility 
 Narrative 
Timepoint 1 Accepting 
 
 
Assigning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deflecting 
 
 
 
“…Try to coordinate with the family well and…be very thorough. I see that as a 
primary responsibility, to advocate for him and just give some consistency to get good 
care.” (RN3) 
 
“Pull the breathing tube and let him go, transfer him for a transplant, or the ENT would 
attempt to rework his trachea.” (RN1) 
“ENT, at that point, sat down with Dad in the room and discussed ‘these are the 
alternatives that we have,’ and he explained every one of them, and then Dad said: ‘We 
will go forth with reconstruction.’” (RN1) 
“The ENT surgeon involved gave the family the option to take their child to an airway 
center…but the family chose to have it done here.” (ICUPULM) 
“How well we explained to them the difficulty with this type of procedure, I don’t 
know how good a job we did with that…one also could have made the admonition of 
we don’t do this here; you need to go to an airway center.” (ICUPULM) 
“…I think it was challenging to get a handle on him to feel confident that he was going 
to sustain on your shift, and maintain stability…knowing that he had this potential to go 
sideways pretty quickly.” (SW) 
 
“The parents did not come in very frequently. Mom was busy at school, raising two 
other kids, doing all her homework…That first stage was a pretty long time…” 
(IMCMD) 
“…When you have a child that’s acutely ill and we’re telling you, ‘Stay away from 
him. Don’t touch him, that’s disturbing him. That’s making him sicker,’ then, like any 
parent, if your child is taken away from you, in a sense, for several months, you start, I 
think, detaching as self-preservation, and maybe not knowing exactly how you fit into 
helping him…” (CM) 
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Timepoint 2 Accepting 
 
 
 
 
Assigning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deflecting 
“…I felt it very important to nurture [growth and development], to let him experience a 
little bit of the world going on around him…” (RN1) 
“I remember a lot of us were talking, like ‘I don’t want to be that one. I don’t want to 
be that nurse that he decannulates on,’ because [ENT] was very clear about it being a 
very big possibility that if we couldn’t get the trach back in, it would be devastating to 
him.” (RN3) 
 
“You always felt like you had to have somebody watching him. You had to pass that 
off constantly…You couldn’t just go in your other room and know that he’d be fine.” 
(RN3) 
“…Trying to encourage the bedside staff, when the family is here, to try to maximize 
that time, to have them start performing cares…sometimes if the family’s here the 
nurses don’t always have time…” (CM) 
“With him being more awake and more interactive, the presence of family was not 
there. The expectations as caregivers would be to see the family a lot more frequently 
than we did.” (RN1) 
 
“At that point [timepoint 2], people did not think his airway was stable enough for him 
to discharge home. The family wasn’t even allowed to do trach changes; ENT was 
doing the trach changes…we were talking to the family about coming in and starting to 
practice learning his care so when he was ready to go, they’d be trained…” (CM) 
 
“…Dad had to return to work. I mean, life goes on, and they had other kids and other 
responsibilities, so they had to move forward knowing there was an unknown time 
frame of how long he was going to need to be here. But in doing that, I think 
they…were unable to see what his day-to-day cares were, what those day-to-day crises 
could potentially be, and their engagement with the process…was hampered by that.” 
(SW) 
 
Timepoint 3 Accepting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assigning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deflecting 
“…Still advocating for him, making sure that he was cared for, and then trying to figure 
out where we were going to go from there.” (RN1) 
“Teaching the home care nurses how to take care of him.” (RN1)  
“…I felt like giving him the most we could give him in that situation, giving him the 
consistency and giving him….compassion…” (RN3) 
“…I don’t think I was actually serving him so much as coming to provide an outlet for 
the nurses with the moral distress that they were feeling, and trying to show up for the 
medical team to help shoulder the burden…” (PPMD)  
“A lot of my work was supporting the staff and helping them maintain some 
perspective. A lot of people were dropping into this situation.” (SW)  
“I really wanted to partner with the rest of the team and help them take on what was 
clearly a distressing, burdensome process of negotiation…” (PPMD) 
“…The inconsistencies among the nursing staff who felt comfortable with certain 
things and who did not, and trying to help Dad understand that’s just how we are as 
human beings, and to have the responsibility as the nurse to keep your son safe while 
you are enjoying that closeness together. It’s a lot of responsibility…it isn’t just simply, 
oh, trach falls out; put it back in. It’s a whole big to-do, and that nurse will take 
ownership and will take the blame.” (RN2) 
“Mom would let go: ‘Okay, today I can’t hold him. That’s okay. I’m fine with that,’ 
and Dad was: ‘No, I am holding my son.’ And then trying to figure out, and trying to 
let them know not every nurse feels the situation is safe.” (RN2) 
 
“We had gotten a year and a half under our belt of telling them routinely that he was 
going to die and he had a precarious airway…and he kept surviving…” (SW) 
“…I think there was such confusion in control: wo had control, who should have 
control, who’s making decisions. And yet, at bedside, those were questions that weren’t 
answered in the hall. So if you were a bedside nurse, you had to decide then and there 
what you were going to do for your 8- to 12- hour shift. Yes, you had general 
guidelines. There was a range of things that you could do if the situation was safe. But 
ultimately this kid could decompensate at any moment, and what are you willing to be 
responsible for?” (RN2) 
“…We started to…villainize the parents, when we were just as culpable in what his 
course was and what our role was in communication and expectation.” (SW) 
 
“Eventually I signed off. I gave my best recommendation: that this was an ethical 
issue… and needed to go through formal mediation…That was not accepted by the 
team, so, given that the child was comfortable, I didn’t see another role for myself…” 
(PPMD) 
 “…There were so many people involved, and there was a lot of fear of upsetting the 
family—fear of being sued, on some level—that drove people not to give clear 
ultimatums to the family on their decision-making. And they were savvy in delaying 
things.” (PPMD)  
 “A lot of things leading up to that point had signaled that they were just not interested 
in taking him home. I think he was too complex, in their point of view, to be managed 
at home. Some of that was our own messaging of saying, ‘He’s too complex, he’s too 
complex, you can’t just take him home,’ and then all of a sudden...’He had this 
incident, he can go home.’” (CM) 
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and in lieu of…this devastated child;’ but the conflict was that this was a family who 
would never give up.” (IMCMD) 
“This is kind of the issue in medicine: could you, in a hopeless situation, should a 
hospital go against the family’s wishes and withdraw support?” (IMCMD) 
“Our hope was that in the home setting, the family, who would only see him on 
weekends, would now see him day after day after day after day, see what he was like, 
and this would begin to change their minds.” (IMCMD) 
“The docs—and I—understood the neurological devastation that was occurring, and to 
try to convey that to the parents was extremely challenging. They would not readily 
accept it, or if they did hear you, they would give other alternatives or other 
explanations or have many other questions pertaining to cares…” (RN1) 
“At that point it was very challenging, because trying to bring the family…The first 
phase, when he came in and had the different surgeries, I believe family was still 
hopeful of going home. Then he had the significant event…such a significant change, 
and they started to really distance themselves…” (RN2) 
“They never really took over the caring role, the ‘I’m going to change diapers, I’m 
going to take care of his trach, I’m going to do his G-tube cares’ consistently so that 
every time they were here, they did those cares.” (RN1) 
 
Timepoint 4 Accepting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assigning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deflecting 
“In the fourth phase when I did interact with them [physicians], it was usually on a 
crisis basis and they were having to come in.” (RN2) 
- “…Supporting the primaries that were in there routinely, knowing that they had a point 
of reference for who he was, and then helping the people that were new to his situation 
understand the global picture.” (SW) 
“…Dad had this idea from when he reentered his son’s life…I remember him telling 
me, ‘From this point on I believe I need to do everything I can for my son until he’s age 
five. If nothing has improved by then, I think then I’ll be able to let him go.’” (RN2) 
 
“…All physicians were starting to call Parents to bedside when emergencies were 
happening. That’s how I think they chose to deal with it: so that Family would see it 
happen, in hopes that they would change the DNR status…They would just hear the 
situation over the phone…So then it was almost like it never happened. ‘Well, that’s 
good it happened at the hospital, because we wouldn’t be able to do it.” (RN2) 
 “I don’t know why we would give the family a choice on something that clearly isn’t a 
family choice…We don’t let families choose which antibiotic they want. No matter 
how much they like the color of the liquid…And yet we put burdens on them when 
they’re not able to make these decisions about things like ECMO.” (PPMD) 
“…nursing staff bore a lot of the care and process…but I think everyone’s goals were a 
little bit different in their investment.” (SW) 
“…I think we can influence [parental decisions to withdraw care], but invariably it falls 
upon them and we can blunt their sense of responsibility, but often times we don’t do 
that well and/or they see through it.” (ICUPULM) 
 
“…But a parent knowing: ‘It has been nurses 24/7 taking care of my child, all I am is 
Mom. I don’t have a nursing degree. How am I going to be able to do it?’ Parents have 
to believe that they can do it. Otherwise, they’ll sabotage that discharge planning every 
time. Which is what happened here.” (RN2) 
“Having to advocate for active treatment [from physicians] for a chronically ill child is 
like pulling teeth sometimes.” (RN2) 
“Basically, at that point [after brain death], I think [ICUPULM] sat down with them 
and said, “We as a group and we as a hospital, and with the hospital’s support, are no 
longer going to take care of him. We’re going to send him back to the group home, and 
he will have to go elsewhere for any future care.’” (IMCMD) 
“We talked about this with the nursing leadership and with nurses, and in pediatric 
cases, there was no precedent for this, going against a family’s wishes and withdrawing 
support without the family’s consent…The hospital didn’t want to cross that ground.” 
(IMCMD) 
“I think the extra challenge in this situation was that the family was rather disengaged 
with his day-to-day care, so it was hard to see him here alone, and people were kind of 
dictating what should happen, but not being here…caring for him, turning him, rolling 
him…” (CM) 
“I felt caught in the middle of a couple of different things, and I thought that, for 
myself, I had to sign myself off.” (CM) 
“…Never ever would [the family] agree to withdraw support, and the hospital wasn’t 
going to do it, nor our group. The hospital especially was not going to set the precedent 
of withdrawing support against the family’s wishes…it was more ‘I really don’t want to 
take care of him anymore.’ There was just the sadness of taking care of him, watching 
him with no…” (IMCMD) 
- “I don’t feel like we always do a good job of advocating for the child as a person, but 
the families dictate how far to go.” (CM) 
 “…As health providers, at some point we as a group disengaged with the child, 
because the person we knew no longer was…and I think that confused the situation as 
to how each doc wanted to handle a so-called health emergency or a change of 
condition.” (RN2) 
“One of the strangest things that I found through this experience is that I felt extremely 
isolated…they did not want to come into the child’s room, did not want to really 
discuss what was happening for the day. (RN2) 
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the hospital, which is not a reasonable situation.” (Ethicist) 
“Dad specifically could not bring himself to withdraw. I think Mom would have done it 
a long time ago…” (Ethicist) 
 “…There’s no way…a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment against the 
wishes of the parents would be undertaken without hospital administration.” (Ethicist) 
 
Relations: 
Specific moral claims on us arise from our contact or 
relationships with others whose interests are vulnerable 
to our actions and choices. We are obligated to respond 
to particular others when circumstances or ongoing 
relationship render them especially, conspicuously, or 
peculiarly dependent on us. (Walker, 2007, p. 113) 
 
     How we interact and how we view our relations is important to exploring moral 
spaces. The role of nurse or physician elicits obligations when put in context of a 
relationship such as to a child as patient, parent of patient, colleague, hospital, 
employer, and so on. While there are typical obligations such as professional codes of 
ethics, normative rules, and other laws and guidelines there are also obligations and 
feelings that can be found in particular situations given the context and circumstances. 
This particular space, a wholly moral one, is where we find the ethics being practiced 
by people. A view of naturalized ethics looks to these moral spaces to find how we 
construct morality in our society. By exploring the way responsibility is accepted, 
assigned, and/or deflected within these relationships we can see how ethics are 
practiced and viewed.  
     In this case study we can analyze these relations in how participants discussed 
their interactions with others through how they experienced their actions, inactions, 
responsibilities, and how they viewed other’s interactions. Not all persons involved in 
this case were able to participate or responded to participation requests. The persons 
that did participate, however, make up the more intimate relations around the care of 
this child. In the way these participants discuss how they viewed their relationships 
and responsibilities to the child as well as to other people involved in the case, we can 
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to an intractable conflict. 
Clinicians and Parents 
     As this research only was able to collect data from the clinician viewpoint, the 
relations with parents are viewed from the perspectives of particular clinicians. There 
was an overall perspective that parents were not at the bedside or present for the 
child’s care as much as expected by the clinical staff. There were two participants, 
CM and SW, whose perspectives were more understanding to the larger picture of life 
for a family whose child is hospitalized for a lengthy period of time; an 
acknowledgment that parents have responsibilities to attend to. This is fitting with 
their roles as reported in Table 5.  
…When you have a child that’s acutely ill and we’re 
telling you, ‘Stay away from him. Don’t touch him, 
that’s disturbing him. That’s making him sicker,’ then, 
like any parent, if your child is taken away from you, in 
a sense, for several months, you start, I think, detaching 
as self-preservation, and maybe not knowing exactly 
how you fit into helping him… (CM, Table 8) 
 
     Several clinicians reported an effort to reach out to parents and assist them in being 
able to be present more. This suggests that there is an expectation by staff towards 
parents around presence at the bedside, though unwritten. This is present in the way 
nurses and CM described reaching out to see if parents need assistance in finding time 
to be present. None of the participants mentioned particular rules or specific 
obligations, just expectations.  
     This theme of expected parental obligations is interesting considering the 
instability the child faced in the beginning and inability of parents to perform many 
standard parenting tasks. However, this absence is felt during the child’s recovery 
phase, as RN1 notes specifically that:  
With him being more awake and more interactive, the 
presence of family was not there. The expectations as 
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frequently than we did. (Table 8).  
 
There was clearly an expectation that became stronger during timepoint two, but it is 
unclear if there is a delineating point where this begins or whether there is 
communication about when this expectation begins or becomes an obligation on the 
part of the parents as perceived by the clinicians.  
     Another theme that emerges is that after the child’s first event, timepoint three, 
there was an observation that the father became more involved and there were some 
different feelings about this from the father reestablishing responsibility or obligation 
to fear of the father and family viewing them as controlling. On the other hand, as 
reported by SW, the team had been repeatedly telling the family that the child could 
die from one of his many events, but this constant warning seems to have only bred 
distrust, from SW’s perspective. It seems clear from the physicians and ethicist 
perspective that this family would never agree to withdraw support. There was a fear 
around lawsuits expressed as well. There is an interesting power dynamic happening 
here. On one hand the expertise and knowledge lay with hospital staff, yet the family 
was offered a choice between going to a center that specialized in the type of problem 
that this child had or having it repaired at the current institution, or withdrawal. 
ICUPULM questioned how clear they were on this (Table 8) but the option itself is 
interesting.  
      
Table 8. Clinician and Parent Relation Themes 
Clinicians and Parents 
RN1 “…Interpreting what the docs are saying to the parents and how the parents are interpreting that. 
“The parents were not present the majority of the time, and a lot of discussion was occurring: what should we 
do, how can we do it, what’s best for the child?” 
“They would frequently call in, or they would make an appearance once a day, and I would tell them what 
the doctor was saying.” 
“I reviewed what they heard and clarified any misinterpretations or anything they didn’t hear correctly. I did 
not offer any opinions at that point.” 
“I explain the details of past histories of patients I’ve dealt with and reference those, and I explain the life-
altering and life-changing processes that will and can occur if certain medical interventions occur….” 
“The docs—and I—understood the neurological devastation that was occurring, and to try to convey that to 
the parents was extremely challenging. They would not readily accept it, or if they did hear you, they would 
give other alternatives or other explanations or have many other questions pertaining to cares…” 
“With him being more awake and more interactive, the presence of family was not there. The expectations as 
caregivers would be to see the family a lot more frequently than we did.” 
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his siblings interfering with that part of it? What’s preventing you from coming here, and is there anything 
we can do to help alleviate that?” 
“…It was more heart-wrenching not to see the family involved with him.” 
“…It was the where are we going from here, going from healthy to devastated, and now it was this 
devastation and I’m still caring for him, I’m still advocating for him; but the hard part was the parents’ idea 
of where they wanted to bring him and what their goals were, versus the medical team’s goals…” 
“Again, the more stressful part is that the parents were saying stuff but not doing anything.” 
“They never really took over the caring role, the ‘I’m going to change diapers, I’m going to take care of his 
trach, I’m going to do his G-tube cares’ consistently so that every time they were here, they did those cares.” 
 
RN2 “At that point it was very challenging, because trying to bring the family…The first phase, when he came in 
and had the different surgeries, I believe family was still hopeful of going home. Then he had the significant 
event…such a significant change, and they started to really distance themselves…” 
“And I think at some point in that phase, family decided, or Dad decided, that he wanted to do more for his 
son, but at that time, the child was so agitated…and was in pain.” 
“And not always was the desire of the family appropriate, for the moment, for the child, for parents wanting 
to hold him, and yet he was so uncomfortable and so difficult to work with that just holding him wasn’t safe.” 
“Mom would let go: ‘Okay, today I can’t hold him. That’s okay. I’m fine with that,’ and Dad was: ‘No, I am 
holding my son.’ And then trying to figure out, and trying to let them know not every nurse feels the situation 
is safe.” 
“Definitely the parents understood the risk of decannulation…” 
“…The inconsistencies among the nursing staff  who felt comfortable with certain things and who did not, 
and trying to help Dad understand that’s just how we are as human beings, and to have the responsibility as 
the nurse to keep your son safe while you are enjoying that closeness together. It’s a lot of responsibility…it 
isn’t just simply, oh, trach falls out; put it back in. It’s a whole big to-do, and that nurse will take ownership 
and will take the blame.” 
“I think it was fear, and I there was such confusion in control: who had control, who should have control, 
who’s making decisions.” 
“I would get the to-do list from Care Management, which was fine, because it worked out well, and then I 
just planned and did the educating and training and answering questions.” 
“…But a parent knowing: ‘It has been nurses 24/7 taking care of my child, all I am is Mom. I don’t have a 
nursing degree. How am I going to be able to do it?’ Parents have to believe that they can do it. Otherwise, 
they’ll sabotage that discharge planning every time. Which is what happened here.” 
“…All physicians were starting to call Parents to bedside when emergencies were happening. That’s how I 
think they chose to deal with it: so that Family would see it happen, in hopes that they would change the 
DNR status…They would just hear the situation over the phone…So then it was almost like it never 
happened. ‘Well, that’s good it happened at the hospital, because we wouldn’t be able to do it.” 
“…Dad had this idea from when he reentered his son’s life…I remember him telling me, ‘From this point on 
I believe I need to do everything I can for my son until he’s age five. If nothing has improved by then, I think 
then I’ll be able to let him go.’” 
 
RN3 “There was also some fear of parents. Dad was pretty intense, so there was also some fear that if something 
bad happened on our watch, there would be legal ramifications…” 
“…[Parents] just didn’t come around all that often when he was younger…” 
“…There was enough of a feeling when Parents would talk to you that you should be careful what you 
say…it was never said by Parents, but it was just a feeling we got.” 
“It was after his neuro hit that [Parents] started coming more consistently, but it was upsetting, because he 
really needed them there before…He wanted to be held all the time. He needed that parent, that nurturing 
piece that he never got.” 
“Then Dad got really controlling…which I could understand…” 
“…Parents were really resistant to taking him to their house.” 
“[Dad] would come in and be very, very, very specific on everything that happened to him, but then he would 
leave…I think that…he was trying to show [the child] love, but he didn’t know how to do that. He didn’t 
bond initially with him…” 
“I didn’t agree with their decisions, so I think that was partly why I was fired from the room.” 
CM “…When you have a child that’s acutely ill and we’re telling you, ‘Stay away from him. Don’t touch him, 
that’s disturbing him. That’s making him sicker,’ then, like any parent, if your child is taken away from you, 
in a sense, for several months, you start, I think, detaching as self-preservation, and maybe not knowing 
exactly how you fit into helping him…” 
“At that point [timepoint 2], people did not think his airway was stable enough for him to discharge home. 
The family wasn’t even allowed to do trach changes; ENT was doing the trach changes…we were taking to 
the family about coming in and starting to practice learning his care so when he was ready to go, they’d be 
trained…” 
“[Parents] weren’t at the bedside a lot, so we were trying to encourage them to be here to start learning his 
cares and, even if they couldn’t do certain things, to do other aspects of his cares in order to ease the 
transition.” 
“A lot of things leading up to that point had signaled that they were just not interested in taking him home. I 
think he was too complex, in their point of view, to be managed at home. Some of that was our own 
messaging of saying, ‘He’s too complex, he’s too complex, you can’t just take him home,’ and then all of a 
sudden...’He had this incident, he can go home.’” 
 
SW “…The family was repeatedly told this might be the thing that tipped him over the edge and he may die as a 
result—but then he would recover, to a point, and then we would have another incident…So there was an up 
and down course for him…” 
“I think they lost trust in: ‘You told me he was going to die this time and he didn’t, and now he’s doing what 
he was doing before.’” 
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these setbacks…” 
“…Dad had to return to work. I mean, life goes on, and they had other kids and other responsibilities, so they 
had to move forward knowing there was an unknown time frame of how long he was going to need to be 
here. But in doing that, I think they…were unable to see what his day-to-day cares were, what those day-to-
day crises could potentially be, and their engagement with the process…was hampered by that.” 
“More often than not, they saw him at his best.” 
“We had gotten a year and a half under our belt of telling them routinely that he was going to die and he had 
a precarious airway…and he kept surviving...” 
 
IMCMD “The parents did not come in very frequently. Mom was busy at school, raising two other kids, doing all her 
homework…That first stage was a pretty long time…” 
“…The Father’s stance was that technology would save the day, that in five years we’d be able to create a 
good airway for him… and we’d have figured out ways with these kinds of patients to be able to restore their 
brains.” 
“It became an issue for nurses taking care of him: ‘Why are we continuing to do this and in lieu of…this 
devastated child;’ but the conflict was that this was a family who would never give up.” 
“This is kind of the issue in medicine: could you, in a hopeless situation, should a hospital go against the 
family’s wishes and withdraw support?” 
“Our hope was that in the home setting, the family, who would only see him on weekends, would now see 
him day after day after day after day, see what he was like, and this would begin to change their minds.” 
“Basically, at that point [after brain death], I think [ICUPULM] sat down with them and said, “We as a group 
and we as a hospital, and with the hospital’s support, are no longer going to take care of him. We’re going to 
send him back to the group home, and he will have to go elsewhere for any future care.’” 
 
PPMD “…There were so many people involved, and there was a lot of fear of upsetting the family—fear of being 
sued, on some level—that drove people not to give clear ultimatums to the family on their decision-making. 
And they were savvy in delaying things.” 
“”I don’t know why we would give the family a choice on something that clearly isn’t a family choice…We 
don’t let families choose which antibiotic they want. No matter how much they like the color of the 
liquid…And yet we put burdens on them when they’re not able to make these decisions about things like 
ECMO.” 
 
Ethicist “They said, ‘We cannot have him at our home.’ They, in essence, wanted him to stay in the hospital, which is 
not a reasonable situation.” 
“Dad specifically could not bring himself to withdraw. I think Mom would have done it a long time ago…” 
 
ICUPULM “The ENT surgeon involved gave the family the option to take their child to an airway center…but the family 
chose to have it done here.” 
“How well we explained to them the difficulty with this type of procedure, I don’t know how good a job we 
did with that…one also could have made the admonition of we don’t do this here; you need to go to an 
airway center.” 
“…I think we can influence [parental decisions to withdraw care], but invariably it falls upon them and we 
can blunt their sense of responsibility, but often times we don’t do that well and/or they see through it.” 
 
Clinician and Clinician 
     Interactions between clinicians is also an important context to understanding the 
moral and social structure of any care provided. While this research samples a very 
small proportion of care providers who cared for this child, the participants all played 
major roles in his care. The participants also had the most exposure and interaction 
with this child’s care and course. Therefore, they can be said to be reflective of the 
overall experience of their particular roles. This does not limit the contingent relations 
these participants bring into their relations necessary for their role. What I mean is, 
each participant brings their own experience, perceptions, and distinctions towards the 
role that they enter into as a clinician, which as a role has its own relations necessary 
for that role. I enter into the role of a nurse which has necessary perspectives, but I 
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cannot separate someone from their life and their role, the two experiences and 
identities are intertwined. This study did not seek to discover those contingent aspects 
of the participants lives but it must be understood that they exist, that reality cannot be 
researched in a vacuum with metaphysical people. 
     There is evidence that during the first timepoint the interactions between clinicians 
was typical of any child in the PICU. RN1 discusses typical responsibilities within the 
care team about monitoring and reported progress. RN3 discussed collaborating with 
ENT about the severity of the child’s reliance on the trach and having to coordinate 
with other bedside staff to help watch the child if other responsibilities arose due to 
the tenuous nature of his airway. Of particular interest is RN2 who describes the later 
timepoints as interactions on a crisis basis which seems, as reported, due to the more 
chronic nature of the child. What RN2 is saying here is that due to the distress around 
caring for a child most clinicians thought should be allowed to die, or was now a 
“chronically” ill child, there was a perception of some clinicians disengaging from 
what would normally be more attentive care. RN2 reports feeling isolated because as 
the child was more severely devastated staff disengaged from the child completely to 
include dealing with any issues that may have arisen in his care. Getting a physician 
to come to the bedside to assess what RN2 thought was a change in condition was 
difficult and getting assistance and support from other nurses was difficult because of 
this level of disengagement, which was probably somewhat a protective mechanism 
against further moral distress. 
     From the allied staff and PPMD there is a sense of trying to maintain the narrative 
and communication between clinicians as the case became more fraught with conflict. 
The other physician participants did not mention interactions between other clinicians 
at this point but in these timepoints there was more of a sense that they were acting as 
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sense of retreat or disengagement consistent with how RN2 describes the feeling. 
There are, after all, other patients that need to be seen, but for the nurse who is still 
caring for the child this is not as easy to walk away from, thus RN2’s feeling of 
‘advocating as pulling teeth.’ PPMD reports wanting to partner with the team but 
feeling unable to do so because her belief in how to proceed was rejected.   
 
Table 9. Clinician and Clinician Relation Themes 
Clinician and Clinician 
RN1 “…Keeping the docs informed of what progress he’s making…” 
 
RN2 “In the fourth phase when I did interact with them, it was usually on a crisis basis and they were having to 
come in.” 
“Having to advocate for active treatment [from other clinicians] for a chronically ill child is like pulling teeth 
sometimes.” 
“…As health providers, at some point we as a group disengaged with the child, because the person we knew no 
longer was…and I think that confused the situation as to how each doc wanted to handle a so-called health 
emergency or a change of condition.” 
“One of the strangest things that I found through this experience is that I felt extremely isolated…they did not 
want to come into the child’s room, did not want to really discuss what was happening for the day. 
 
RN3 “I remember a lot of us were talking, like ‘I don’t want to be that one. I don’t want to be that nurse that he 
decannulates on,’ because [ENT] was very clear about it being a very big possibility that if we couldn’t get the 
trach back in, it would be devastating to him.” 
“You always felt like you had to have somebody watching him. You had to pass that off constantly…You 
couldn’t just go in your other room and know that he’d be fine.” 
 
CM “…Trying to encourage the bedside staff, when the family is here, to try to maximize that time, to have them 
start performing cares…sometimes if the family’s here the nurses don’t always have time…” 
“…When you have a child that’s acutely ill and we’re telling you, ‘Stay away from him. Don’t touch him, 
that’s disturbing him. That’s making him sicker,’ then, like any parent, if your child is taken away from you, in 
a sense, for several months, you start, I think, detaching as self-preservation, and maybe not knowing exactly 
how you fit into helping him…” 
 
SW “…We started to…villainize the parents, when we were just as culpable in what his course was and what our 
role was in communication and expectation.” 
“It was Ethics and I trying to maintain that common thread across the whole team, knowing that every seven 
days you had potentially a new provider, a new nursing group…” 
 
PPMD “…I think there was some dissent among the team about whether or not we should be very clear in giving a 
final deadline and time for things to move on…” 
“Eventually I signed off. I gave my best recommendation: that this was an ethical issue… and needed to go 
through formal mediation…That was not accepted by the team…” 
“I really wanted to partner with the rest of the team and help them take on what was clearly a distressing, 
burdensome process of negotiation…” 
 
Ethicist “… [The Intensivists] were split as a group, but unwilling to act as a group unless they were unanimous as a 
group.” 
 
Clinician to Hospital 
     A necessary relation in this case and others like it is the relationship between 
clinicians and the institution itself. Of course, there is no one entity that can be said to 
be “the hospital” but there are interests that individual actors have in the context of 
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patient and adherence to hospital norms and policies. Unfortunately, most of the 
administrators during this time have moved on. Risk management was contacted but 
was unable to participate. However, hospital qua hospital would be in a position to 
balance many different factors: that of the child, the staff, the parents, and the 
standing of the hospital and its ability to provide care to the community, which does 
include a legal and PR interest. Risk aversion due to PR and legal implications could 
be criticized but this is a real concern and one a hospital is not necessarily wrong to 
consider.  
     The nurses report the difficulties of being paired with a child who could so 
unexpectedly decompensate. As this child transitioned to a more chronic period, 
nurses often had a second child to take care of, in fitting with hospital staffing policies 
and norms. This meant not being in direct view of this child and therefore leading to 
an increased sense of fear around the inevitability of an event happening. There seems 
to be a sense from participants that there was an unspoken agreement around 
watching out for this child. Though given the workflow of others around the child, 
this may have been difficult at times. The norms of the staffing in PICU saw this child 
as “pairable,” meaning his nurse could take on another patient assignment, and yet the 
nurse participants’ reports’ suggest he needed constant and close supervision which 
suggests he was not pairable. 
     Ultimately the hospital appears to have been involved, from the participants 
perspective, once the child had an event and the conflict with parents began to 
emerge. From the data it seems as if the hospital attempted to find a path of least 
resistance. Not forcing withdrawal but allowing parents to take the child home or to a 
group home would at least remove the distressing conflict from the PICU and satisfy 
parents. This seems like an understandable path to take, after all, no one sets out to 
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relationship, since there is a lack of perspectives involved, is the idea that even if the 
hospital supported the feelings of the medical team, the PR and legal repercussions 
outweighed those concerns. It is also interesting here and was reported also by 
IMCMD in addition to PPMD in the table below (Table 10), that since the physician 
group of intensivists was a private group there was concern about legal support from 
the hospital towards the physicians. The private physician group seems as if they 
would have supported unilateral withdrawal of medical treatments without parental 
consent if the hospital also supported that position. In this relationship, there is an 
acknowledgment of what was felt was the right thing to do and a concern over the 
repercussions of any legal challenge, whether successful or not. One can’t ignore the 
fact that even if the hospital and private physician group prevailed in a legal battle 
that the PR could be more damaging considering the fact that the hospital and 
clinicians have restrictions on public discourse around private health data whereas the 
family does not. 
 
Table 10. Clinician and Hospital Relation Themes 
Clinician to Hospital 
RN1 [Question on paired with another child as nurse assignment] “Yes, because he was in stable chronic mode” 
 
RN2 [Question on primary obligations] “Well, within the guidelines of the hospital and what their expectations are 
of a nurse, it would be first to the patient—ultimately, the patient, even if I have a different viewpoint…” 
“…Whenever I had to receive his care at 3, I would make sure there was a nursing assistant in his room at 
bedside so that we could have report safely, and if they couldn’t be at bedside, then the day nurse and I would 
be gowned and gloved, ready to go in an intervene if we had to.” 
[On having a second patient] “…You just kind of juggled And if you could keep him happy…And as a team of 
nurses we would pull together. Whoever was in the neighborhood had your back. Half of the time you never 
even had to say anything, because everybody was always keeping track of him.” 
 
RN3 [On caring for a second child] “…Especially if the pairing wasn’t next to [child], that was sometimes really 
hard. I had a couple situations where I was paired, and that was really difficult, because, like I said, he could 
just lose his airway at any minute and then you would have to be in there. I do feel like the unit as a whole kept 
an extra eye on him, but that was difficult, to get a new admit with him. You always felt like you had to have 
somebody watching him. You had to pass that off constantly, all the time. You couldn’t just go in your other 
room and know that he’d be fine.” 
 
CM “Any time a child is medically ready to go and we’re getting into this kind of conflict getting him out of the 
hospital, we get Risk and other people involved.” 
 
SW “Once he passed a year, people were watching for a multitude of reasons, but once he had that event, and the 
conflict… I think the whole administration, everyone, was engaged in trying to understand where the family 
was coming from, what could we do as a hospital to continue to move this forward…” 
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precedent for this, going against a family’s wishes and withdrawing support without the family’s consent…The 
hospital didn’t want to cross that ground.” 
 
PPMD “This went all the way through the hospital to the top…and they were trying to sort out an easier way, but there 
really wasn’t one.” 
“I think they [hospital/administrators] supported the medical team in feeling that the care the family was asking 
for was inappropriate care. Their concern was whether or not there would be PR repercussions or legal 
repercussions…” 
“…I think an additional complication was that the physician group was a private group, not employed by the 
hospital, so that contributed to more concerns that the hospital wouldn’t be able to back up the physicians that 
had to carry this out.” 
 
Ethicist “…There’s no way…a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment against the wishes of the parents would 
be undertaken without hospital administration.” 
 
Moral Community 
     A moral community was built around this child, who was a part of that 
community, what drove those connections, and what barriers and divisions were 
present that split the community emerged from the data. The lack of narrative around 
the initial timepoint, admission with critical illness, is telling because it may indicate 
routine PICU care and structured responsibilities that didn’t fall outside the norm. The 
data shows this shift when the child became more awake and stable and descriptions 
of family as not present as much as expected begin to emerge. Later in timepoint four 
there were attempts to call in family during emergencies to bring them into the moral 
community, to bear witness. These moral claims, or expected responsibilities, connect 
with barriers to building moral community, as CM reports around the ambiguousness 
of when we want families involved and in what role (Table 11). If moral claims are 
not connected or reciprocated, then barriers and divisions emerge.  
     There were many barriers and divisions in this case that prevented the construction 
of a moral community that included the parents, and that held together throughout the 
child’s hospital stay. The length of time the child was in the PICU and the uncertainty 
over how long he would continue to be there contributed to a division between staff 
and parents as it seemed to disrupt a normal process where the transition from a more 
critical status is met with an increase in parent involvement. In this case we can see 
this norm through the fracture between staff and parents around the expected presence 
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happen.  
     Normally a child requiring more parental involvement at the bedside would be 
planning to go home, yet there was never any clear timeline for this child and there 
were ongoing procedures. The narrative from CM reports a significant insight into 
how this unspoken shift in responsibility plays into this barrier when you have a case 
with uncertain timelines and no clear demarcation for parental responsibilities re-
emerge. As SW also reports, the parents began to be villainized, which is evident 
through the data from bedside staff as well through the narrative data that reports 
parents’ perceived absence at the bedside (Table 11). Given the deviation of this case 
from more normal cases, it isn’t unusual to see fractures like this because there is a 
normal process where parents may not be required to disengage for so long as the 
usual. 
     Further divisions in the moral community, or in building a moral community, were 
seen as the conflict emerged. The data shows an increasing fear around litigation 
coupled with the distress of caring for the child which seems to have led to a 
disengagement from some staff members who were able to disengage. For the 
primary nurses, who were still committed to the child, this disengagement was not 
possible. This shows up in RN2’s statements about feeling isolated and earlier reports 
(Table 9) about the difficulty in engaging physicians and other nurses around care 
issues for the child. The commitment of the primary nurses is still to this child whose 
care they are faced with intimately, for better or worse, and this led to rifts with both 
parents and other providers. These primary nurses were continuing to perform the 
work while others decided what happened.  
     Another interesting finding that worked to divide the moral community is the way 
in which the system of staffing physicians and nurses is set up. As ICUPULM notes, 
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one in this case where uncertainty, conflict, and longevity become an issue, the 
system falls apart (Table 11). This also leads into another finding within the theme of 
moral community, that of moral ambiguity. This ambiguity is present in the way in 
which decisions were proposed and made, how responsibility was deflected, and trust 
between the parties involved. 
     The ambiguity present in the data is evident through how decisions were offered 
and made. In a normal case, part of the ninety-five percent of patients, there is likely a 
typical course and treatment plan. In this case decisions were made that participants 
questioned. This doesn’t mean that they were wrongly offered, after all the offering of 
options is well within normal practice. However, in this case participants report the 
decisions as maybe not ones that parents could really make, and maybe no one party 
really could. As ICUPULM notes, how the choice was offered may have not been 
sufficient (Table 11). Also evident is that many decisions around best interests for the 
child were discussed without parents present (Table 11). It seems that there was a lack 
of clarity over what to do, who should make decisions, how well those decisions were 
understood, and a lack of trust and/or understanding around the severity and 
feasibility of the effort. 
     A positive aspect of the moral community being built and sustained was seen in 
the data as accountability between nurses. Inevitably there was a more intimate 
connection between nursing staff and the child as they became more responsible for 
his development as he aged. There is also an element of the nurses being accountable 
to each other through the precarious nature of the child’s airway and ability to 
decompensate rather rapidly. The data shows an unspoken agreement between nurses 
on the unit that everyone around the child would watch out for him, particularly when 
his nurse had other patients and could not have a constant eye on him. Also evident is 
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loss of personhood and distress over what appears to be the inability to let the child 
go. 
      
Table 11. Moral Community 
Moral Community 
Moral Claims/ 
Expected 
Responsibility 
“With him being more awake and more interactive, the presence of the family was not there. The 
expectation as caregivers would be to see the family a lot more frequently than we did.” (RN1) 
“The hard part for me was the lack of interaction by the family…it was more heart-wrenching not to see 
the family involved with him.” (RN1) 
“…The more stressful part is that the parents were saying things but not doing anything…They never 
really took over that caring role…” (RN1) 
“…All physicians were starting to call Parents to bedside when emergencies were happening. That’s 
how I think they chose to deal with it: so that Family would see it happen, in hopes that they would 
change the DNR status…They would just hear the situation over the phone…So then it was almost like 
it never happened. ‘Well, that’s good it happened at the hospital, because we wouldn’t be able to do it.” 
(RN2) 
 
Barriers/ 
Division 
“…Dad had to return to work. I mean, life goes on, and they had other kids and other responsibilities, so 
they had to move forward knowing there was an unknown time frame of how long he was going to need 
to be here. But in doing that, I think they…were unable to see what his day-to-day cares were, what 
those day-to-day crises could potentially be, and their engagement with the process…was hampered by 
that.” (SW) 
“More often than not, they saw him at his best.” (SW) 
“…When you have a child that’s acutely ill and we’re telling you, ‘Stay away from him. Don’t touch 
him, that’s disturbing him. That’s making him sicker,’ then, like any parent, if your child is taken away 
from you, in a sense, for several months, you start, I think, detaching as self-preservation, and maybe 
not knowing exactly how you fit into helping him…” (CM) 
“…We started to…villainize the parents, when we were just as culpable in what his course was and 
what our role was in communication and expectation.” (SW) 
“The parents did not come in very frequently. Mom was busy at school, raising two other kids, doing all 
her homework…That first stage was a pretty long time…” (IMCMD) 
“…There were so many people involved, and there was a lot of fear of upsetting the family—fear of 
being sued, on some level—that drove people not to give clear ultimatums to the family on their 
decision-making. And they were savvy in delaying things.” (PPMD) 
“…As health providers, at some point we as a group disengaged with the child, because the person we 
knew no longer was…and I think that confused the situation as to how each doc wanted to handle a so-
called health emergency or a change of condition.” (RN2) 
“One of the strangest things that I found through this experience is that I felt extremely isolated…they 
did not want to come into the child’s room, did not want to really discuss what was happening for the 
day.” (RN2) 
“That’s what I mean by falling prey to a system that developed for the average length of stay in the 
ICU, which at the time was about three-and-a-half days. So if you’re an ICU patient and you need 
three-and-a-half days, you don’t need continuity. You need good care and to get out. Once you get past 
two weeks you need continuity and it’s not something we do well, but recognize that only about 4-5% 
of patients are in the ICU for greater than two weeks. You can see why this system evolved, not for the 
5% but for the 95%.” (ICUPULM) 
 
Moral 
Ambiguity 
 
“The ENT surgeon involved gave the family the option to take their child to an airway center…but the 
family chose to have it done here.” (ICUPULM) 
“How well we explained to them the difficulty with this type of procedure, I don’t know how good a 
job we did with that…one also could have made the admonition of we don’t do this here; you need to 
go to an airway center.” (ICUPULM)  
“The parents were not present the majority of the time, and a lot of discussion was occurring: what 
should we do, how can we do it, what’s best for the child?” (RN1) 
 “…The family was repeatedly told this might be the thing that tipped him over the edge and he may die 
as a result—but then he would recover, to a point, and then we would have another incident…So there 
was an up and down course for him…” (SW) 
“I think they lost trust in: ‘You told me he was going to die this time and he didn’t, and now he’s doing 
what he was doing before.’” (SW) 
“The docs—and I—understood the neurological devastation that was occurring, and to try to convey 
that to the parents was extremely challenging. They would not readily accept it, or if they did hear you, 
they would give other alternatives or other explanations or have many other questions pertaining to 
cares…” (RN1) 
 
Accountability “…We all got very close to him because his family wasn’t there that often, so we became daycare, kind 
of, for him…” (RN3) 
“You always felt like you had to have somebody watching him. You had to pass that off 
constantly…You couldn’t just go in your other room and know that he’d be fine.” (RN3) 
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could just lose his airway at any minute and then you would have to be in there. I do feel like the unit as 
a whole kept an extra eye on him, but that was difficult, to get a new admit with him. You always felt 
like you had to have somebody watching him. You had to pass that off constantly, all the time. You 
couldn’t just go in your other room and know that he’d be fine. (RN3) 
And as a team of nurses we would all pull together. Whoever was in the neighborhood had your back. 
Half of the time you never even had to say anything, because everybody was always keeping track of 
him. (RN2) 
“It became an issue for nurses taking care of him: ‘Why are we continuing to do this and in lieu 
of…this devastated child;’ but the conflict was that this was a family who would never give up.” 
“This is kind of the issue in medicine: could you, in a hopeless situation, should a hospital go against 
the family’s wishes and withdraw support?” (IMCMD) 
 
 
Moral Hazard and Distress 
     The theme of moral hazard and/or moral distress came up from every participant. 
Moral hazard is a term that has been used to describe situations in pediatrics where 
decisions about risk are made by parties who will not bear any of the cost of that risk 
(Brunnquell & Michaelson, 2016). In healthcare, and particularly pediatrics, this can 
be seen by either parents or providers making decisions about the care of a child while 
the burdens will be felt by the child and/or caregivers, whether those caregivers be 
nurses, therapists, aides, or even the parents themselves. Moral hazard is not arguably 
only related to parental decisions as decision-making processes often involve more 
than one party. This concept came up as a theme from all participants in many ways. 
Some participants felt like parents were making decisions that were not within the 
child’s interests, and the physicians were going along with it. Others reported barriers 
to decisions from the hospital influence legal and public image risk aversion. Moral 
hazard may or may not be a precursor to moral distress, but the two concepts are very 
related, particularly in this context. 
     Moral distress was initially described by Andrew Jameton who wrote about stories 
from nurses who were distressed by situations where they felt they knew what the 
right thing to do was but felt constrained from doing it (Jameton, 2013, 2017). This 
feeling of being constrained in nursing often coincides with an obligation to perform 
cares that are felt to be painful, noxious, or non-beneficial on their patients (Austin, 
Kelecevic, Goble, & Mekechuk, 2009; Austin, Lemermeyer, Goldberg, Bergum, & 
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collected for this research, themes of moral distress were identified either by 
participant report of their own feeling or observation of other staff member feelings.     
     After the child’s first hypoxic ischemic event, all the participants spoke with 
understanding that there was some part of him left and while they would recommend 
withdrawal their distress seemed stronger after the second event. This seems to be due 
to the increased level of injury and a loss of any distinguishable interaction from the 
child. As the RN’s and CM report below (Table 12), there is some sense that after his 
first neurologic injury he had some comfort or ability to perceive contrasted with his 
second injury which they perceived that he had no conception of the world. The 
decrease in personhood perceived seems to increase the distress felt by the 
participants. 
 
Table 12. Moral Hazard and Distress Themes 
Moral Hazard and Distress 
RN1 “I was sad. I immediately thought which nurse did it happen to and how are they dealing with it, knowing 
that his airway was so fragile. I experienced that many times, where he'd pull his trach out and literally 
within 10 seconds he'd pass out. I'd put the trach back in and he was right back up playing again. And I 
knew it would only take mere seconds before something catastrophic could happen, and hearing that it did 
happen…Shocking, but definitely not surprising.” 
“It was frustrating, knowing what I saw prior to the incident, to see what I was dealing with after that…” 
“I was caring for a shell, his body. I was not doing any nurturing of him, I was not stimulating his brain.” 
“…It was the where are we going from here, going from healthy to devastated, and now it was this 
devastation and I’m still caring for him, I’m still advocating for him; but the hard part was the parents’ 
idea of where they wanted to bring him and what their goals were, versus the medical team’s goals…” 
“In this situation, he was dead. That was my thought, knowing where we were, what we were doing, and 
knowing [him].” 
 
RN2 “…I think there was such confusion in control: wo had control, who should have control, who’s making 
decisions. And yet, at bedside, those were questions that weren’t answered in the hall. So if you were a 
bedside nurse, you had to decide then and there what you were going to do for your 8- to 12- hour shift. 
Yes, you had general guidelines. There was a range of things that you could do if the situation was safe. 
But ultimately this kid could decompensate at any moment, and what are you willing to be responsible 
for?” 
 
RN3 “…If you don’t have to do anything to him medically ever again and you can just leave him here in this 
body, you can maybe find some way to give him comfort. But the fact that we had to keep dilating his 
airway and keep doing things to him to keep his body here, for me that was too hard…It was hard to 
watch.” 
“Just because he would never get better. He would never be back in any better…better is such a subjective 
word. Nothing could ever be done that would give him comfort, I guess. Not knowing what he was 
feeling was probably the most heart-wrenching part, what he was experiencing, if anything.” 
“I remember a lot of us were talking, like ‘I don’t want to be that one. I don’t want to be that nurse that he 
decannulates on,’ because [ENT] was very clear about it being a very big possibility that if we couldn’t 
get the trach back in, it would be devastating to him.” 
“You always felt like you had to have somebody watching him. You had to pass that off constantly…You 
couldn’t just go in your other [patient] room and know that he’d be fine.” 
“I still felt like the care we were giving him was providing him some, even futile…I mean, it was 
definitely futile, everything that we were doing, but we didn’t really have a choice at that point, because 
we weren’t able to make the decision to leave him, let him go.” 
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I don't think he moved at all. I know a lot of people caring for him just felt like they were caring for a 
body. I think the extra challenge in this situation was that the family was rather disengaged with his day-
to-day care, so it was hard to see him here alone, and people were kind of dictating what should happen, 
but not being here, maybe every day. But it was futile.” 
“I felt caught in the middle of a couple of different things, and I thought that, for myself, I had to sign 
myself off.” 
“I think the extra challenge in this situation was that the family was rather disengaged with his day-to-day 
care, so it was hard to see him here alone, and people were kind of dictating what should happen, but not 
being here…caring for him, turning him, rolling him…” 
“I don’t feel like we always do a good job of advocating for the child as a person, but the families dictate 
how far to go.” 
 
SW “We recommend withdrawal. But the family still maintained, ‘You maintain his care, and you maintain 
efforts to resolve his airway, and, hey, I’ve found a bunch of trials about how to fix brains from a hypoxic 
ischemic event,’ so it was a tennis match…” 
“…nursing staff bore a lot of the care and process…but I think everyone’s goals were a little bit different 
in their investment.” 
“…I think it was challenging to get a handle on him to feel confident that he was going to sustain on your 
shift, and maintain stability…knowing that he had this potential to go sideways pretty quickly.” 
 
Ethicist “Sad. Just hard for everybody—including the parents. It was miserable for them, too. And for him.” 
“There was a real concern that this case was going to end up in a malpractice suit…administration, they 
did not, in this particular case, want to take on the questions of overriding the parents…” 
“…I think many of them [intensivists] felt that it was an okay thing to do, but there were a few of the 
intensivists among the more senior members who felt that one should never override a parent’s express 
wish.” 
 
IMCMD “…Never ever would [the family] agree to withdraw support, and the hospital wasn’t going to do it, nor 
our group. The hospital especially was not going to set the precedent of withdrawing support against the 
family’s wishes…it was more ‘I really don’t want to take care of him anymore.’ There was just the 
sadness of taking care of him, watching him with no…” 
“But there was significant sadness with having to take care of him, and anger.” 
“It was very difficult for the nurses to take care of him, but then the goal was that now that he had a stable 
airway, we could get him out of the hospital and into his home setting.” 
 
PPMD “…I don’t think I was actually serving him so much as coming to provide an outlet for the nurses with the 
moral distress that they were feeling, and trying to show up for the medical team to help shoulder the 
burden of what I thought was really difficult for them, and that was to do the right thing.” 
 
ICUPULM “This is every ICU nurse’s, therapist’s and to some extent physicians, worst nightmare, coming to work 
and extending an expertise that doesn’t have an outcome.”  
“For me, there was probably not single case with greater moral distress than this case that I know of.” 
“I remember thanking people and recognizing with them [bedside staff] how difficult this was. I felt badly 
for them.” 
 
Inevitability 
       There is some sense that the outcome faced in the end of this child’s care was so 
likely that it was almost inevitable. This feeling reported by participants, whatever the 
term used to describe it, begs some important questions for the ways in which 
clinicians know or feel this and what this knowledge or feeling may mean for 
discussions around decision-making or care. It can certainly be said that any child in a 
hospital is there because they are ill and require professional nursing care around the 
clock, and thus are sick enough that decompensation is always a possibility. However, 
in this case the description of this feeling by the participants was so rich and strong 
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was almost always at an incipient point. 
     This theme had different contexts but mostly to describe the expectation or 
likelihood that an event would happen. Only one participant, PPMD, did not appear to 
discuss this. This participant was involved after the first neurologic insult and wasn’t 
involved during the first two timepoints. Since the majority of the feelings of 
inevitability were felt during the first timepoints it is not surprising that PPMD did not 
express any feelings on this, in addition to the fact that the role doesn’t necessarily 
involve emergent response, as does the RN’s and other physicians. One other 
participant, ICUPULM, did not express the likelihood of an event happening as 
probable or as unique to this child as other participants did.  
     During the child’s second timepoint where he was active and moving there seemed 
to have been more possibilities for the tracheotomy tube to come out. This was seen 
in the reports around balancing the care of a developing child and the security of his 
medical devices. It is not surprising that the RN’s reported more feelings of 
inevitability and fear around the tracheotomy tube then because they held ultimate 
direct responsibility to the child’s constant disposition. 
      
Table 13. Inevitability Themes 
Inevitability 
RN1 “As a primary, I knew there was a strong potential of that happening, and unfortunately it did.” 
“I think we were very honest about what was going on and the life and death tightrope we were walking. It 
was very obvious.” 
“Some days were nice, quiet, and boring; others, it was frequent near-death experiences.” 
 
RN2  
 
“But ultimately this kid could decompensate at any moment, and what are you willing to be responsible 
for? And everybody interprets that differently. I think it depends upon your years of experience…[t]here 
are just so many variables.” 
“I think you knew it could happen, and it possibly would happen, but it never had a negative outcome after. 
You would just deal with the situation. I think that's what was so shocking with all of it: that that time, that 
was the time it just all fell apart, and he became a very different person from that point on.” 
 
RN3  “…[ENT] was very clear about it being a very big possibility that if we couldn’t get the trach back in, it 
would be devastating to him.” 
“…He could lose his airway at any minute…” 
“You always felt like you had to have somebody watching him. You had to pass that off constantly…You 
couldn’t just go in your other [patient] room and know that he’d be fine.” 
“It [first neurologic insult] was heartbreaking. But we all knew it was possible.” 
“In the back of your mind you always prep for that day, knowing that this could possibly happen…I think 
somehow we all felt like we were superhuman, that we could keep him alive and it wouldn’t happen to him, 
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possible.” 
 
CM “With any trach. With the nature of his airway, I think he was probably at a slightly higher risk than other 
kids…But yeah, it’s a risk to be decannulated, accidentally unplugged.” 
 
SW “I think there was a global perspective that he would at some point succumb to his multiple medical 
complexities…” 
“Without repair to what I understand to be a very unique airway, there was no way he was getting out of 
the hospital, and the possibility for a crisis, and a life-ending crisis, was really quite, I wouldn’t say 
inevitable, but it wasn’t out of the realm of any possibility.” 
“…I think it was challenging to get a handle on him to feel confident that he was going to sustain on your 
shift, and maintain stability…knowing that he had this potential to go sideways pretty quickly.” 
 
Ethicist “…both of those things can be true: that, given the complexity of his care, it is likely that he’s going to 
have an event, and one of the things that may contribute or lead to an irreversible event can be a failure of 
monitoring…We knew that he was having these events, but in the complex system we have, that’s part of 
why it becomes inevitable, or gives the feeling that it’s inevitable. The system is so complex, how long can 
you maintain all of this?” 
 
IMCMD “His issue with his airway was always pretty tenuous.” 
“It was a very, very narrow airway, probably the smallest one that we had seen that was surviving.” 
“[His trachea] was always getting really narrow, and needed multiple, almost weekly, dilations, so we 
never could get to the point of having an airway that was safe enough for him to go home…[he] would 
decannulate fairly frequently. He was an active little kid, and when he would decannulate, it was not 
uncommon for him to desaturate quickly…he never, ever got to the point…where his airway was safe 
enough to go home.” 
 
ICUPULM “Any child with a trach, an event is a possibility. I have no doubt that we made that clear, but that we had 
confidence. We expressed confidence that it would be unlikely.” 
“…Trach ventilated children can be in a very safe environment and still have singular events that can be 
devastating.” 
 
Futility 
      The conceptualization of futility by the participants was one of the few structured 
questions asked in the interviews. The question was asked in two forms: what do you 
think of the concept of futility and how was it relevant in this particular case? These 
questions were asked in different ways and in different times in each interview to 
avoid leading. The majority of participants took a qualitative view of futility, noting 
that the child had very little quality of life. Participants also related a view of futility 
as the limited possibility that their clinical work would achieve particular desired 
goals. One participant (PPMD) considered futility under the nomenclature of “non-
beneficial and/or potentially harmful.” This participant was the only one to use this 
different formulation or rejection of the concept of futility in this context. Another 
participant (ICUPULM) discussed two different viewpoints of futility, of which I will 
call the organ view and the personhood view. In this viewpoint when a treatment is 
reduced to what it can do to a particular organ it may not be futile but if expanded to 
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overall being. This will be explored further in the discussion section. 
     The nurses all reported a practice-oriented view of futility. Whereas RN1 seems to 
report looking at the feasibility of what had to be done for the child, RN2 and RN3 
reported futility around the actual nursing work being successful and gaining a quality 
of life that they found suitable. CM and SW reported a more personhood-view of 
futility around quality of life and the ability to engage with the environment. Though 
Ethicist reports a more nuanced view of futility, there is an element of it related to the 
amount of interaction and perception a person has. Below, (Table 14), Ethicist reports 
that it may not have been a case of futility because at that point the child could still 
experience things. This seems to indicate that, even if value-laden, there is something 
about interaction with the environment that connects with feelings of futility. 
 
Table 14. Conceptualization of Futility 
Conceptualization of Futility 
RN1 “It [reconstruction of the trachea] seemed futile, from the extent that the ENT was explaining what 
had to be done to manipulate an airway that was pretty much nonexistent, or incapable of life.” “Not 
worth pursuing.” “…going down the road we’re going to go down, we’re not going to get anything 
positive. Nothing good is going to come out of it.” 
“…Knowing what he was before to knowing where he is now, and knowing that what I saw and 
what I was taking care of was not recoverable, and that that was going to be his life.” 
 
RN2 “…As I was doing all this busyness and aromatherapy and baths and range-of-motion that looked 
senseless to my co-workers and others. I just wanted him to be able to go, and he never went. So is 
that futile? Yeah, that’s probably how I would say it was futile. My interventions and my motivation 
just did not work.” 
 
RN3 “After his second hit, there was nothing. He would just have this twitching, and sometimes nothing 
at all. I just didn’t feel like there was anything in there, and if there was something in there, it was 
painful to him, or like futility: no matter what we did, we would never get him to have any quality of 
life. No matter what.” 
 
CM “I think it's a good term. I think there are definitely cases where that is an appropriate term, 
especially in regard to this particular case after his second out-of-hospital [arrest]. It felt really 
hopeless and that we weren't going to do anything to improve his state, and, to me, to keep him alive 
felt sad and wrong. Futile.” 
“I think at that point he couldn't even control his temperature. He wasn't moving, he wasn't 
interacting.” 
“After his first event, in-hospital, the nurses could perceive him enjoying certain things. After the 
second, I don't think he moved at all. I know a lot of people caring for him just felt like they were 
caring for a body. I think the extra challenge in this situation was that the family was rather 
disengaged with his day-to-day care, so it was hard to see him here alone, and people were kind of 
dictating what should happen, but not being here, maybe every day. But it was futile.” 
 
SW “We were left with fairly reflexive systems that were life-sustaining, but his quality of life and his 
ability to engage with his environment were gone…from our perspective.” 
 
Ethicist  
 
“Futility is complicated because futility does, in the end, have a value element to it…Could we keep 
his heart going with the technology we had? Yes. Barely, but yes, so it wasn't physiologically futile 
to do what we were doing. So, you could ask, was it qualitatively futile, in that he can't recover? But 
to me, this isn't an issue just of futility, because up until some point along the way, he clearly still 
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probably takes that away, because I don't think his brain was functioning well enough to have that. 
But there was a period of time where he was still suffering, so that's a little bit different than futility, 
because you're actively imposing a negative state on a person, as opposed to not being able to 
achieve a positive state.” 
 
IMCMD  
 
“So you have a child who is irreversibly injured, irreversibly in a situation where they have no or 
extremely minimal interaction, and you go long enough that it's apparent that this is not going to 
change, and then those situations become futile, for a meaningful life.” 
 
PPMD “I don't think we can use 'futility,' because what we're talking about is a ventilator. Did it ventilate 
the lungs? Yes. But I don't think it was beneficial to this patient as a whole, because it didn't 
improve his quality of life, it didn't improve his ability to interact with or know his family, it didn't 
improve the likelihood that he would have neurologic recovery -- which was his family's hope but 
medically was not true. So, in this sense, yes, I think it was under the category of harmful and 
nonbeneficial...” 
 
ICUPULM “So on the one hand, yes, a ventilator isn’t a futile endeavor if you’re trying to keep the person alive. 
If you’re seeking neuro recovery and development it is very futile; it will not do that. It can’t reverse 
that problem.” 
“And this [second neuro insult] was a more futile situation than we’d had before.” 
 
Bearing Witness 
     A theme of “bearing witness” as described by William Cody, was found in the 
reports from the nurse participants and SW (Cody & Milton, 2001). Bearing witness 
invokes a sense of moral obligation through experience and presence (Cody & Milton, 
2001). This was found in reports from most participants around the perceived lack of 
presence at the bedside by parents. This was evident in many nursing progress notes 
as well as reported in these interviews by participants. There were also reports from 
participants that seemed to elicit a strong sense of presence during the child’s acute 
episodes. As RN2 reports below (Table 15) there was an attempt to call family to the 
bedside to witness the child’s many emergencies with the hope that by witnessing the 
practice of rescuing the child would bring them into the same moral space as the 
clinicians. RN2 goes on to report that by the time parents arrived, the issue was 
resolved, and the child appeared fine. This indicates that there is a distress or 
something the needs to be witnessed, or participated in, to grasp what the moral 
community is seeing and feeling, or at least that the community believes one ought to 
see even if it doesn’t change their minds. There is also a sense, from SW, that given 
the longevity of the hospitalization this was an expected, albeit unfortunate, reality 
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the family outside the PICU.  
Table 15. Bearing Witness  
Bearing Witness 
RN1 “With him being more awake and more interactive, the presence of the family was not there. The expectation as 
caregivers would be to see the family a lot more frequently than we did.” 
“The hard part for me was the lack of interaction by the family…it was more heart-wrenching not to see the 
family involved with him.” 
“…The more stressful part is that the parents were saying things but not doing anything…They never really 
took over that caring role…” 
 
RN2 “…All physicians were starting to call Parents to bedside when emergencies were happening. That’s how I 
think they chose to deal with it: so that Family would see it happen, in hopes that they would change the DNR 
status…They would just hear the situation over the phone…So then it was almost like it never happened. ‘Well, 
that’s good it happened at the hospital, because we wouldn’t be able to do it.” 
 
RN3 “…We all got very close to him because his family wasn’t there that often, so we became daycare, kind of, for 
him…” 
 
SW “…Dad had to return to work. I mean, life goes on, and they had other kids and other responsibilities, so they 
had to move forward knowing there was an unknown time frame of how long he was going to need to be here. 
But in doing that, I think they…were unable to see what his day-to-day cares were, what those day-to-day 
crises could potentially be, and their engagement with the process…was hampered by that.” 
“More often than not, they saw him at his best.” 
 
Artifacts: 
      There were several artifacts referenced by the participants. Artifacts are man-
made objects that seem to hold cultural or historical interest.7 I would extend this 
conceptualization to include a political, social, and ethical dimension attached to 
certain artifacts such as the ventilator, as was found in the results. These artifacts are 
important to exploring how ethical problems are constructed and negotiated. In the 
preliminary literature review, the ventilator was found to be a major factor in cases of 
futility and neurologic devastation, and a focal point of argument around life and 
death.  
Ventilator 
     The mechanical ventilator is a significant artifact in this case, and as found in the 
data from the preliminary literature review, becomes a central point of dispute around 
futility within the context of neurological devastations. In cases where terminal illness 
is the central factor the ventilator is a part of the dispute around an array of aggressive 
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113 treatments. Initially developed to maintain respiratory function during surgeries in the 
1970’s, the ventilator has become a standard, and arguably, defining object of 
intensive care units (Kaufman, 2015, p. 129). In this particular case, the ventilator 
became a focal point after the child’s fist hypoxic event with discussions around 
withdrawal of the treatment, and even more so after his second event and subsequent 
brain death testing. After the brain death testing and his subsequent breaths, the 
discussion became on what the random breaths meant for the overall picture as the 
ventilator was the object keeping the child’s body alive.  
     Discussions of discharge for this child did not occur until after one of his events 
led to neurologic injury and thus some airway stability. Although he was still 
receiving interventions to his airway there was a shift towards transitioning out of the 
hospital. At this point the ventilator seems to become a ‘routine’ object for clinical 
staff. The physician group, as reported by IMCMD and ICUPULM, has a relatively 
large trach/vent population living at home (Table 16). However, CM relates the 
magnitude of what it means to care for a vent-dependent child at home, just in terms 
of the in-person monitoring that needs to happen (Table 16). RN2 notes the 
complexity around just simply moving the child into the father’s arms (Table 16). CM 
also notes the contrast around the routinization for the staff and the expectations of 
parents. It is worth noting, as brought up by ICUPULM, that the state in this case has 
very little to no transitional facilities for children with ventilator dependency and thus 
it is either the PICU or home, with the exception of a few group homes. This has to do 
with the state’s Olmstead plan and how they have implemented this part of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). This was also brought up by CM along with 
other contributing factors affecting the disposition of vent-dependent children.  
     There appears to be less distress around the child’s dependence on the mechanical 
ventilator after his first significant event. This seems partly due to the moderate nature 
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some reactions and possible comfort as opposed to after the brain death determination 
where “…he was being ventilated on the ventilator… (Table 16).” This may relate to 
the spectrum of value judgements around quality of life where moderate devastation 
and vent dependence may be not ideal to clinical staff, but severe devastation is not 
consistent with their views around quality of life. It could also be a part of the way the 
interaction of the child aids in construction of his personhood. 
     Clinical staff talk about the ventilator as a machine that is keeping the child alive 
as opposed to a part of the child after his severe devastation. This distinction is 
important, again, because it signifies how the clinical staff view the moral status of 
the child and ventilator. “It was just the ventilator giving a breath (RN1, Table 16).” 
The ventilator is giving the breath, the child is not taking a breath. There is a 
distinction here between how much support the ventilator is giving as it relates to the 
status of the child-as-child versus child-as-patient. This separation of action between 
the child or the ventilator breathing signifies a relationship in understanding how 
these clinicians viewed the status of this child. By noting that the ventilator was doing 
the action of breathing without any reference of action by the child, the staff is noting 
the extent to which they see the ventilator as not benefiting the child. This may hold 
logically if we contrast a child with complete neurologic devastation against a child 
who is ventilator-dependent and interactive.  
     A final finding around the artifact of the ventilator is the special status it seems to 
hold in society, or at least in healthcare, as reported by PPMD and ICUPULM (Table 
16). PPMD suggests there is something different, whether morally, emotionally, or 
clinically, about the removal of a ventilator versus other LST. More research would 
be required to determine where this feeling comes from but given the literature review 
and volumes of discussion in medical ethics, the ventilator does seem to trigger some 
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whether it’s about sustaining breathing or feelings of agency in the connection 
between living and dying as there is more of a direct action-reaction between shutting 
off a ventilator compared to not doing dialysis.  
 
Table 16. Mechanical Ventilator 
Ventilator 
RN1 “It was just the ventilator giving a breath.” 
 
RN2 “Technically, weight-wise, one person could have lifted him, one person manage his circuit to his trach 
and vent…” 
 
RN3 “…By the time he got to us, they thought he was brain dead; but he was being ventilated on the 
ventilator…” 
 
CM “That's why we require somebody to be awake for a ventilated patient 24 hours a day and hooked up to 
monitors.” 
“You're trached and vented. You need somebody awake with you 24 hours a day. That means you 
require X amount of help in the home because no one, of course, can be awake for 24 hours.” 
“…I feel like sending a child with a trach and a vent has become so routine that we just expect it to 
happen and the family to get on board.” 
 
SW “…He would now need the trach and the vent permanently, that he would need significant cares for the 
rest of his life, and that wasn't going away now.” 
 
Ethicist “The second exam was done and also showed brain death. But after that, there was a little bit of a blip on 
the ventilator he was still on.” 
 
IMCMD  “…He basically was trach-dependent, vent-dependent.” 
“Our goals were to, hopefully, stabilize his airway early and see how low we could get down on the 
ventilator or off the ventilator…” 
“He always needed the ventilator. He didn’t breathe enough to make it.” 
“…We take care of a lot of trach/vent patients and get them home.” 
 
PPMD “…If you’ve got multisystem organ failure and the kidneys go next, people easily will get behind and 
stand together and say no dialysis. Or no ECMO. But for whatever reason, stopping a ventilator is not 
the same thing.”  
“And yet people will offer ventilation, even long-term mechanical ventilation, and they feel obligated if 
anyone requests it.” 
 
ICUPULM “If the plan includes removing the ventilator, it’s being done on behalf of the child. But for many people, 
removing the ventilator is viewed as sort of actively killing the child and parents have said that…So 
there’s an emotional piece with the ventilator that is different from other life-sustaining 
maneuvers…dialysis is not less life-sustaining, but there’s something different about sustaining 
breathing, as opposed to a metabolic function, even though both are critically necessary for survival.” 
 
Tracheostomy 
     The tracheostomy and tube were central to this case. The results from this research 
show that the child’s tracheotomy was a central object of his survival, the focus of his 
surgical treatment, and a sense of fear amongst bedside caregivers. Though CM 
discussed children with a trach and vent as becoming seemingly routine, there is 
acknowledgement of the planning and education involved in a child going home with 
those needs from ICUPULM (Table 17). However, as ICUPULM discusses this, all of 
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interesting distinction towards focus on physiologic versus psychosocial safety as 
well as casual reference to the fact that, despite all efforts, there is still a possibility of 
a devastating singular event. This seems to beg the question of how this is discussed, 
perceived, and/or understood by parents. At one point it has become routine to 
clinicians but for a family it is life-changing as well as frightening as the threat of a 
devastating event is much more of a possibility than a child without a trach. There is a 
sense here of what Barbara Koenig calls ‘routinization’ of biomedical technology 
(Koenig, 1988, p. 469). This social process habitualizes the implementation, use, and 
practice of a technology or procedure and, I believe, creates a dichotomous space 
between clinicians and parents due to the difference in the knowledge of caring for a 
child with a trach. 
     There was also a sense that there was a very quick shift from where the child was 
too fragile to allow parents to do many cares due to the trach and his airway, and then 
there to focusing on home care teaching from the clinical staff (CM, Table 17). This 
child’s trach became a very important focal artifact in this case as it was the key to his 
continued survival as well as the thing, or absence of, that led to his devastation. From 
the nursing staff the tracheotomy tube was seen as evoking fear due to its connection 
to the child’s fragility and the difficulty of getting it back in if it came out, which it 
did routinely. RN2 notes the feeling of responsibility attached to the ability to reinsert 
the trach (Table 17). All three bedside nurses noted the link between life and death in 
the securement of the tracheotomy tube, yet other staff discussed it merely as an 
object that factually existed in a technical sense with less emotion of feelings of fear 
and responsibility around its proper placement (Table 17). 
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Tracheotomy 
RN1 “I’d experienced that many times, where he’d pull his trach out and literally within ten seconds he’d pass 
out. I’d put the trach back in and he was right back up playing again. And I knew it would only take mere 
seconds before something catastrophic could happen.” 
“Usually you can take a trach out and the kid can maintain life for quite a while, but with his, it definitely 
maintained an airway opening and he relied heavily on that trach.” 
 
RN2 “Because it isn't just simply, oh, trach falls out; put it back in. It's a whole big to-do, and that nurse will 
take ownership and will take the blame.” 
 
RN3 “…A very big possibility that if we couldn't get the trach back in, it would be devastating to him.” 
“He [the child] was pretty protective of his trach, instinctually, probably.” 
 
CM “…I feel like sending a child with a trach and a vent has become so routine that we just expect it to 
happen and the family to get on board.” 
“At that point, people did not think his airway was stable enough for him to discharge to home. The 
family wasn't even allowed to do the trach changes; ENT was doing the trach changes.” 
 
SW “…Even if he'd still need the trach: like, can we fix and sustain the stability in that airway.” 
 
Ethicist “…It did stabilize so that we weren't taking him to the OR every five days. But there were all kinds of 
issues around the trach and the length of the trach and what was happening at the place where the trach 
met the main stem bronchus.” 
 
IMCMD “He would get his airway looked at very frequently, and he could decannulate fairly frequently, but it was 
never an issue.” 
Besides having the critical airway…he basically was trach-dependent, vent-dependent, and feeding 
[gastric tube] dependent.” 
 
ICUPULM “Once this got into the land of tracheostomy, there’s education, interventions, technical skills that have to 
be mastered by the family, home care arrangements have to be made, and there has to be a collective 
decision that the patient is safe enough to go home. I’m talking safe from a physiologic point of view, not 
a psychosocial point of view.” 
“Sending children home with a tracheostomy requires that the child not be having airway-related events 
for at least a month…the environment that they are sent into has people skilled in monitoring and caring 
for a tracheostomy, too.” 
“…We would not send someone home who we did not feel had a stable airway or an environment in 
which just a routine tracheostomy could not be cared for.” 
“…Trach ventilated children can be in a very safe environment and still have singular events that can be 
devastating.” 
 
Policies: 
     Several internal and external policies were discussed and used in this case. Internal 
policies were unique to the institution while external policies were from either state, 
federal, or private agency. None of the institutional policies will be included in order 
to maintain privacy for the institution, participants, child and family.  
“Futility” Policy 
     This policy has been renamed several times since the “ATS statement” 
recommended changing from futility to inappropriate, non-beneficial, and potentially 
harmful (Bosslet et al., 2015). In reviewing the policy versions over the years, it has 
essentially retained the core of its deliberative process that holds with similar policies 
around the nation. While this policy was in place during this case, discussion of it by 
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it being mentioned (Table 18). Other participants discussed it in context of decision-
making and the difficulties around using it in terms of legality and publicity. 
 
Table 18. Futility Policy 
Futility Policy  
RN1 “I remember hearing stories about it, but I don’t remember it ever taking place.” 
 
SW “…I don’t remember if we actually enacted the futility policy or not. There was a lot of conversation that 
we could move in that direction even during the first injury, but I don’t know that there was a hospital-
supported, administration-supported direction that we could take that stance.” 
“…From my perspective…I’ve seen the futility policy used rarely, and I think often it’s the result of 
perception. So if we force families to withdraw, regardless of how steadfast we were in our 
recommendation and expertise in what we anticipated the recovery to be, if the news got hold of a 
construed story, that would be challenging to overcome, know that we couldn’t clarify it.” 
“No one…wants to be that hospital, that lands on a front page that says: ‘You killed my kid. You made me 
withdraw…’” 
 
Ethicist “I don’t know that we ever did [use the policy]. I think what happened was that the policy was at least 
temporarily suspended from being in place because Risk Management and Legal were nervous about it.” 
“It had been used I think three or four times previously.” 
“…There were concerns about the policy and where [the hospital] was in relationship to the rest of the 
community around this. That policy was originally called a futility policy, and it was changed specifically 
to treatments that were nonbeneficial, harmful…” 
“Because we went with this policy, we went through multiple iterations with the intensivists about this. 
They were split as a group, but unwilling to act as a group unless they were unanimous as a group….many 
of them felt that it was an okay thing to do, but there were a few…who felt that one should never override a 
parent’s express wish.” 
“There was real concern that this case was going to end up in a malpractice suit, so within the 
hospital…they did not, in this particular case, want to take on the question of overriding the parents…” 
 
IMCMD “You’re obligated [to provide care] until there is a futility policy…that legally is seen throughout this 
country.” 
“As a group, we had a couple of other cases…where we discussed this, whether we wanted to do this 
[override parents] and be the first to do it.” 
“…When we were looking at a hospital futility process, we took it to judges in [State] and asked them.” 
 
PPMD “I think there has to be a place for us to be able to bring our expertise to the table, and in these gridlock 
situations there needs to be some mechanism to proceed with that. I thought we had that with the ethics 
policy, but if we’re unable to get the administration and the physicians to follow it, it’s pretty tough to carry 
out.” 
“It’s hard to know whether it works or doesn’t, because I think the issue comes with whether or not you 
actually use it…I think there are so many fears about using it that it gets stopped before it even gets 
started…I feel that as an institution we need to have a solid policy that everyone stands behind and will 
enact…” 
 
ICUPULM “…We tried to invoke the hospital futility policy, a policy that has never been fully invoked at this 
institution, a policy that gives the provider the opportunity to stop care, regardless of the family’s wishes. 
But we have never invoked that policy, primarily for medical-legal reasons. It’s a policy that has not been 
tested legally in the courts. There are no cases that give us guidance, whether one can do this and be free of 
criminal or litigious repercussions. There’s just no case law, so we’re stuck with a policy that we are very 
reluctant to use.” 
“If you don’t have the support of the family to allow a child to die, there are potential criminal 
ramifications of that, though that has never been tested. One doesn’t necessarily want to be contributing to 
case law as the first one…the group came to the conclusion that unless the hospital, with the full force of its 
legal department, agree and sought us to stop doing what we were doing, we were not going to do it, and 
we never received that support from the legal component of the hospital.” 
“It’s a policy without a population. It probably will never happen here because legally one can’t find 
support for it.” 
 
Brain Death Determination 
     The policy of brain death determination was used and referenced in this case by 
participants. The institutions policy follows the state law which recognizes brain 
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accepted medical standards. There was no dispute over the testing itself and in fact 
there is a discharge note from the physician following the second brain death 
examination. However, sometime after his declaration of death, the child seemed to 
initiate a breath on the ventilator. From participant interviews and chart notes this 
appears to be an unfortunate situation to an already complicated case. 
I was there when they did the examinations and found 
him to be brain dead, and in our policy it says that we 
can allow up to 48 hours for family to gather and say 
goodbye between the brain death declaration and 
removing the ventilator…Father took that as ‘I get 48 
hours to the dot,’ and I think somewhere in that time he 
had an agonal breath that was irregular, on average, 
once an hour. (PPMD) 
 
The policy from this institution does indeed allow 48 hours, if needed, to gather 
family. Considering many events that lead to brain death in children are unexpected, 
and this institution serves a vast regional geographic area, it is a likely possibility that 
sometimes a child may be declared brain dead before all family is able to practice 
whatever parting rituals they may desire. This policy, while not widely mentioned by 
participants, is playing a considerable part in current social and legal debates in the 
US currently, and particularly around children.  
Conclusion 
     The results of this research report the social structure around a particular case that 
led to intractable conflict. The participant narratives reconstruct a part of the moral 
space around the care of a child that led to complex conceptions of responsibility, 
decision-making, fear, distress, and conflict. Reconstructing the intimate work and 
relations around and throughout a case aids in understanding how morality is 
perceived and negotiated. Analyzing cases like this at its conclusion by applying 
principles ignores many of the interactions and relations that construct morality and 
work to building towards conflict. 
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better investigate the morality existing within complex relationships, responsibilities, 
and interactions; the moral community. Instead of looking at this case as a problem of 
futility, this study results construct the many complexities that work together to get to 
the point of where futility is felt, or in this case how it is felt, by whom, and how it 
changes. In addition to reporting roles, responsibilities, and relations, many themes 
were found in the results such as moral hazard and moral distress, inevitability, 
bearing witness, and conceptualizations of futility. In addition, participants reported 
how they viewed, conceived, and interpreted policies and artifacts that heavily 
influenced this case.   
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Chapter 6: Critical Analysis 
 
Solve et coagula 
(Separate and join together) 
      The question “what must exist for this to happen?” undergirds this research and 
provides the impetus for unique method of investigation into ethical dilemmas. 
Basically, it asks what things (people, objects, concepts, etc.) exist within and during 
a particular case that leads to intractable conflict. This question is derived from 
critical realism which believes in a stratified reality between the real world we cannot 
see, the empirical one, and the actual one that is socially constructed; there is a 
tension that exists and is acknowledged through its critical method (Easton, 2010). 
The stratified reality is a main tenet of critical realism, that the world exists 
independently of our knowledge of it, or how we explain it; what is going on behind 
the scenes.  
     Critical realism looks to examine what structures and entities exist in forming the 
area of study and identification of causality, tendency, and generative mechanisms 
that are natural or social that work, sometimes unknowingly, to produce certain 
outcomes (Schiller, 2015). What are the pieces, how do they function both inherently 
and in particular, and how they work together as a whole? These questions will guide 
critical analysis of the social structural system. 
     In the study of a case of intractable conflict in pediatric critical care there were 
several things that must be present which were also found in the precursory literature 
review. Parent-provider disagreement of course must exist by definition of an 
intractable conflict in this context, but as the preliminary literature review noted, this 
may be the precursor to labeling something as futile. Futility requires that something 
being done has no usefulness. If there is agreement between providers and parents, 
providers and providers, or parent and parent, then there is no conflict. This can either 
  
122 mean all parties are in agreement on what is being done or proposed, the proposed 
action is within normal standards and thus not being questioned, or there are silent 
parties who may disagree but feel they cannot speak up. Futility is thus socially 
created by the lack of agreement around something being done or requested and there 
is no evidence that it violates any clear laws or standards that would rule it illegal or 
objectively unethical; it exists within a zone of some uncertainty.  
     Intractable conflict has been studied through systems theories such as a dynamical 
systems approach (Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007). 
Healthcare, and particularly intractable conflict in healthcare, fits the definition of a 
complex adaptive system (Schneider & Somers, 2006). Recognizing health care as a 
complex adaptive system may provide a better lens to address difficult problems 
(Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001).  
     The critical lens will be used to question the assumptions present in the case that 
make up the major nodal points, such as decisional power, decision-making, and the 
complex differentials that exist within this case. Through explication by a systems 
theory model, I will then critically examine aspects that seem to exist to work to 
contribute to or cause intractable conflict in a case within the context of pediatric 
critical care. 
     This chapter will incorporate the results of a case examination of intractable 
conflict and synthesize the information with a systems theory strategy designed to 
tackle “wicked problems” (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2015). The DSRP model was 
developed by systems thinker Derek Cabrera and provides a tool for framing complex 
interactions among human and non-human elements (Cabrera & Colosi, 2008). The 
DSRP model provides a way of thinking about complex issues through using four 
simple rules:  
Distinctions Rule: Any idea or thing that can be 
distinguished from the other ideas or things it is with; 
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or lumped into a whole; 
Relationships Rule: Any idea or thing can relate to other 
things or ideas; 
Perspectives Rule: Any thing [sic] or idea can be the 
point or the view of a perspective (Cabrera & Cabrera, 
2015, p. 45). 
 
     I will use the DSRP model to input the results from the data analysis, critically 
analyze and output principals that seem to have causal power or importance to the 
workings of the structure around an ethical conflict. How we make distinctions, split 
things into parts or lump them together, connect things and ideas, and how we view 
things are important considerations to think about thinking and examining complexity 
(Cabrera & Cabrera, 2015).  
     This merging of critical realism and systems theory has already been discussed 
(Mingers, 2014). I would add that an addition of feminist ethics through the lens of 
Walker adds a needed social and ethical construction that is necessary to examine 
how people are navigating their roles and responsibilities. This eclectic amalgam of 
critical realism, systems theory, and feminist ethics provides a novel method for 
analyzing clinical and organizational ethical issues in the future. Prior to synthesis 
through the DSRP model, I will review a systems map of the case.         
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Systems Process 
And there could be arguments made for that 5% 
because they actually take up 60-70% of the ICU days. 
So think about that. 5% of the patients take up 60-+% of 
ICU days. One could say don’t look at the patient 
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system. The problem with a system that focuses on 
continuity, it would be irrelevant for 95% of the 
patients. (ICUPULM) 
 
It’s an inadequate system and everyone who works in it 
knows it. As long as things are going well, that 
deficiency isn’t fully exposed. As soon as something 
breaks or there’s unintended harm or preventable harm, 
emotional distress, the system really falters. 
(ICUPULM) 
 
 
     There are many different systems archetypes (Senge et al., 1994). This particular 
case fits two but also embodies a complexity that seems to create a new archetype, 
which I am calling the success/failure nebulous. In this archetype, which embodies 
the archetypes of shifting goals and accidental adversaries, there is an initial 
agreement on a path forward, a goal or decision. However, since success and failure 
are not, or cannot be, clearly articulated the path leads towards parallel goals in the 
context of a complicated and competing power structure with no clear absolute or 
unilateral decision-maker. Figure 3 shows how this particular case flows down to 
intractable conflict. 
     Once it was clear what the cause of the child’s critical illness was, the parents were 
presented with three options. Reconstruction at the current institution was chosen by 
the parents, there was a process initiated towards this goal, which was reconstruction 
of the airway. This is where the first perspective of futility is reported in that what 
needed to be done seemed so unlikely to be successful that it was viewed as futile 
(RN1). However, at this point, there was a common shared goal. 
     Once timepoint two began, there were feelings of inevitability around the child’s 
propensity to decompensate so rapidly and the tenuous nature of his airway. Also seen 
at this time, as the child began to become more interactive, was a goal described by 
nursing in the perceived absence of parents at the bedside to support growth and 
development. This created an adversarial relationship between parents and nurses, as 
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typically best situated, both on a practical skill level and an organizationally 
supported level, to tend to a growing and developing child. This was evident in the 
participant reports around taking on an additional assignment in addition to this child. 
      Timepoint three marked a reported loss of the child’s personhood, from what his 
level of interaction previously was. This loss or reduction from previous level of 
personhood is also reported by the nursing and allied participants as invoking how 
they conceptualize futility. At this point the treatment goals for this child shifted. This 
point marks where clinical staff thought it was best to withdraw medical 
interventions, such as the ventilator, from the child. Parents disagreed and desired to 
continue to fix the child’s airway. At this point his level of devastation was in a grey 
zone where it would be reasonable to allow the child to pass by removing the 
ventilator or allow parents to take the child home.  
     Nurses at this point, already adversarial with parents, looked towards educating 
parents to take the child home. As the parents refused to allow death, they were 
presented with three options: take the child home or to group home, or CPS would be 
contacted to place the child in medical foster care. The parents refused to take the 
child home. The child would then discharge to a group home and nurses switched to 
educating home care nurses. 
     Timepoint four began with this child’s readmission following cardiac arrest. 
Following the child’s brain death testing and reversal of the death declaration, the 
conflict escalated to another level. At this point participants note their feelings that 
there was nothing of this child’s personhood left. This timepoint brings some of the 
more complicated conflict around parallel and incompatible goals between clinicians 
and parents, competing interests between clinicians, hospital, and parents.  
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parallel goals that reinforced adversarial relations and fed back into further conflict. 
After the initial event (timepoint 3), parental goals emerged that were different from 
the medical goals. The parental goals remained constant while the medical team goals 
seemed to shift to try to reach some mutually agreeable pathway, but instead became 
parallel. Nursing goals seemed to adapt to the overall situation while feelings of 
inevitability and futility emerged and continued to help reinforce conflict. As more 
parties became involved there was not only conflict between clinicians and parents 
but within the team and hospital.  
     Below I will go through each agent within this case explicating their distinctions, 
systems, relationships, and perspectives. Above each section is a rudimentary 
representation of the agent’s distinction and relationships that make up the system 
they exist within. The DSRP rules are then further explored in the text from each 
perspective.  
The Child 
 {child/patient « not adult/not autonomous 
« dependent on « family/clinicians « PICU « state} 
     Presented above is the system with its relations and distinctions around the child. 
While we cannot analyze the child’s views we can speak generally about the status of 
a child. The child, both particularly and in general, can be distinguished in several 
ways. The child is distinct from an adult as not autonomous (at least in most younger 
ages). In this way we are defining children as without self-direction, without the 
ability to choose, to protect itself, to survive on its own, and that has a necessary 
dependency and vulnerability (Garrett, 2018). There is a need to protect the child’s 
open future as some would call it, to protect the future autonomy (Feinberg, 
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would seem that on a larger level children belong to us all (Lantos, 2017).  
     The child invokes a necessary dependency toward and responsibility of the parent. 
The child also invokes a responsibility, and sometimes then dependency, on the state, 
healthcare providers, social service providers, teachers, etc. The child is distinct from 
(most) adults in that there are many more adults that have a responsibility for the 
child. This may be mostly from the parents but teachers, nurses, physicians, social 
workers, etc., also have a responsibility toward the child that they do not necessarily 
have towards an adult. Heimer & Staffen write about the social organization of 
responsibility in the hospital and home (1999). These authors make a distinction that 
while the hospital is responsible for the child as a patient, the parents are responsible 
for the child (Heimer & Staffen, 1998, p. 149). However, the boundaries between 
child and patient are not clear. There is a higher threshold for state intervention and 
this makes the boundary between child and citizen much clearer as the state also 
respects parental autonomy.  
Table 19. Nature of Obligations  
Participants Child’s** Relationship Nature of Obligation 
Family Child** Particularistic 
Direct 
Long-term 
Broad scope 
Hospital/PICU** Patient Universalistic 
Direct 
Short-term 
Limited scope 
State Young citizen Universalistic 
Indirect 
Long-term 
Limited Scope 
*Adopted from (Heimer & Staffen, 1998, p. 138). **Child was changed from Infant, and NICU was 
changed to PICU. 
 
     Parens patriae, Latin, roughly meaning ‘parent of the nation’ holds that the ‘state’ 
has a decisional power for a child as a ‘disinterested protector’ that has a universal, or 
broad interest, in a child as a citizen over the parents’ particular interest (Heimer & 
Staffen, 1998, p. 151). In this conception, the state is essentially a backstop if the 
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intervention against negligent or abusive parents or guardians often guided by a 
standard of best interests or protection from harm for the child (Bester, 2018; 
Diekema, 2004). Within healthcare, there is a concept of ‘mandated reporter’ as a role 
held by nurses, physicians, and social workers. This holds that if there is a suspicion 
of abuse or neglect towards a child that comes into their care there is a mandate that 
holds them responsible to report it to the appropriate state agency and/or law 
enforcement. This distinction shows that the child is both the responsibility of the 
parent but also of other figures in society, and society itself. This can create, and did 
in this case, a dynamic tension between and within the family and healthcare/society.  
     The distinction between child and patient for the clinician seems more complicated 
and less clear. For the nurses, this child was seen as child-as-patient and child-as-
child. The child makes up one aspect of a larger system along with parents, siblings, 
extended family, teachers, caregivers, neighbors, and so on. Within the realm of a 
critically ill child, the three main parts of this network are the family, hospital staff 
members, and various representatives of the state, whether active or not (Heimer & 
Staffen, 1998). In this particular case we see that some of the participants noted the 
longevity with which the child was on the unit and the connection this led to. In 
looking at Heimer & Staffen’s conception of the social structure within the NICU 
(Table 19), there are some obligations that may have become skewed in this case 
(1998).  
     Participants reported that there was a sense of responsibility felt towards his 
development in addition to his critical care needs which during some timepoints were 
minimal, which indicates a shifting of obligations that the child was eliciting by his 
status. The child made up a part of the community in the unit, the connection that was 
shared if only by the knowledge that the nurses would collectively listen for his 
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the nursing staff was that of protectee/protector, nurtured/nurturer, the child 
connected the unit. The perspective of the clinical staff saw the child as their 
responsibility and since he was stuck in the PICU, they felt responsible not just to him 
as a patient but as a child. 
     The child was also a part of a family system, even if this may have shifted due to 
the length of his hospitalization. For parents, as life goes on and responsibilities 
outside the PICU need attention, there is a necessary separation. When a child is in 
the PICU months and years, what parent can come every day when there are other 
children, households, work, etc., to attend to? However, this child was also part of the 
family system, even if not present he was still dependent on parents. There is also an 
element of the child as a part of society as the state has an interest in the children 
within it. 
The Parents 
{parent « not patient « family « responsible for « child « patient « dependent 
upon«clinicians « PICU/hospital} 
     Parents can be said to have ultimate decisional authority for their child. In this 
distinction, however, they are not healthcare professionals, or at least not the 
professionals in the current role towards their child. It is certainly true that some 
parents are also healthcare professionals. The conception of parents is to choose for 
their child, to protect future rights, and have the child’s best interests in mind. Parents 
enter into a hospital setting and become a part of a complex system with many parts 
that also have a role with a perspective towards the child as the central connector of 
this system. This is the impetus for the connection of many different systems: family 
to hospital team, nursing team to medical team, etc. So, parents merge their structure 
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happen. When it doesn’t, the two systems find conflict.  
     It is not the case here that parents did not have the child’s interests in mind, it’s 
that they had differing or competing interests. The parental perspective towards the 
child differed from the clinician perspective. (It could also be the case that clinicians 
could disagree). The parental perspective could view, as the healthcare staff did, that 
technology failed to achieve an outcome that is desirable. Parents could also perceive 
that technology had gotten the child this far, and it was said he would die before, and 
he didn’t, and the child still has breath, is still living. In this view parents could 
continue to see their role as making the decision to maintain their child’s life. The 
child is a part of their family, they are the parents, they make the choices for their 
child, the hospital and its technology saved the child, kept him going, and can 
therefore solve this problem as well.  
     Parents enter into a complex system in the hospital comprised of different roles 
and responsibilities working together. Parents develop their role from the interaction 
they experience with the hospital, they become a “parent of a sick child” (Heimer & 
Staffen, 1998). This new role seeks definition through interaction with social structure 
engaged with in the particular unit of the hospital. Care for their child is given over to 
staff and the parent’s responsibilities are then delegated from clinical staff. In this 
case we do not know the specific parental view but can suppose that there were 
complicated interactions. 
     In this case, something the emerged from the data was a sense that there was an 
unclear demarcation where parents were expected to be more involved in day to day 
care. However, given the longevity of the child’s critical illness and fragility there 
was a seemingly prolonged period where parents couldn’t do anything, couldn’t 
practice their role as parent. The only way they could be a parent was to return to 
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their other children. Even when the child was more awake and interactive there was a 
sense by participants that while they would have expected parents to be more present 
there was some unpredictability and fear with the child’s airway. If experienced PICU 
nurses felt fear around the airway what must parents have felt? After all, a parent is 
not a PICU nurse, they require education on their now chronically ill child, for which 
they are dependent on the PICU nurses for. The parents are no longer the experts on 
their child, and initially there was a goal to not go home with a tracheotomy tube, so 
should parents even begin to learn about the airway? 
     In this case it appears that parents became a more distant relation and part of the 
system. One can surmise that there could well be some resentment from parents when 
clinicians came to them and told them what they should decide now once the child 
had a neurologic injury. Even if withdrawal of the ventilator and the allowance of 
death was the right thing to do, there may be a parental perspective that viewed the 
hospital structure as taking over parental responsibilities. Likely there was a 
disconnect between the relations in the hospital and the parents and this led to two 
different perspectives and distinctions, and an experience that was not shared between 
the hospital staff and the parents. So instead of a connected set of relations between 
and among clinicians and parents there were two systems, the clinicians and the 
parents. Within the data there was many comments around the perceived absence of 
parents at the bedside which may indicate a breakdown of what would be considered 
the normal presence and involvement yet there doesn’t seem to have been or to be a 
clearly articulated description of scope and responsibility of a parent with an ill child. 
The Nurses 
{nurse « not parent « responsible for « patient « works in « PICU « within « 
hospital « state} 
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ill. The nurse is not the parent but takes over much care of the child given the severity 
of the illness. This of course began to change when the child recovered from some of 
his critical instability towards a child who was not in need of total control of his care. 
Nursing care in the PICU is not normally a place where growth and development are 
fostered. However, as the child’s airway was tenuous enough to require staying in the 
PICU, the child existed, for the nurses, in this grey area. It is no surprise then, that 
there were feelings of fear and inevitability as the sole reason for the child’s 
requirement to stay in the PICU was his potential to decompensate so rapidly.  
     Nursing staff saw this child as one who both did and did not need to be in the 
PICU, didn’t need critical care nursing but also did. Nursing staff were caring for him 
essentially to prevent a catastrophic event that they felt was inevitable given their 
capabilities and the child’s anatomy. This may present an originating point of moral 
hazard as the relationship of nursing to physician staff and parents begins to show 
signs of adversarial undertones. Through nursing staff’s feelings of inevitability, we 
see a sense that they felt they could not prevent what they were being asked to, at 
least not forever.  
     Physicians, by requiring the child to stay in the PICU due to his airway, were 
viewing the nurses as the treatment and thus the cure for the risk of decompensation. 
So, for nursing staff, the care of this child was essentially a time bomb waiting to 
explode on some unsuspecting, or unlucky, nurse. The repercussions of which were 
that the burden of failure was felt on that particular nurse. This sentiment from 
nursing staff never appears to have been an integral part of the social structure or 
conversation between physicians and parents. Thus, the decisions around this were 
made between parents and physicians with the moral risk existing at the bedside 
among nursing, intensivist, and other caregivers on shift when an event happened.  
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hospital, who is inherently risk averse, begins attempting to look for a deficiency that 
led to the adverse event, a reason why this happened. However, if nursing had been 
more powered within the conversations prior there would have been a voice to this 
inevitability, maybe. While there was this feeling of inevitability by the nurse 
participants, and even an acknowledgement by other participants, this didn’t seem to 
stimulate conversations around possibility or what failure looks like, or what would 
happen if it did occur. 
     Once the child had his first neurologic injury nurses still viewed him as having 
some semblance of himself, though not the child he was previously. There was still a 
fear around his airway but there was a less of a sense of inevitability, or at least a 
worry about it. This is likely because the outcome that nurses’ thought was inevitable 
had come to fruition. Now decisions would be made about what to do next, which 
would not involve them explicitly. This is where the concept of bearing witness really 
comes through. Nurse participants report witnessing the child’s distress and further 
episodes and by the time parents came to the bedside the child was calm. There was 
also some sense of bearing witness from RN2 towards physicians during the later 
timepoints. RN2 reports some inconsistency between physicians on how involved 
they would be with medical issues. Some physicians would be more dismissive. This 
may be a sense that while nurses couldn’t change their level of involvement, 
physicians seemed to be disengaging.  
The Allied Staff 
{SW/CM/Ethicist « coordinates with « PICU team, parents, hospital « 
responsibility to « patient, parent, PICU team «works within « PICU « hospital} 
     Allied staff saw themselves wholly in a coordination lens. SW, CM, and Ethicist 
all reported some aspect of tending towards the structure of relationships between 
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the social structure around the child. SW as a social worker is less responsible to the 
child than to the family, at least in this case. In the PICU, generally, social work is 
directed towards families as the child is typically young and critically ill. CM as care 
manager is responsible for discharge planning around care needs. Ethicist has a more 
complicated distinction due to a presence that is predicated on the belief or report of 
ethical concerns by some party involved, whether parent or clinician. Ethicist role is 
not necessarily responsible to any party, outside of the child, and is instead more tied 
to resolution or some best outcome; managing the situation or dilemma. 
     CM reports a role as primarily responsible to the child through coordinating, 
planning, and forecasting. CM’s responsibility requires discussion with parents to 
help establish what the child will need after discharge. CM’s distinction here is that 
the child has needs and the parents will require support in obtaining training and 
equipment to meet these needs. CM follows every child through insurance reviews 
and discharge planning. The perspective for CM is towards discharge. CM reports 
working with family, staff, and outside services to set up appropriate and needed care 
after discharge, as well as setting up care conferences. From CM’s personal 
perspective, there is some disconnect between parental involvement at the bedside, as 
well as discrepancies between messaging to the family around the child’s complexity 
and ability to discharge.  
     SW reported providing support and assistance in navigating resources for the 
family as a responsibility. SW also was communicating within and between the team 
and family. SW also reported keeping the common story among different caregivers. 
Support was also given to the staff as well as parents. This responsibility was quite 
substantial and along with Ethicist seemed to be the primary connection between all 
the parties involved. SW seemed to be the most consistent person in this case which is 
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relationship to the child in this situation.  
     Ethicist had the most complex responsibility and relationships through having to 
understand the perspectives of all parties involved. Ethicist also reported circles of 
responsibilities from the child to the hospital. Ethicist reported the responsibilities of 
being the mediator, analyzer of perspectives and situation, and managing the 
situation.  
The Physicians 
{physician « not parent « responsible to « patient « family « PICU « group « 
hospital} 
     Physician participants had several distinctions evident in the results. While only a 
few key physicians were interviewed for this study they were integral to the child’s 
case. Two of the physician participants were primary physicians of the child distinct 
from the third physician who was a consultant. ICUPULM did also have a consultant 
role during the case as well. In this distinction between primary and consultant there 
is an important relationship. A primary 
     There was an interesting difference in the number of role codes between PPMD 
and the RN’s and the two other physicians. This could indicate the limits of our role 
conceptions around the work done by nurses and pain and palliative care practitioners. 
For instance, we know what “nurse” is, we know what “physician” is but when we 
look at PPMD’s codes, or the RN’s codes there are more because there are narratives 
that describe responsibilities that don’t fall under our normative conceptions of what 
it is to practice as a nurse or physician. This limitation in our conceptions may 
indicate or reflect what kinds of practices are promoted and valued, especially within 
an interventional-bases health system. The fact that the role codes of PPMD and the 
RN’s more personal and intimate in nature and are not necessarily a part of the 
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space that is not visible, not recognized as important, and/or not a normally 
highlighted aspect of general good healthcare.  
     Walker, and other feminist philosophers, would certainly note that the role codes 
of PPMD and the RN’s would be considered more caring practices, more historically 
female roles, and therefore do not fit well within the scientific view of allopathic 
medicine for which American healthcare is dominated (Lindemann, Verkerk, & 
Walker, 2008; Walker, 2007). Since this is a case study it is limited in its ability to 
generalize. Whether an expanded role code set is symbolic of a more gendered and 
complex set of responsibilities or a result of the way we conceptualize the roles of 
physician and nurse would need to be answered by further studies. What is interesting 
is that both of these explanations could be true. We may better conceptualize more 
male-oriented roles and therefore have a better understanding of what a “physician” 
does and this results in less role codes and/or more caring or female-gendered roles 
are more difficult to define under the umbrella of one concept such as “nurse” as 
compared with the conceptualization of “physician.” Of note, it is interesting that the 
pain and palliative care physician shared similar amounts of role codes as the nurses 
did. Pain and palliative care has been said to be originating from a more nursing-
oriented theory.  
The Hospital 
{hospital « responsible to patients « dependent on  « clinicians « responsible to 
« parents « community « board} 
      While I was unable to interview anyone that is makes up the hospital, the hospital 
itself has some situated distinctions. Certainly it is true that a place like a hospital 
cannot be described by the persons who compose it. By interviewing administrators 
and risk managers we cannot obtain a sense of the hospital but since these persons 
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concerns from that perspective. From the other participants there were reports of the 
decisions involved leaders in the hospital took and this seems to be related to the risk 
of legal and PR repercussions. 
 
 
The Social Structure 
{State {Parent « {Child « Clinical Staff « SW « CM} PICU} « Consultant « 
Ethicist « Administration} Hospital} State} 
     The relations that make up this social structure are clearly complex. Below, 
(Figure 4) the figure shows the complex relations and domains. The arrows show a 
directional relationship, either one or two-way. The PICU clinical staff have a 
relationship through responsibility towards the child-as-patient who has a dependent 
relationship on the PICU clinical staff. The parents have a relationship through 
responsibility to the child who is dependent upon the parents, who have decisional 
power over the child. The parents and the PICU clinical staff have a bi-directional 
relationship as they form a necessary relationship. This necessary relationship is 
connected through aggregate interests that can be in agreement or disagreement. The 
child is both dependent upon the clinicians and parents, to the clinicians as patient and 
parents as child. This duality seems to be central node that can lead to either 
agreement or disagreement, and is likely a source of many ethical conflicts in 
pediatrics. 
      Social workers and care managers, in this case, exist within the social area of the 
PICU and work as the link between the network of parent and clinical staff. Social 
worker has a direct relationship with clinical staff and parents, while holding a bi-
directional relationship with care manage and ethicist. The social worker appears to 
act, as the results noted, as a sort of keeper and manager of the social structure by 
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manager, for their part, has a bi-directional relationship with the clinical staff as they 
work together on understanding what cares will be needed for the child and what 
education is needed for the parents or home care nurses. Care manager notes an 
obligation to the patient as a guiding motivation, this could be due to their background 
as a nurse. A bi-directional relationship with social worker is seen as they worked 
together, with different foci, to manage the social structure of clinical staff and parent. 
Ethicist has mostly one directional relationship as duties towards, with the exception 
of social worker. Ethicist is the link to the larger hospital picture and relationship.  
     Consultant, through reports from PPMD and ICUPULM, holds a duty to the child, 
parents, and clinical staff, but this is not bi-directional as the role of consultant is to 
advise as reported by PPMD. Consultant, like Ethicist, is a part of the hospital 
structure that exists outside of but embodies the PICU. Hospital administration has an 
ultimate obligation to the child and parents both as individuals and as part of a larger 
community. The parents exist within the realm of the state, where the child moves in 
and out of. Once the child is in the hospital, that child becomes an obligation of the 
hospital and staff through its dependency. The state has an interest in the child, the 
parents, and the hospital.  
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Shifting Goals and Accidental Adversaries: The failure/success nebulous 
We discussed [child]'s condition, and that the 
[Hospital]'s team recommendation to the family has 
been to move to a comfort cares only/hospice plan of 
care certainly after his most recent arrest but also over 
the past year, but that the family has requested 
continued treatment. (Ethics note) 
 
     The main causal themes that emerged from analyzing the social structure is the 
subtle shifting of goals, emergence of adversarial relations, and the lack of defining 
failure. As the central node to the social structure appears to be the duality of the child 
existing as child-as-patient and child-as-child, this seems to be the point of departure 
from a unified goal to shifting and parallel goals, accidental adversaries, and 
ambiguity around success and failure. 
  
141      Initial goals at the time of admission were inherent of any critical care admission, 
to resuscitate and stabilize. After this, however, there was a point at which the belief 
in the goals seemed to fracture. The offering of three options seems to be a point at 
which there was some varying conceptions of how achievable this child’s stability 
would be. Within the data there is little mention around discussing the options 
between going to a specialty airway center and doing the surgeries at the current 
institution. One would think that given the choice to remain in the institution currently 
in that is not a specialty airway center would indicate that success would be less 
likely. The option to withdraw being offered would also indicate there was some view 
that success was uncertain and/or risky. RN1 notes that success felt like a very 
unlikely chance. It seems there was a sense from the clinical participants, though not 
explicitly noted, that failure to them meant death or severe devastation. This comes 
forward in participant report after the first neurological devastation. However, from 
the chart review data and participant data failure as death or devastation does not 
seem to have been discussed with parents at the juncture of the initial options.  
     From this initial agreed upon goal towards airway reconstruction and stabilization, 
the participants described the progression from critical to a more stable rehab focus 
while the child still maintained a critical status due to his tenuous airway and 
increasing activity related to his age and development. Normally, once a child is in 
more of a rehab phase of care they would be out of the PICU and not requiring lots of 
cords and monitors, which allows the child to play and be active. However, due to this 
child’s risk of death being so high he remained in the PICU hooked up to monitors.       
     Timepoint two appears to be the beginning of shifting goals from nursing where 
parents, who had not had a role in his care due to his critical status, were not as 
present at the bedside and the nurses began to have an expanded case load which 
didn’t seem to allow them constant one-on-one time with the child. As the surgical 
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towards stability and maintenance, the nursing goal shifted or expanded to include 
promoting development, something for which the PICU is not typically geared 
towards. Inevitably then, there seems to have been some notice, as reported by 
participants, that parents were not present during this time as would be expected. This 
may have led to some adversarial beginnings between nurses and parents as the fear 
of the tracheotomy tube coming out increased and this distress found an outlet 
towards viewing the parents as absent; the structure was fracturing. 
     At timepoint three the goals seem to have shifted after the neurological injury 
became evident. At this point there was a recommendation from the healthcare team 
that withdrawal of the ventilator and allowing the child to die was the most 
appropriate goal. As parents rejected this plan, the goal then was to recover as much 
function as possible, address any new symptoms or issues, ensure that the airway was 
stable and discharge home. Since the child was no longer as active his airway was 
more stable. This goal was different than the original because the focus was less on 
reconstruction and more on stabilization. However, considering how tenuous the child 
had been throughout his hospitalization, and the many near-death experiences, parents 
did not feel comfortable taking him home. This seems to be a point where, while the 
goals shifted, the rest of the healthcare team became accidental adversaries along with 
the nursing staff. 
The goals I think shifted, at least temporarily, to try to 
help the family recognize how injured this child was. 
Again, we were working off of just partial brainstem 
function. By neural imaging, the child was what we call 
neocortically dead. That is the cerebrum or thinking 
areas of the brain were infarcted; they were gone. So we 
had someone who was neocortically dead and not 
expected to develop any improvement in those things 
that contribute to personhood, sense of presence, 
interaction, responsiveness. In that setting we were 
hoping to move the family to a non-resuscitation mode, 
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unsuccessful in that. (ICUPULM) 
 
     At timepoint three and four there seems to have been co-existing or parallel goals. 
The clinical staff maintained the goals they thought in the best interests for the child-
as-patient and child-as-child, while the parents had goals in the best interests of the 
child-as-child. While the child was now more devastated as explained in the narrative 
report above, the goals remained the same with the exception of secondary provider 
goals trying to help the parents understand the futility that staff saw. This brings up 
questions around the complicated power dynamic and differentials within pediatric 
decision-making in critical cases such as this. 
 
Power Differentials and Decision-Making 
 
I feel like sometimes we put families in unfair positions 
where like, ‘We can do this, or you can go palliative, or 
we can go full throttle,’ and I think there are some 
families who literally know the right choice isn’t to go 
full throttle, but…They can’t be the ones to say it. (CM) 
 
     We often think of power differentials as who holds the power of choice over 
another. In this case it is easy to see the parents as having more power in the ability to 
choose, but this would neglect to consider the complete picture of how power is 
distributed as seen through how practices of responsibility were assigned and 
deflected in the previous chapter.  
     The medical team holds the knowledge of what can and could be done. The parent 
then hears these choices and is expected to decide despite having less understanding 
about the downstream realities of each choice. For example, the choice of going to a 
specialized center seems to indicate that the child had something unique that has led 
to, in the past, the creation of a center that specializes in the issue. It seems odd then 
that a third choice between withdrawing or transferring was offered. It may certainly 
be reasonable for parents to decide to stay in the current state and let the surgeon 
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family with other children and lives in the current area may feel competing interests 
and therefore feel obligated to remain and try to reconstruct not at the specialized 
center, but this then begs the question of how much this decision is understood. This 
may be where the issue of undefined failure may have emerged, in that parents may 
have had an idea of success, the medical team may have had an idea of success and 
what failure could look like without this failure being made explicit with parents. This 
shifts power, unknowingly, to the medical team whereby they grasp the gravity of the 
choice and parents are making the choice ignorant of this perspective. Parents, in this 
way, are making the choice out of what is best for the family, understanding that there 
exists a successful situation but not a failed one, thus making it difficult to define 
failure later on. This power differential in choice is seen later as well with the issue of 
withdrawing support.  
     There are more important nuances present in these shifting obligations and power. 
On one hand parents are delegating care over to staff because their expertise is needed 
but whenever there is a decision to be made the obligation and power shift to the 
parents, even if there is a consensus between clinical staff about a particular path. In 
addition, it may be the case that parents are being obligated through clinician’s 
deflection of responsibility to the parents even while they know what the best decision 
for the child is. It could said, and certainly is true, that these are the ethical and legal 
norms in US healthcare, that parents are the ones assigned the responsibility to make 
these decisions. However, this doesn’t mean parents should be making these decisions 
in a vacuum. Clinicians are present to assist parents in making decisions but the 
complexity of some decisions, as in this case, seem so complicated that it is 
reasonable to question how responsibility is apportioned between parents and 
clinicians. Some decisions may be said to be completely reasonable for parents to 
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by the absence of giving a choice.  
…In our society parents drive that decision, and we can 
influence that decision. We can influence that decision I 
think in positive ways, but it takes a fair amount of 
experience with listening. It takes probably more than 
anything else, an appreciation for time; these decisions 
aren’t made overnight. People have to arrive at them 
and if there are two parents they both have to arrive at a 
similar decision and, invariably, one person is at a 
different place than the other. (ICUPULM) 
 
     While we are always concerned about keeping families abreast of their options, 
expecting parents to make a choice for which they have limited knowledge may be as 
irresponsible as unilateral decisions are often viewed. This would be an issue of 
deflecting responsibility then by clinicians knowing the right path but putting the 
choice on the parents; whether this is a legal constraint or clinician obligation. That 
being said, clinical staff are doing this because it is the norm, expected, and in 
keeping with social and legal practice. As ICUPULM notes: “…invariably it falls 
upon them [parents] and we can blunt their sense of responsibility, but often times we 
don’t do that well and/or they see through it...” The attempt to blunt responsibility 
suggests that as a clinician, ICUPULM knows there is a problem with how 
responsibility is distributed for these decisions, a sense that putting these choices on 
parents is an undue burden or at least, that we don’t do a good enough job thoroughly 
explaining the options, again, from the clinician perspective. This brings forward 
complexities around a child’s interests, who is best to decide them, and the ethics 
around risk aversion in the face of ethical conflicts. 
 
Best Interests/Competing Interests and the Ethics of Risk Aversion 
I often tend to think of it more as aggregate interests: 
let's look at all of them compared to each other. That's, 
in a sense, a reformulation of 'best interests', to get away 
from that comparative element of good, better, best. The 
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in the best interests of the child? But what we're really 
asking is: what is in the best overall aggregate interests 
of the child? That's, I think, what we're actually talking 
about. Once he's essentially brain dead, what interests 
does he have? There are certainly people that argue that 
once you're brain dead, or even once you're in a PVS, 
you have no direct interests. (Ethicist) 
 
     While evoking themes of accidental adversaries, there is a complicated discussion 
and realization of best interests and harms in pediatric decision-making that has 
significant relevance in bioethics and emerges in this case (Diekema, 2004; Garrett, 
2018; Lantos, 2017; Winters, 2018). Though it was a small part of the data from 
participants, the relation of the hospital to the other parties involved was interesting 
and important. The fact that there was a division noted between the hospital, the 
private physician group, and the bedside clinical staff shows a lack of a unified 
system and an unequal distribution in power of voice. The latter is more interesting as 
the former is not surprising. Even the use of “system” to describe anything in our 
healthcare is somewhat problematic. This case provides an insight into the nexus of 
where these decisions can go awry, where how you view the child, either as a child-
as-patient or child-as-child, can lead to competing interests based upon one’s 
responsibility and perceived obligations.  
     Further medical intervention towards this child after the severe neurologic 
devastation is seen as inappropriate by the participants. The nurses felt like they were 
caring for a shell of person, a body. The physicians recommended withdrawal as the 
interventions being implemented had no benefit to the child-as-patient. Yet, the 
physician group could not go forward with unilateral withdrawal of the medical 
interventions due to the legal risk and lack of institutional support. The hospital would 
not move forward due to the same legal risk, as well as PR risk.  
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medical intervention was not in the child’s best interests, they were hindered, along 
with the physician group, from acting in the child-as-patient’s best interests. The 
parents were adamant, by all reports, that they would not withdraw medical 
interventions that were keeping their child alive. This left the nursing staff and other 
bedside staff seemingly out of any decisional equipoise. Since the parents were not 
taking the child home, this left the PICU nursing staff, and subsequently the group 
home nursing staff, the most affected by these decisions yet with none of the voice, 
except for the home care agency nursing staff after timepoint four.  
     There are three logical problems following a best interests standard that are 
relevant here: 
• If the clinicians’ best interests for the child were correct, then the hospital was 
not acting in the child’s best interests. 
• If the parent’s best interests for the child were correct, then the hospital was 
acting in the child’s best interests (assuming they were acting for reasons of 
the child’s best interests).  
• If the hospital had the interests of the child in mind, and the hospital’s best 
interests for the child were correct, then the clinicians were not acting in the 
child’s best interests. 
 
     Of course, if we view this differently within the context of aggregate interests or 
competing interests there is a necessary balancing of interests. The hospital has an 
interest in mitigating bad press and legal risk so if we look for a path of least 
resistance this would be to concede to parental perspectives and against those of 
clinician perspectives. This may be for several reasons relating to risk aversion. The 
hospital has a large community of patients as well as a need to generate financial 
sustainability. Any risk to this, through bad publicity and legal action, may harm more 
than the distress caused by one particular case. After all, parents are free to speak 
about the details of the case in the press while the hospital is bound by privacy and 
confidentiality. The path of least resistance by the hospital and physician group by 
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principles to  
     A critical view of risk aversion, or an ethics of risk aversion, however, would find 
some logical problems with an overly risk-averse institution. As the previous logic 
model eluded, there is some aspect of overriding the very standards of care that 
clinicians within the institution hold. Certainly, one could say that those are only a 
few clinicians and it is subjective, but this presents a problematic way of adhering to 
standards of care that are established by the professional societies that those clinicians 
are a part of and represent. Furthermore, risk aversion through the path of least 
resistance may become an insidious pathway if we seem to only accede to parental 
demands when they feel empowered enough voice them. Only allowing some parental 
wishes when risk becomes higher could easily wind up benefiting those in positions 
of power, or those who speak up; there is something inherently wrong about this.  
     Risk aversion towards paths of least resistance benefits parents who speak up, 
which invokes questions around outspokenness as a causal factor. It requires us to ask 
about the parents who don’t speak up. It also requires us to look at this from the 
perspective of whether there is some ethical obligation embedded within this space 
that is being realized when parents don’t speak up, but not when parents speak up. 
What I mean is, if clinicians feel something is ethically right, such as to withdraw the 
ventilator in this case, and there is conflict when parents speak up against this, there 
seems to be a morality that is not being recognized; what is it? Conflict seems to 
highlight some morality that is not institutionally supported whether this is by the 
hospital or legally in society. Taking a more risk averse position seems to hide or 
suppress some moral claims and accounting. The absence of precedent doesn’t 
necessarily equate morality to legality, or vice versa. Just because something is not 
legally supportable doesn’t mean it is unethical. It is interesting, after all, that risk 
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when the child’s care seemed to be quite risky. 
     What is the morality of the hospital in regard to its acting against the clinical staff 
and the child’s best interests, if the hospital agreed with the clinicians? What does this 
say about society that an institution will weigh legal and publicity risks against ethical 
practice or use of resources? These questions are not easily answered, and they are 
further challenged by the fact in this case that the home care nursing agency refused 
to care for the child further unless there was a DNR in place. It would seem that some 
organization was able to set limits around what care they felt was appropriate. There 
was apparently never a time when a unilateral DNR order was able to be implemented 
in the hospital.  
     Does the state play a role in having a decision about the child’s best interests? 
This seems to speak to the need to reconceptualize how we look at the best interests 
of a particular child. It may well be within the parents’ view of best interests for the 
child to be alive and at the same time not be in the child’s best interests from the 
clinicians to prolong LST. I don’t know that these two things necessarily have to 
cancel each other out. The interest to be alive doesn’t necessarily negate the interest to 
not be kept alive by technology. Technology after all is just as fallible as people and 
may provide more opportunities for something to go wrong, as was seen in the fear 
around the child’s trach. There appears to be a confusion or lack of agreement in our 
society over what adequate biological survival is, what it means, what needs it entails, 
and who and when adequate biological survival becomes a point of focus (Walker, 
2007). 
 
Inevitability 
I think you knew it could happen, and it possibly would 
happen, but it never had a negative outcome after. You 
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was so shocking with all of it: that that time, that was 
the time it just all fell apart, and he became a very 
different person from that point on. (RN2) 
 
     The concept or question of what can be considered inevitable, probable, or likely 
when referring to something happening such as a patient decompensating is an 
interesting concept elicited by this case. Nursing staff reported feeling like taking on 
his care was similar to ‘Russian roulette,’ you never knew if today was going to be the 
day. This type of stress felt by staff daily can be minimized by some saying that any 
child in the PICU could decompensate at any time. This may be true but there seems 
to be a different way these participants discussed the feeling around this child. I 
would hesitate to say that this is a common feeling about all PICU patients. And we 
see this same feeling reported by other participants as well. However, it could 
certainly be a more prevalent feeling than thought. The question would then be is it 
more prevalent with riskier or more experimental cases? 
     While this concept remains difficult to explicitly apply it to a particular situation it 
seems important to decision-making. Arguably subjective, feelings of inevitability 
may signal the need to discuss expectations with patients and families. Given that 
there are some instances in NICUs, PICUs, and cardiovascular ICUs in pediatrics, or 
in healthcare in general, where things are attempted that haven’t been done before, the 
feeling of inevitability may be a signal. This feeling from staff may indicate that 
defining or discussing when to stop could be beneficial to both parents and providers.  
     Feelings of inevitability may also signal that nursing staff, or those more directly at 
the bedside, ought to be involved in the decisions around what things are done and 
how feasible or how much moral risk should be taken on. This is particularly notable 
considering the knowledge of the moral hazard present. In this case, when the child 
had his first neurological insult it was fairly clear that the PICU staff and providers 
thought it best to stop and let the child pass, or at least change to a comfort measure 
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take on most of the hazard, and defining when to stop, defining failure, may be a 
reasonable thing.  
     Defining failure is not something common in healthcare. A surgeon may say that 
they will have two options in a case where the first is more desirable and the second 
less so but stands as a possible plan B once in the operating room. For physicians, 
trained to conceive illness as a pathology of organ systems, literal organ failure 
remains the standard for failure, and legal recognition.  
Given his overall condition and the high likelihood of 
further deterioration and the recent events in which 
changes in his cardiac status required fluids and his low 
heart rate, they [home care agency nurses] realistically 
anticipated that a cardiac deterioration is likely at home, 
and inn [sic] view of his overall status the nurses felt it 
was not appropriate to attempt resuscitation and stated 
that they would not provide care for him at home 
without a DNR in place. [Agency owner] conveyed to 
me her agency's stance that they would take him home 
only with a DNR. (Ethics note) 
 
     It is interesting that the home care nurses were able to insist on a DNR order prior 
to return to their care where the hospital nurses were not able to make the same request. 
This point is interesting as this was after his more devastating neurological incident that 
happened in the care of the nurses at the agency, timepoint four. What is interesting is 
that there is, here in this time, a documented feeling of inevitability. While this is after 
he was further devastated, it was felt that particularly then the child was even, or further, 
at risk for events or death.  
 
Policy and Artifact 
     Non-biological elements play important roles within social structures. We are 
concept-dependent beings and we conceive our world by how we conceptualize the 
things we interact with. The policies in place, or not in place, technologies present or 
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necessary policy and artifact elements that were integral to how the case unfolded and 
how perceptions and distinctions were made. 
     The major policy that was relevant found in the data was the futility policy. 
Futility policies have many different and constantly changing names. In this case it 
seemed that if it was used it was a modified version of what many institutions use. 
Namely, that it allowed the family to search for other institutions. However, the 
formal policy does not appear to have been used or felt that it could be used. This, as 
the physicians IMCMD and ICUPULM report, is likely due to the precarious legal 
standing it holds in the particular state. When this issue was posed to a legal scholar 
and bioethicist this sentiment was confirmed: 
The [state] statute specifically forbids overriding the 
surrogate when they are a POA [power of attorney]. But 
the absence of specific prohibition is hardly permission 
(when the surrogate is a guardian or family member). 
The normal rule is that the clinician follows the patient 
or the surrogate. One can go to Probate Court (as in the 
Barnes case) for the judge to green light the clinician 
CMO [comfort measures only] treatment plan. But to 
proceed on one’s own surely does entail risk. 
  
Some institutions are more risk averse than others (with 
respect to both legal and PR risk). And even if the 
institution is okay with the policy, individual clinicians 
are not willing to take the risk or even invest the time 
the policy requires. (T. Pope, personal communication, 
Jan. 9th, 2019).  
     
     The futility policy was viewed by participants from uncertainty that it was even 
used to a certainty that it is a policy without a population. This policy, which exists in 
many facilities as well as legislation in Texas, seems to be an object that symbolizes 
the intersection between practice, ethics, and law. Clinicians, and these participants, 
have a clear view that there are treatments that they prefer not to do or prolong yet 
seem incapable of stopping them. Futility policies were meant as a force to reduce 
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by participants, going against parental autonomy has very few, if any, test cases 
outside of Hunt v DFS, which was a state case in Delaware and therefore not relevant 
in other states (Hunt v. DFS, 2015).  
     This type of policy seems stuck in a sort of limbo where, in this case, the 
participants that were direct bedside caregivers were aware of it but unsure about its 
use. Other participants discussed the feasibility of its use while acknowledging if you 
don’t use it then it will not ever work. There was also a sense, as reported by some 
participants, that unless you have a united front it won’t go forward.  
     The brain death policy, which in this institution as with many others, is influenced 
by professional society policy statements and formulated from state law, played 
another role in this case. While the testing itself was performed by clinicians well-
trained and experienced in performing brain death examinations, clearly the child was 
not brain dead. Since the ventilator was still in place the child was able to initiate a 
breath. From the data it seems that participants viewed this as an aberrant finding that 
didn’t change the overall status of their view that he was, for all intents and purposes, 
dead from the view of his personhood, or “neo-cortically dead” as ICUPULM states. 
The brain death policy is simply a line in the sand we as a society have drawn as 
objects like the ventilator have skewed the conception of life and death. In this case, 
these two things worked together to complicate the situation and evoked differing 
views and decisions for this child. 
     The Hospital’s fear of bad publicity and legal ambiguity shift the path of least 
resistance and ceding to parents against what clinicians in their expertise feel is 
appropriate. There is an odd sort of logic that came forward in the data from the 
physician and ethicist participants that acknowledges the interventions being asked 
for are not appropriate and/or non-beneficial, and maybe even futile. Yet these 
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expertise because other agents involved requested them and the agencies at the higher 
level are unprepared, or even fearful, to back up the expert opinion. Intractable 
conflict, in one view, appears as a problem of our own making.  
     In critically analyzing this there are some reasonable arguments against it. One 
could say that once they are declared dead that is it, and clinicians should remove all 
medical treatments that are thus inappropriate for a deceased person and not offer or 
allow forty-eight hours for family to gather. After all, they are dead, it is tragic, but a 
child dying is inherently tragic, and the presence or absence of medical equipment 
does not change this. However, I would challenge this logical practice against the 
personal interaction of explaining this to a family member. Many parents don’t get to 
say goodbye to their children when they die, but this may not be an argument to 
justify the instant removal of life support. Suppose one parent is on their way and one 
is present. Both parents may fully understand that their child is dead but there is 
something about saying goodbye that is morally relevant and may assign a moral 
claim towards bedside staff. I may personally believe that a child near brain dead is 
dead but the ability to touch my child’s warm body one last time has such a powerful 
feeling that I would find it hard to be so cold as to deny this. 
     Another factor around brain death is that some children declared dead by 
neurological criteria qualify for organ donation. In this case these children may be 
kept alive on the ventilator, sometimes longer than forty-eight hours. The issue of the 
forty-eight-hour grace period within this policy seems to be less of an issue in this 
case. Instead it seems that this case was an anomaly as it concerns brain death. It just 
so happens that this child took some agonal breaths, and this seems to indicate more 
that it is an aberrant finding and not necessarily a policy failure; though it could be an 
indication of needed modification. I don’t know that the logical conclusion to his 
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sooner. If anything, it would argue that this case was unique, or that our definition of 
death by neurologic criteria is too strict, or not strict enough depending on your view. 
From the perspective of the participants it is clear that for all intents and purposes, in 
their view, this child was dead. 
     In this case the tracheotomy and the ventilator were key artifacts with significant 
meaning. The tracheotomy was the key to life for the child and a great sense of fear to 
the nursing staff. It is also the reason he stayed in the PICU rather than transferring to 
a lower acuity floor or discharging home. It is also interesting that after his 
neurological devastation, there was more stability and seemingly less fear about it. 
However, while the tracheotomy was seen as an object of fear and necessity, the 
ventilator became more present as an impacting artifact during the later timepoint 
where the intractable conflict began. 
     The ventilator within the context of a child with a devastating neurological injury 
seems to play a very significant role in how we conceptualize the situation. Without 
the presence of a ventilator this child, and many others, would not be alive. Their 
hearts would stop because nothing would be ventilating the lungs and providing 
oxygen for the heart. The feeding tube can be said to do almost as much in this 
context, and it was mentioned sort of as an aside in the data, but the ventilator seems 
to hold a unique position from the perspectives of the participants and the family.  
     The ventilator has become a main staple of intensive care for its ability to not only 
save lives but provide a means for sustaining life, an object that provides the ability to 
obtain organs for donation more effectively, and at the same time a focal point of 
disagreement. In this case it seems to have allowed the child to continue to provide 
some adequate biological survival while having questionable personhood as perceived 
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life and death, and brain death. 
      
Conclusion 
     A critical systems analysis of the structure around this case finds several different 
parties acting in ways consistent with their role.  Through separating the parts that exist 
around this case we can see how each are set to work separately and together. Most 
relevant is the competing interests around a child in this particular context, power 
differentials, and inevitability. The lack of practical policies, or the lack of support to 
use them also played a role. There have been several cases invoking futility and conflict 
around children, even when there is a policy. As in this case, the system seems to 
function fine if all parties are in agreement and the normal process is followed. When 
things deviate, differing goals arise, adversarial stances are taken, and there is no 
measure of failure save organ failure and death, then the stage seems set towards 
intractable conflict.  
     As the case deviated in what the normal structure is designed for, ambiguity around 
responsibilities also emerged and conflict began. This suggests that when a system is 
set up for a specific type of patients, deviation from this results in much ambiguity 
around responsibility and sets the stage increasing conflict. As the competing interests 
become more adversarial, the level of risk increased towards an institutional one. In 
this way, institutional risk carries more weight than moral or clinical risk of the 
caregivers as risk was only considered once it got to an organizational level.  
     This critical systems analysis provides a part by part view of the whole system. Each 
part appeared to work well within their role in relation to the other parts. In this 
working, an ambiguous power differential emerged around how decisions are offered, 
presented, understood, and who makes them. Further complicating the matter is the 
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There appears to be an inherent tension that exists in pediatric care. 
     Risk aversion is found to have bearing once it gets to an organizational level while 
inevitability seems to indicate risk being felt at the bedside almost from the point of 
admission. There is inherent risk in a PICU but the data from this case provides a rich 
description that goes beyond normal risk. The fear around the probability of this child 
decompensating was so entrenched that it built a moral accountability around the child 
within the unit. 
     There are some major implications here for the connection, or disconnect as in this 
case, between clinical and organizational ethics. If we take a best interests standard 
there are problematic positions present, particularly if the hospital took a position of 
risk aversion knowing it was against the child’s best interests. As noted in this chapter, 
the hospital has valid reasons for this, however, it presents some problems towards the 
clinical staff that must be addressed, particularly in considering moral distress, moral 
hazard, and moral injury. At the very least, it begs a question around the obligations a 
hospital has to a particular patient and a potential patient such as the community. Taking 
a risk averse stance against the ethical action for a particular patient within the 
institution built on an obligation to the community may be ethically precarious as a 
utilitarian argument within an arguably individualistic duty-based institution. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
 
     This study showed that when the care of a child falls outside the normal 
established system, when there is ambiguous and conflicting practices of 
responsibility and power, and a breakdown of the moral community happens, 
intractable conflict emerges. Nurses in this case bore a large amount of responsibility 
that was absent from the decisions around the child’s care. Competing interests, 
particularly involving risk aversion, can potentially overshadow the child’s best 
interests and show a weakness in using principle-based ethical theories alone. This 
case highlighted complex competing ethical interests and divisions within a complex 
system.  
      This study also found an inability to define failure among shifting goals while 
decision-making did not consider moral hazard nor feelings of inevitability. These 
shifting goals and adversarial divisions led to parallel and incongruent goals between 
different parties involved. Feelings of inevitability may have been a signal that early 
discussions and agreement on failure may help avoid the intractability of conflict. 
Overall these findings speak to a need for early identification of complex cases and 
need to tend to the moral community through presence and continuity. These complex 
cases will not be solved by simple algorithmic policies and instead require 
recognition, attention, and work. Put simply, there is no solution that doesn’t involve 
time spent in the moral spaces where these cases, and other ethical dilemmas in 
healthcare, exist. Time spent in communication is necessary and must be supported. 
     While examining a particular case could lead one towards blaming a specific party, 
everyone in this case acted within the abilities and capacities of their role, as noted in 
the critical analysis. The findings from this study shows the things that exist to lead to 
intractable conflict. The choices and paths taken and reported by persons involved in 
this case are all credible options chosen from a way of reasoning that is allowable or 
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to say is that this happened within the confines of the social structure that exists, 
certain actions by parties involved may be disagreeable another party but they are 
within the confines of what is allowable. In this same way, ethical dilemmas, whether 
they be futility conflicts or health inequities, are resultant from the way in which the 
larger healthcare system works and functions. Through this study we can also see how 
there is a system and moral community set up for a specific type of care and 
deviations from this can lead to intractable conflict. A system set up for a specific 
type of care will inherently devalue or depower some care. 
     In the literature, particularly in the case of Baby K, Jahi McMath, Charlie Gard 
and others, we can see that similar and higher levels of conflict were reached (Annas, 
1994; J. Paris, 2015; J. J. Paris et al., 1990; Wilkinson & Savulescu, 2019). These 
cases could also be said to extreme cases on their own, and ones that don’t happen 
frequently. However, this way of thought diminishes the amount of moral work, time, 
and resources these cases require, in addition to the amount of moral distress and 
injury on all parties. If one party in any of these cases was clearly in the wrong, there 
would not have been such a high amount of involvement because there would be a 
clear path forward. These cases cause a large amount of conflict because the questions 
they stimulate are difficult to answer but tending to them can tell us valuable things 
about the way in which we practice as healthcare providers.  
      In the literature, attempts to mitigate these cases have been discussed by many 
authors, societies, and groups (see chapter 2). However, the focus of these attempts 
have been on definitional clarity and then procedures after the fact (Bosslet et al., 
2015; Kon et al., 2016; Nelson & Nelsom, 1992). The conceptualization or feeling of 
futility exists independent of the word used to name it. The attempts to mitigate these 
cases through policy and procedure seem to only make the conflicts worse. Mitigation 
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case, and could lead to further ethical issues around justice (Carnevale, 1998; Robert 
D. Truog, 2007). 
     One author, who is a clinician and ethicist has begun to explore the complexity of 
decisions similar to futility within the neonatal population. Wilkinson provides a 
framework for decision-making that recognizes different zones wherein there is a grey 
area between parental discretion and unilateral decisions (Wilkinson, 2013). This 
begins to get at the nuance and uncertainty around the spaces where these cases 
happen but continues to address it through logical principal based and end-result 
focused strategies. Some principal and policy interventions may be necessary in 
combination with the recognition that these cases require moral and intimate work at 
the bedside as well. Wilkinson, in a later work, does discuss the idea of refocusing 
and embracing disagreement, which speaks to this study’s conclusion that we 
recognize the need for tending to these cases through moral work rather than 
interventions (Wilkinson & Savulescu, 2019). We can hand families, nurses, and 
physicians all the policies we want but we must also tend to ways in which 
responsibility is practiced at the bedside, in the moral space. 
      These situations are conflicts between aggregate interests, relations, and 
responsibilities. Framing these dilemmas by their end result may only help to continue 
their existence. Carnevale, an ethicist and nurse, proposes examining how the futility 
discourse and debate itself requires analysis (Carnevale, 1998, p. 516). Carnevale 
examines the discourse around futility through a constructionist lens and, much like 
this study, suggests that we ought to look at the context and how “…problems are 
constructed and negotiated (Carnevale, 1998, p. 516).” Instead of seeking definitional 
clarity as a way to stop what is distressing some participants we should instead 
investigate, as this study has done, what is going on, the context, and how 
  
161 responsibilities are practiced around these cases, as well as other types of ethical 
conflicts. As Carnevale, in reference to futility debates, states: 
Framing these struggles in terms of a futility discourse 
disregards this inherent strife over trust, respect and 
power; indeed, futility talk seems to perpetuate these 
problems further (Carnevale, 1998, p. 515). 
 
     Not only does the current method of futility discourse ignore issues of trust, 
respect, and power, it ignores how our social constructions within and around 
healthcare work to produce the conditions for such a thing as the concept of futility to 
exist or be invoked. The major findings of this study can be separated into three 
themes: findings around conceptualizations of futility, how the moral community is 
constructed and negotiated, and the connection between clinical and organizational 
ethics.  
 
Differences in Conceptualization of futility: The organ, personhood, and practice 
perspectives 
     Much of the futility debate rests on the notion of qualitative versus quantitative or 
subjective and objective futility. As much as we try to move away from futility, we 
realize how ubiquitous the concept really is in our practice. While changing the terms 
to inappropriate and non-beneficial may seem to pull us out of the logical word games 
around literal futility they continue to keep us anchored to ideas of objective and 
subjective use of the concept. Objective futility is the obvious ventilation of lungs on 
a person with no head, this could be considered an organ-view of futility. This is 
similar to how ICUPULM describes the ventilator in this case in that it wasn’t futile 
in the context that it would ventilate the lungs but overall it would not fix the 
neurological injury, the person.  
     The nurse participants discussed futility related to the probability of their work 
being successful and towards a personhood view. There is an element in this study 
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goals. RN1 discussed futility around reconstructing the trachea in terms of probability 
of a successful outcome. RN2 described the futility in the case around the work they 
did and the lack of success. RN3 discussed futility in quality of life or the ability to 
provide a quality life for the child through their work. 
After his second hit, there was nothing. He would just 
have this twitching, and sometimes nothing at all. I just 
didn't feel like there was anything in there, and if there 
was something in there, it was painful to him, or like 
futility: no matter what we did, we would never get him 
to have any quality of life. No matter what. (RN3) 
 
     CM gave some descriptive context to a conceptualization of futility in this case. 
CM noted that there was no ability to recover any meaningful improvement in the 
child’s quality of life. Of note, is that this conceptualization gives comparative 
thought to previous levels of function as well as state of ability to interact with the 
world. SW also described futility through quality of life and ability to interact. 
Ethicist described quantitative versus qualitative futility but also invoked a sense of 
ability to experience as being relevant to the concept of futility. 
     Since qualitative and quantitative futility seem set to continue being invoked in 
futility it seems logical to look critically at the concept terminology itself as 
problematic. Do we move towards inappropriate and non-beneficial? These terms 
seem to fall victim to the same sense of ambiguity and value-laden issues that 
qualitative futility does. After all, who decides what is beneficial? There are certainly 
two concepts of futility as certainly treating blood loss with antibiotics is clearly futile 
as is CPR for a body in rigor mortis. This type of futility may be considered organ-
view futility as it is referenced when a particular treatment has no benefit towards 
achieving an intended goal for a specific organ. This may also be viewed as goal-
specific futility. There is also the more value-laden and problematic aspect of 
  
163 qualitative futility which has been somewhat replaced by potentially inappropriate 
non-beneficial.  
     What do we mean by “qualitative futility?” From the participants in this study 
there is a comparative sense to their conceptions of futility. When quality of life was 
invoked it was in relation to a previous level of functioning. This shows that futility is 
conceptualized as a reduction in level of functioning from a previous state. This could 
be considered a personhood view of futility. In regard to neurologic status, when the 
child sustained an insult to which he no longer was acting and interacting within his 
previous level of functioning, participants viewed this as futile. The child no longer 
had personhood, or his personhood. In this conceptualization a child with some 
neurologic injury at birth may have personhood in their beginning level of functioning 
and if sustained further injury and lost some functioning may lose personhood. 
Personhood futility is futile in that treatments to sustain life cannot recover what made 
someone a person, in fact they may no longer be a person. In this way a treatment 
could be considered inappropriate and non-beneficial to the loss of personhood. 
     Rather than finding the right definition it may be more productive to pay attention 
to the feelings that surround it. The practice view of futility provides some insight into 
this approach. Subjective and value-laden terms should be embraced rather than 
tossed aside. If nurses are not feeling like their interventions and care have any utility 
this should spark conversations. Not to say that doubt around success should always 
indicate futility or mean that care should stop, but it may signal a need to begin 
managing interests and expectations. Value-laden sentiments should be legitimized, 
explored, and acknowledged within a moral community, particularly in the context of 
resource allocation within the hospital and out in the community. 
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or function of these organs, but this seems reductive to the person. If we view people 
as a being through their personhood then futility lies in the nature of their self. 
Personhood is complicated and the subject of much neuroscientific debate (Farah & 
Heberlein, 2007). As found in this case, there was an idea of who the child was and 
then an absence of it. If, as the nurse participants reported, the interventions being 
enacted won’t succeed in achieving an overall goal than there is a feeling of futility in 
practice. This way of thinking about futility gives us three different views of futility: 
organ-view, personhood, and practice. 
     Despite ongoing debates around conceptualizing and defining futility, the 
participants in this study mostly conceived of futility through qualitative or subjective 
measures. This suggests that, overall, the participants in this study conceive of futility 
qualitatively relating to the absence of the ability to interact and engage with one’s 
surroundings; a personhood view of futility. While the term itself, from a logical 
standpoint, is problematic, the fact that there is a more qualitative view from 
caregivers suggests that no matter the nomenclature, it has a presence in practice, and 
this is important to the social structure of the moral community. Futility exists 
regardless of what we call it, however, reconceptualizing it into organ, personhood, 
and practice views may help us to reorient its meaning and use in practice. 
      
Bearing Witness, Moral Hazard, and Moral Distress and the Moral Community 
     Through participant narratives we can see how the moral community around the 
care of a child is constructed and negotiated. Though terms like moral distress have 
been around for some time there is a need to dig deeper into how and why this type of 
distress can exist. In this case, there are several themes present that shed light on how 
the moral community is negotiated. There were feelings of distress from nurses caring 
  
165 for the child with decisions being made by those not at the bedside. There was 
acknowledgment from participants around distress felt by direct caregiving staff such 
as nurses and intensivists. Moral distress and moral hazard seem to be intricately 
linked.  
     Through participant narratives, practices of responsibility were highlighted that 
explicate how the moral community constructs itself through a socially embodied 
ethic. There was a variation in when and who was responsible for what. There were 
unclear but expected responsibilities that led to adversarial feelings and deflections of 
responsibility that led to distress. There were also unspoken community 
responsibilities that seemed to show a united moral community among nurses. The 
evidence of this socially constructed moral community comes through particularly 
when it broke down, when the conflict emerged. An important concept that aided in 
identifying how the process of responsibility was constructed is the concept of 
bearing witness. 
    Who is and is not bearing witness is important to the moral community (Cody & 
Milton, 2001; Djkowich, Ceci, & Petrovskaya, 2019). It was felt that parents were not 
present at the bedside partaking in the care of the child where staff felt obligations 
were present. In particular, the absence of parents during the child’s recovery and 
rehab period and his episodes irritability and decompensations invokes strong sense 
from the data that nurses were taking on the responsibility and burden. The bedside 
staff were responsible for taking the entirety of the child’s care, the good times and 
the difficult times, and there was an animosity towards parents for not partaking or 
witnessing these experiences. The feeling of not bearing witness, from the nurses, is 
seen as a parental deflection of responsibility and a rift in what should be a moral 
community that sees nurses and parents united. 
  
166      Related to this practice of bearing witness is the concept of moral hazard. None of 
the decision-makers were, arguably, the ones involved in the day-to-day physical and 
mental care of this child. This is observed in many of the narrative themes around 
moral hazard and distress. The nurse participants discussed this by reporting 
confusion in who had control of the decisions, conflict between the medical team’s 
goals and parent’s goals, and their view that he was, at timepoint four, never going to 
be himself and was essentially dead. Bearing witness, moral hazard, and moral 
distress seem intricately linked in the construction and existence of the moral 
community. These conceptual pillars of the moral community are evident in this case 
because they broke down, but are certainly present in positive conceptualizations, or 
in positive polarities, organizationally, clinically, and professionally. Paying more 
attention to the connections between communities in care rather than individualistic 
notions of care may aid in navigating these situations more constructively. 
      
The relationship between clinical and organizational ethics 
     Viewing ethical issues as independent dilemmas reduces our ability to examine the 
elements that contribute to them. There is a need to connect clinical ethics to 
organizational ethics in order to expand the view of ethics and of ethical problems. In 
this case, and the critical systems analysis, we can see how the many parts involved 
within this particular structure worked together to lead to the intractable conflict. 
Ignoring the connection between organizational structures and clinical decisions leads 
to a reductive view of ethical dilemmas as isolated incidents and ignores the 
complexity that is present. By acknowledging the relationship between clinical and 
organizational ethics we can began to take a more broad view of how interactions 
influence care and improve the way we provide care. 
  
167      In this research, there are clear links between decisions made at the bedside and 
decisions made at the organizational level. The hospital had to weigh the risks 
involved with going against family and doing what the clinicians’ thought was best 
for the child versus taking the path of least risk and allowing the child to be 
maintained. For their part, the physicians, without the support of the hospital looked 
at taking on all of the risk alone. The physician participants in this study discuss how 
they pursued using the hospital futility policy, which is a deliberative process similar 
to many futility policies present in other hospitals. The participants discuss the 
difficulty around implementing the policy and overriding the parents without a 
precedent, in their state, doing so. The hospital, for their part, must balance acceding 
to parental wishes and avoiding risk even if it seems against the best interests for the 
child according to the clinicians. Unfortunately, with legal risk avoided, the moral risk 
fell completely to the bedside caregivers. 
     Only one state has a “futility” policy set in law. The Texas Advance Directives Act 
(TADA) of 1999 is a dispute resolution process that was passed to provide an efficient 
and fair adjudicatory process around medical futility (Pope, 2017). The problems found 
in this study around the fear of being the first hospital or physician group to go against 
parental requests would be lessened by a state law protecting clinicians from litigation 
through a process such as the TADA. However, there are some criticisms of this law, 
particularly in its seemingly inequitable use against African American families, the ease 
at which it can become a rubber stamp, and its diminishment of the value in discussion 
and understanding with parents (Robert D. Truog, 2007; Robert D. Truog & Mitchell, 
2006). While it seems that legal policy may aid clinicians in resolution or refusal in the 
context of care deemed futile, there are some concerns around the use of these laws and 
the institutional power it provides. Overall, this speaks to the importance of time spent 
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of presence with families at the bedside, consistent with the findings of this study. 
 
 
Implications for research, practice, and education: 
 
     One major implication from this study is the need to move away from only looking 
at ethical dilemmas as independent occurrences and searching for simple and 
unilateral solutions. We need to view ethical dilemmas as resultant from the way we 
have set up our systems. This view can help us identify ways in which our structures 
work to cause unintended consequences, self-defeating practices, and conflicts in 
care. Many of the problems faced in healthcare are happening because of the way we 
have chosen to value certain systems, types of care, and payment models. For 
instance, we focus more on interventional and rescue care in the US, but we lag 
behind in preventative care and social programs that affect health (Papanicolas, 
Woskie, & Jha, 2018). The US focuses more on individualism than community, and 
healthcare is set up accordingly, (except it seems when organizational risk is 
involved). 
     Our individualistic values create systems set up for certain types of patients that 
follow the particular expected pathway, namely ones who are deemed to have no fault 
in their illness. Autonomy, in our society, is a simpler concept to translate to 
judgements compared with best interests (Garrett, 2018). When care falls outside this 
norm, we see conflict and seemingly intractable problems. The way we view who is 
responsible for what, and how moral claims, dependency, and vulnerabilities are 
distributed is important to how moral spaces are constructed and negotiated (Walker, 
2007). The way these spaces are lived in can influence who speaks and is heard. 
While this case, and most other futility discussions, center around clinicians’ feelings 
of futility, it is a legitimate worry that there are cases where families may think an 
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disagrees. Our moral assumptions and norms often hide the very viewpoints that 
construct these moral spaces. Conflict and distress emerge from these interpersonal 
and social features of morality when they are hidden (Walker, 2007). 
     Moving away from only using ethical principles and towards naturalized bioethics, 
such as Walker’s expressive-collaborative model of morality, can help refocus us 
towards examining what is going on within the spaces around these problems. Using 
systems theory and critical realism to examine the inherent parts and relations within 
the complexity of the space where something is happening and using Walker’s model 
of morality to examine the particular way persons are negotiating their responsibilities 
can help us examine how we establish better systems. Rather than finding an external 
principle or solution and applying it simply, we should look within the complexity, 
acknowledge it, and tend to the voices that exist within it. 
     In nursing education this may be accomplished by examination of critical cases as 
they unfold through time, being mindful of different perspectives and relationships. 
Increased clinical opportunities that allow nursing students to follow a patient through 
many different interactions in and out of the hospital and over time. Additional study 
in health systems and policy with a focus on how these affect individual patients. 
Policy and systems study within the context of how they affect health would help 
nursing students gain insight into the complexity of health. Knowledge could also be 
gained by more education into how patients fit into healthcare as complex adaptive 
systems. 
 
Rethinking the Moral Community 
     The findings in this study highlight the need to rethink how we examine these 
cases and suggests a need to pay attention to the moral community. The many 
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silent when it came to mediation and mitigation. This separation from the choices 
being discussed and the intimate work within the case should be eliminated. The 
persons doing the moral work of caring for this child should be in the discussions 
around what was being decided for him. Involvement in these discussions may not 
change the course of actions taken but would force a more open dialogue between 
those making the decisions and those who will bear the impact. Open dialogue will 
promote more insight in all parties as each person will be able to present their 
viewpoint and view of their responsibility and would aid in understanding that may 
help manage distress and conflict. 
 
Continuity, early identification, and management: the role of nursing and ethics 
     While this study cannot be generalizable, it does present some implications for 
attending to these cases going forward. The findings suggest moving away from the 
search for definitional clarity, categories, and algorithms when dealing with ethical 
conflicts. Instead, this study suggests that we should embrace complexity, recognize 
it, and tend to it. We spend significant time and energy trying to find a solution to 
these problems with policies and concepts. We should acknowledge that these cases 
require identification and management. If nothing else, this case should show us that 
when there are feelings that the interventions contain some feelings of inevitability, or 
are experimental, then conversations should begin among parents and clinicians.  
     One way to do this is to utilize the clinical ethics service, or a nurse care manager 
adept at discussing goals of care and decision-making similar to a palliative care 
clinician. Further research is needed into how to identify these cases, and this may be 
unique to each institution. Once identified, as this case proves, there is a need for 
continuity, early communication, and management of the moral space and 
  
171 community. This could be a reasonable task for a palliative care or ethics consult 
service, though it may not be a feasible use of a palliative care services time as this 
does not necessarily require medical management. A clinical ethicist or nurse ethicist 
seems well positioned to fit within the role of managing complexity around ethical 
issues such as this case and other ethical issues that abound in and around healthcare. 
 
Conclusion 
     This study presents a new approach to examining ethical dilemmas within 
healthcare. Using feminist ethics, or naturalized bioethics, via Walker’s expressive-
collaborative model of morality to examine the social construction of morality around 
an ethical issue provides a unique and inclusive way to examine how initial 
conditions, identities, relationships, and responsibilities are negotiated. Critically 
analyzing the dynamic structure and complex adaptive system through critical realist 
theory and methodology of systems theory provides a way to model the causal powers 
and mechanisms that work together to produce outcomes. Future research around 
futility and intractable conflict should be focused towards what is happening that is 
causing these situations to come into being, and towards identification and 
management of ethical issues as resultant from how we evolve and operate within a 
community and structured systems. 
 
Limitations 
      There was one important limitation to this study, the absence of parental voices. 
There is a lack of parental voices within academic literature in general. Some recent 
journals have addressed this by publishing parental narratives. While this study 
attempted to include parents, they chose not to participate. ENT, and hospital 
  
172 administration was also unable to participate or declined. Interpretation and analysis 
is always subject to the researcher.
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